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EXETER

NOTICE

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THE MYSTERY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

By THE REV D G. H. TAVARD, A.A.

ACCORDING to the Divine scheme of redemption which was thought out and achieved in Christ, the revelation of the Holy Ghost was due to proceed slowly from the Apostles' experience of our Lord's humanity. The knowledge of his humanity gradually raised in the Apostles' mind the question of the mysterious personality of Jesus, of the uncommon spiritual strength which they dimly but more and more distinctly perceived through his ordinary human words and actions. Through this progressive insight into the mystery of the man Jesus, the Apostles came to know—very imperfectly as yet—the mystery of Jesus, the Father's Son, and, correlatively, the mystery of the Father. 'Have I been so long a time with you, and hast thou not known me, Philip? he that hath seen me hath seen the Father.' (John xiv, 9.)

Such a revelation of the Father could not be brought about without an obscure experience of the Spirit of God, who 'will guide you into all truth' (John xvi, 13). Indeed, the revelation of the Father and the Son, although darkening to our discursive intelligence, is the most adequate revelation of the Holy Ghost, of whom St John, whose religious penetration is so enlightening on the mystery of the Holy Trinity, said that 'He shall not speak of himself, but whatsoever he shall hear, that shall he speak' (id.). And what does the Spirit 'hear', besides the everlasting conversation of the Father and the Son, besides the movement—that he is—of the Son from and to the Father?

A great proof of the efficiency of our theology would be given if we could always say that the movement of theological reflexion on the Third Person of the Holy

Trinity follows the very movement by which the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. Such a line of approach to the mystery of the Third Person would undoubtedly force our theology to come back to its Scriptural and patristic sources, there to be invigorated with an ever-new life. At the same time, and this is the particular point which the present paper is meant to stress, it would bring our theology nearer to the real discovery of the Holy Ghost in the spiritual life. For, if we may adopt Gabriel Marcel's vocabulary, the Holy Ghost is not a 'problem', but a 'mystery'. He is not a 'problem', because he is not a set of proportions proposed to our intelligence which, since we enjoy abstract reasoning, we can put in the form of equation most satisfactory to our more or less methodical minds. The Holy Ghost is not a 'problem'; he is a 'mystery', a Person in whose life we are called upon to take part as persons. 'For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God' (Rom., VIII, 14). We cannot solve a 'mystery', because it would involve an attack upon our very being, which receives the best of its life precisely from the deepest 'mysteries'; we cannot solve it, but we can learn to live in it according to its own laws.

It is a privilege of the highest mystical states that they offer an experimental approximation to the mystery of the Holy Trinity and to the final 'knot' wherein the life of God is found in its endless ineffable movement, the Holy Spirit. The following pages will try to show how the experience of the Spirit is presented in *The Spiritual Canticle* and *The Living Flame* of St John of the Cross. As the recognized Doctor of mystical life, St John of the Cross, who, besides being a privileged mystic, was a learned theologian, can help us to mould our theology on the pattern of the life of God, which, after all, is the only thing that really matters.

* * *

The law of Incarnation is applied in the mystical life, in which the knowledge of Christ's humanity is the way leading to the knowledge of the Holy Ghost. Thus it is in *The Spiritual Canticle*. The first eleven stanzas of it present a soul in search of her beloved, Christ, and growing in the intimacy of his humanity, from which she comes to understand the spiritual meaning of his mediation, to know that Christ's body is a way to his spirit and that his spirit is a way to the Divine Spirit. In the development of a spiritual life, it is only during the spiritual betrothal and, more substantially, during the spiritual marriage, that such a purified understanding of the mission of Christ is reached. Even then, it is reached only because of a joint communication of the Word and of the Holy Ghost; the knowledge of the Holy Ghost becomes thus an integral part of the knowledge of Christ. We shall examine briefly how the Person of the Holy Ghost is obscurely but distinctly apprehended in this joint communication.

* * *

The knowledge of the Holy Ghost is given together with a knowledge of Jesus as Word. Nevertheless, in that ineffable communication of two Divine Persons, there is a distinct experience of each of them.

Let us take one of the most beautiful passages where St John of the Cross speaks of the experience of the Word, *The Spiritual Canticle*, st. 36 (second redaction). In this passage, the knowledge of the Word appears to be the consciousness of a sudden invasion of the soul by him whom she desired. It is an impression made by one who is at the same time present and transcendent. His presence gives rise to an incredible sweetness in the soul. "Let us rejoice, Beloved", that is to say, in the communication of the sweetness of love, not only in that which we already have in the habitual joining together and union of us both, but in that which overflows in the exercise of effective and actual love, whether

interiorly with the will in the act of affection, or exteriorly, in the performance of works belonging to the service of the Beloved.' (*Sp.C.*, st. 36, n. 4; Vol. II, p. 380.)¹

In the interior sweetness which marks his presence, the Beloved is known as being essentially transcendent. His beauty surpasses all other beauty; yet, because he adorns the soul with his own beauty, he is in a way like the soul. 'Let us so act that we may be alike in beauty, and that Thy beauty may be such that, when one of us looks at the other, each may be like to Thee in Thy beauty, and may see himself in Thy beauty, which will be the transforming of me in Thy beauty.' (*Sp.C.*, st. 35, 1st red., n. 3; Vol. II, p. 164.)

This twofold character of the Word, who is both transcendent and immanent, different and similar, unlike and like the soul whom he is adorning, makes possible a perfect union between them. 'Thus I shall see Thee in Thy beauty and Thou wilt see me in Thy beauty; and Thou wilt see Thyself in me in Thy beauty, and I shall see myself in Thee in Thy beauty; and thus I may be like to Thee in Thy beauty, and Thou mayest be like to me in Thy beauty, and my beauty may be Thy beauty and Thy beauty my beauty; and I shall be Thou in Thy beauty, and Thou wilt be I in Thy beauty, because Thy beauty itself will be my beauty.' (*id.*) The mystical consciousness of the presence of the Spouse in the soul is that of the achievement of a unity in the assertion of a transcendence; it is the reception of an intimacy which transforms itself in prayer and, finally, in a deep longing after the unity of death. 'No longing for this life have I, who die because I do not die.' (*Poems*, Vol. II, p. 450.)

The sweetness of the knowledge of the Word is not given alone; for the Word is really known in the Holy

¹ All the texts of St John of the Cross will be taken from Allison Peers's translation.

Ghost. The experience of the Second Person has been brought about thanks to a simultaneous experience of the Third Person, which presents other characteristics. While the experience of the Word is essentially the consciousness of a presence, of a dialogue with the Beloved who remains in and with the soul, the experience of the Holy Spirit is the consciousness of a movement, of a 'breath of wind', which all of a sudden carries the soul away to its own goal.

In the spiritual marriage described by St John of the Cross, the soul is habitually enjoying an infused knowledge of the Holy Trinity. But that knowledge should not be conceived as completely changeless. It is not like the quiet waters at the bottom of a lake, which remain perfectly still when a light wind blows over the surface. The Trinitarian background of the spiritual marriage is rather like the wild bottom of the sea, from whose depths enormous waves surge to the surface. In St John of the Cross's language, the soul experiences sudden conflagrations of her faculties; all at once, she will feel burnt by a flame that is no other than the Holy Ghost. Under the fire of the Spirit, the soul becomes herself a 'living flame'; but that hardly expressible inner movement is not the work of the soul, who cannot but submit to it, and St John of the Cross speaks of a relation between that experience and the Holy Ghost even when, before the spiritual marriage, in the betrothal, the flame had not reached its full blaze and was only a slight mystical touch urging the soul to a greater generosity in love. 'By this breeze, the soul denotes the Holy Spirit, Who, as she says, awakens love; for, when this Divine breeze assails the soul, it enkindles it wholly and refreshes it and revives it and awakens the will and upraises the desires, which aforetime had fallen and were asleep, to the love of God, in such manner that it may well be said thereof that it awakens the love both of the Spouse and the Bride . . .' (*Sp.C.*, st 17, 2nd red., n. 4; Vol.

II, p. 283.) In the first touches of the experience of the Holy Ghost, which, as we have said, are felt in the course of the spiritual betrothal, the Third Person is perceived in the faculties as both the cause and the object of transitory acts of love; later, especially in the spiritual marriage, the Spirit makes himself known in a movement that tends to become a permanent substantial attitude of the soul, to be no longer the act of a faculty, but the very life and breathing of the soul in its substance. 'This feast of the Holy Spirit takes place in the substance of the soul, where neither the devil, nor the world, nor sense can enter' (*The Living Flame*, st. 1, 1st red., n. 9; Vol. II, p. 23).

As we shall see, the more substantial that living flame becomes, the more similar it is to the Divine procession of the Holy Ghost. But, before we reach this acme of the mystical experience of the Spirit, we have to note an important characteristic of the movement in which the Holy Ghost reveals himself.

In its relation to the Word, mystical experience was 'sweet'; it is 'burning' in its relation to the Holy Ghost. Whatever metaphors are used by St John of the Cross to express it, whether he speaks of a 'breath through the soul' (*Sp.C.*, st. 17, 2nd red., n. 5; Vol. II, p. 283), of 'wounds' (*Liv. Fl.*, st. 1, 1st red., n. 8, Vol. III, p. 23), of 'visits' (*Sp.C.*, annot. to st. 16, 2nd red., Vol. II, p. 275), the touch of the Spirit is always linked with a suffering. Naturally enough, this mystical suffering is first of all a pain in the body, unable to bear easily the communication of the Spirit. Such a suffering is not necessarily connected with the Holy Ghost, for it results from a law of all supernatural graces, which are always out of the range of man's means of natural knowledge. Deeper than that bodily pain, the mystics experience passive purifications of sense and of spirit, which are sources of heart-rending sufferings, because they are supernatural interventions in the struggle for perfection,

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to which they give an unwonted efficiency. Once again, that is not special to the communication of the Third Person; it only prepares it as it prepares all Trinitarian communications.

There is, however, besides those two causes of mystical suffering, a special 'wound' connected with a touch of the Holy Spirit. It is the main theme of *The Living Flame*:

'Oh, Living Flame of Love,

That tenderly woundest my soul in its deepest
centre . . .

Oh, sweet burn ! Oh, delectable wound . . .'
(st. 1; Vol. III, p. 18.)

In a word, we should say that it is a substantial suffering of the soul, which, under the light of a divine touch, suddenly experiences the finiteness of her being; with an extraordinary clarity, she sees as never before the essential limits of a creaturely state and, what is still more of a wound, the new limit that she has set to herself through her sins. From this point of view, the being of a creature, even when it is experiencing the communication of the Spirit, is essentially an obstacle to that communication; in her simultaneous knowledge of herself in her finiteness and of the Spirit in his infinity, the soul feels more and more acutely that she is an impediment to the mystical union which she is desiring. Hence an essential anxiety is part of the highest experience of the presence of God.

Although such a suffering cannot be eluded, we must note that the presence of the Holy Ghost, which on the one hand is the cause of it through the fierceness of its flame, on the other hand is the only possible remedy of the soul's anxiety. Unstable between the finite which draws her downwards and the Infinity of her Spouse who calls to her through the Spirit, the soul, under the guidance of the Holy Ghost, transforms her anxiety in humility and takes refuge in the virtue of hope, by which she will be stabilized.

* * *

Of these two characteristics of the experience of the Holy Ghost, who communicates himself through a movement the consequence of which is a deep wound in the substance of the soul, the first should be followed further. For that movement, which becomes more and more substantial as the soul reaches to and lives in the spiritual marriage, tends to become in the soul the very procession of the Holy Ghost in God.

That St John of the Cross really asserts such a development of the experience of the Spirit can be shown by the metaphor he uses. Before the full experience of the Holy Ghost, his metaphors seem to remain exterior both to the inner life of the Third Person and to the substantial part of the soul ; they express poetically a temporary influence felt by the soul and coming from the Spirit, but, as metaphors, their relevance is still superficial. The Holy Ghost is 'the air of the flight' (*Sp.C.*, st. 13, 2nd red., n. 11; Vol. II. p. 256), which carries the soul into contemplation, the 'torrent' that assails her (*Sp.C.*, st. 14, 2nd red., n. 9; Vol. II, p. 262), the 'south-west wind' that breathes through her garden (*Sp.C.*, st. 17, 2nd red., n. 9; Vol. II, p. 285), the 'amber' that sends forth perfume (*Sp.C.*, st. 18, 2nd red., n. 6; Vol. II, p. 289).

In *The Living Flame*, however, where the spiritual marriage is described at length, the metaphor of the flame brings us much deeper into the personality of the Holy Ghost: the Spirit is a Flame that burns through the soul and makes her become flame herself. The soul is then flame, living flame, in the very procession of the Holy Spirit. 'This flame of love is the Spirit of its Spouse—that is, the Holy Spirit. And this flame the soul feels within it, not only as a fire that has consumed and transformed it in sweet love, but also as a fire which burns within and sends out flame, as I have said, and that flame bathes the soul in glory and refreshes it with the temper of Divine life' (*Liv. Fl.*, st. 1, 1st red., n. 3; Vol. II, p. 20).

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The difference between the first metaphors and that of *The Living Flame* denotes a real deepening of experience. Granted that they are metaphors, we cannot set them aside as irrelevant; for mystical theology expresses under images what conceptual theology grasps through a rigorous purification of analogical judgements. Necessarily discursive because meant to be universal, the latter has to use intellectual concepts, while the former, which is individual and intuitive, will present the same realities under the cover of experimental—and experimented—comparisons. Thus, mystical theology, being a real knowledge, offers us a real expression of the mystery of God, although that expression is shaped in a language more affective than intellectual. This being so, it will be useful to our understanding of the experience of the Holy Ghost to consider how under the images of *The Spiritual Canticle* and of *The Living Flame* mystical experience joins hands with dogmatic theology: the Flame experienced by the soul in the spiritual marriage is no other than the procession of the Holy Ghost.

* * *

In the life of the Blessed Trinity, the Holy Ghost is himself a movement proceeding from the Father and the Son. 'This Flame of Love is the Spirit of the Spouse' (*Liv. Fl.*, id.). St John of the Cross develops this doctrine when speaking of his metaphor, 'the air of the flight'. 'This love which is produced by the flight He here most appropriately calls "air"', for the Holy Spirit, who is love, is also compared to air in the Divine Scripture, since He is the breath of the Father and the Son . . . He proceeds from the contemplation and wisdom of the Father and the Son, and is breathed . . . Love is union of the Father and the Son . . . ' (*Sp.C.*, st. 12, 2nd red., n. 11; Vol. II, p. 256). The divine procession of the Third Person is known in the very act in which the Spirit communicates himself to the soul. 'Even as there He is the air of the flight . . . so here the

Spouse calls this love of the soul "air", because it proceeds from the contemplation and knowledge which at this time the soul has of God . . . Even as love is union of the Father and the Son, even so also it is union of the soul with God' (id.). Similarly, the Holy Spirit is 'the forerunner' sent by the Son of God (*Sp.C.*, st. 17, 2nd red., n. 8; Vol. II, p. 284), the drink made of the pomegranates which are the mysteries of Christ. 'Even as from many pomegranate seeds there comes but one new wine when they are pressed, even so from all these wonders and grandeurs of God which are infused into the soul there overflows for her one fruition and one delight of love alone, which is the drink of the Holy Spirit' (*Sp.C.*, st. 37, 2nd red., n. 8; Vol. II, p. 388).

If the Holy Ghost who is given to the soul is perceived by her as being the Spirit of her Spouse, this means that essentially, according to his eternal procession, the Spirit is one with the Father and the Son, of whom he is the mutual interchange. His eternal movement of everlasting coming is, so to say, translated in the soul by a knowledge of the first two Persons in the Third; the Spirit is not a final object of mystical knowledge, but a substantial movement of love in which the Spouse, the Word of the Father and, through him, the Father, are made known experimentally.

* * *

The Holy Ghost is not only an eternal coming forth from the Father through the Son and, secondarily, in his temporal mission, an ever new irruption into the soul; he is moreover an eternal return to the Father. The theological doctrine of 'perichoresis' is well known; but this aspect of the Trinitarian life is more stressed in St John of the Cross than it is in speculative theology. A stanza of *The Spiritual Canticle* depicts the soul being carried by the Holy Ghost into the very bosom of the Holy Trinity. 'Breathing with that His Divine breath, He raises the soul most sublimely, and informs her,

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that she may breathe in God the same breath of love that the Father breathes in the Son and the Son in the Father, which is the same Holy Spirit that they breathe into her in the said transformation' (*Sp.C.*, st. 38, 1st red., n. 2; Vol. II, p. 176). The movement by which the Holy Ghost comes into the soul is also the movement by which he carries her into God; in the same way as, in God, the procession of the Spirit from the Father through the Son is his own return from the Son to the Father in their everlasting reciprocal union. Both those aspects of the life of the Third Person are experienced by the soul, who is granted 'the favour of attaining to being deiform and united in the Most Holy Trinity, wherein she becomes God by participation' (*Sp.C.*, st. 38, 1st red., n 3; Vol. II, p. 176). Nevertheless, the second movement seems to be more specially characteristic of the highest mystical states. 'The soul that is united and transformed in God breathes God in God with the same Divine breathing with which God, while in her, breathes her in Himself' (*id.*). 'The soul . . . is giving God in God to God Himself . . . For in this state the soul truly sees that God belongs to it, and that it possesses Him with hereditary possession, as an adopted child of God, by rightful ownership, through the grace that God gave to it of Himself, and it sees that, since He belongs to it, it may give and communicate Him to whomsoever it desires; and thus it gives Him to its Beloved, who is the very God that gave Himself to it' (*Liv. Fl.*, st 3, 1st red., n 68; Vol. III, p. 101). The eternal return of God to God, such as the soul experiences by participation, seems to be the highest point of mystical life.

That twofold participation of the soul in the life of the Third Person is enlightening on the nature of the spiritual life. Since the spiritual life, as theology says, is no other than the temporal mission of the Holy Ghost, and since by definition, a 'mission' is a temporal repre-

sentation of the eternal procession, the mystery of the Third Person must leave its mark on all genuine spiritual life. Such as he is and such as he comes to the soul, the Spirit is at the same time he who consoles and he who achieves. Consoler, and promised as such by the Son, he is always coming; and the created participation in his coming is the gift of grace, whether the first infusion of sanctifying grace or the everyday helps that we are granted or the irruption of mystical grace; received in the soul, he keeps consoling her in the expectation of her final meeting with the Spouse in eternal life. Being he who achieves, he is the last 'knot' of the Trinitarian life, the last move in which is accomplished a mutual eternal return between the Father and the Son: it is he who brings to perfection the sanctification of a soul.

* * *

Besides being a privileged approach to the mystery of the Holy Trinity, the mystical experience related by St John of the Cross makes possible a further knowledge of the nature of God. Our faith tells us that the Three Persons are One in their common nature. Thus, in the mystical states, each Person is known not only as Person, but as possessing the common Divine nature. The touch of the Holy Ghost transforms the mystic's knowledge of the Divine attributes: 'Omnipotence, goodness, wisdom, justice, mercy and so forth' (*Liv. Fl.*, st. 3, 1st red., n. 2; Vol. III, p. 60) literally invade the soul and give her a new ineffable knowledge of the nature of God. The attributes thus experienced are not known as abstract qualifications, but as different aspects of the Trinitarian life. 'As each of these things is the very being of God in one single simple reality, which is the Father or the Son or the Holy Spirit, each attribute being God Himself and God being infinite light and infinite Divine fire, it follows from this that in each of these attributes, which, as we say, are innumerable,

and are His virtues, He gives light and burns as God' (id.). St John of the Cross dwells on that seeming side-issue of mystical knowledge, which forms the theme of stanza three in *The Living Flame*: 'Oh, lamps of fire, in whose splendours the deep caverns of sense which were dark and blind, with strange brightness, give heat and light together to their Beloved' (id., p. 59). If we remember that the usual tendency of speculative theologians is to leave aside the question of the divine attributes as appertaining to a philosophical domain preliminary to theology itself, it is striking that mystical knowledge proceeds in an opposite fashion, the knowledge of the attributes of the divine nature following the experience of the Three Persons.

* * *

Summarizing what St John of the Cross wrote concerning the Third Person, we obtain the following points.

—The mystical knowledge of the Holy Ghost is the consciousness of a spiritual movement in the soul, which is accompanied by a spiritual pain;

—this movement tends to take the very shape of the eternal procession, in which the soul comes to know the Son and the Father;

—this union with the Blessed Trinity ultimately shows in each Person God as God, in the oneness of the Divine nature.

Such an experience of the Holy Ghost at the summit of mystical life is not surprising. For after all the theologians have noted that the Third Person is more especially given in grace.

Among others, the testimony of St Bonaventure is particularly interesting, for the Seraphic Doctor was both a great mystical writer and a great speculative theologian. He wrote: 'Etenim cum ipsa et in ipsa (=gratia) datur Spiritus Sanctus, qui est donum increatum, optimum et perfectum, quod descendit a

Patre luminum per Verbum incarnatum . . . ' (*Breviloquium*, P.V., chap. 1, n. 2); 'Fides et Scriptura determinat . . . quod absque dono increato, quod est Spiritus Sanctus, homo non potest fieri Deo acceptus nec assumi in adoptionem filiorum Dei'. (*II Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2); 'Spiritus Sanctus est donum, in quo omnia alia dona donantur, et qui est fons omnium donorum' (id., ad 1). Among the gifts which are given 'in' the Holy Ghost, St Bonaventure points out the so-called 'gifts of the Holy Ghost', which, to his mind, are at work all along the life of progress in virtue. That life itself leads to an intimate union with Christ on his cross in poverty and purity of mind, which is rewarded by the joy of the eight beatitudes and culminates in a mystical union with the Holy Trinity.¹

If we accept St Bonaventure's plan of the spiritual life, it is not only mystical experience which comprises a special communication of the Holy Ghost. The whole of our Christian life already supposes such a communication; our progress in virtue is an experience of the Holy Ghost. Is it impossible to elaborate a theology of the Holy Ghost founded on that experience?

Such an elaboration would not be so new as it may seem. For Scholastic theology itself implies it more or less. With the method of the School we have been accustomed to visualize the mystery of the Third Person by way of analogy. St Thomas in his *Summa Theologica* studies the Person of the Holy Ghost in itself (I P., qq. 36-8) after long considerations on the notions of procession (I P., q. 27, a. 1), procession of love (I P., q. 27, a. 3-4), relation (I P., q. 28), person (I P., q. 29-30). At each of those preliminary phases of his theology, we are asked rigorously to purify our concepts until they become applicable to God. The religious

¹ On the gifts of the Holy Ghost and the beatitudes, see *Brev.*, P.V., chap. v and vi. On the mystical knowledge of the Trinity, see *In Lucam*, chap. ix, n. 65; *Itinerarium*, chap. vii, n. 4, 5.

value of that analogical method is that it enables us to think with accurate philosophical notions of what we know through faith is the Holy Ghost. Analogy is therefore useful. But it will hold a legitimate place in dogmatic theology only if, with St Thomas, we see in analogy no more than a means better to understand the 'names' of the Third Person. And these names, *Spiritus* (I P., q. 36, a. 1), *Amor* (I P., q. 37), *Donum* (I P., q. 38) imply in their origin an anagogical transference of terms from a Christian experience of sanctification to the Sanctifier himself. An instance of that anagogical method may be found in the words of St John, 'He that loveth not knoweth not God; for God is love' (I John iv, 8).

At the root of the theology of the Holy Ghost is the experience of sanctification. If that is not only obvious in the works of such a mystic as St John of the Cross, but is implied by the classical structure of the treatise of the Holy Ghost, we may ask if our theology of the Third Person gives enough place to an experimental description, the elements of which would come from the testimonies of the mystics and from a reflexion on the data of Christian life, particularly in its liturgical experiences.

* * *

It is a well-known fact that, from the early times when Christian literature became bilingual owing to the sundering of the Greek and Latin parts of the Roman Empire, Western theology has drifted along a path leading to an analytical understanding of the contents of the Christian faith, while Eastern theology remained in an 'apophatic' synthetical line of approach to the mystery of the Triune Divinity. Scholastic theology made an unparalleled attempt to prove the non-contradiction of the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity; then, once the theological effort was cut off from a properly religious experience, say, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the duality of Nominalism naturally

led the way to the reaction of 'Faith alone'. Separation between theology and religious experience went for something during the rise of Protestantism, which, it is significant to note, has never taken root in the lands controlled by the Eastern Churches, where theology always remained subservient to a liturgical and mystical apprehension of the mystery of God.

Western tradition, however, is not void of all 'apophatism'. And we have just seen that St John of the Cross presents a doctrine on the Holy Spirit which underlines the mystery of the Third Person as being at the same time the mystery of the Three Persons revealed in him, and the mystery of all sanctification. Instead of an analytical pneumatology, he offers us a synthetical pneumatism.

At a time when a certain anti-intellectualism seems to be creeping into theological thought, it would be good to rejuvenate our teaching by a return to an often forgotten part of our tradition, there to make up in depth for what we might come to want in subtlety.

CONTEMPLATION IN 'THE SCALE OF PERFECTION'

III

By DOM GERARD SITWELL

IN two previous articles¹ I attempted to examine what Hilton has to say about contemplation in the second book of *The Scale of Perfection*. The following article rounds off the subject in the way proposed in the first article² by considering his teaching on various effects and manifestations of the contemplative union.

It may be useful to set out his treatment of this last subject schematically.

1. General effects of contemplation which may be connected with the Gifts of the Holy Ghost (chaps xxxvi and xliii).

2. The effect of contemplation in relation to particular vices and virtues (chaps xxxvii to xxxix).

3. Various supernatural experiences which are 'mystical' in the more commonly accepted sense of that term (chaps xliv to xlvi).³

1. *General effects of contemplation which may be connected with the Gifts of the Holy Ghost.*

The first effect which Hilton attributes to contemplation he describes as follows:

'Then bringeth love into the soul the fullhead of virtues, and turneth them all into softness and into liking as it were without working of the soul ; for the soul striveth not mickle for the getting of them as it did before, but it hath them easily and feeleth them restfully,

¹ THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW, Summer 1949, Winter 1949-50.

² THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW, Summer 1949, p. 278.

³ Chapter xlii deals with prayer and it would take too long to go into this in the present article. I hope to make a separate study of his teaching on prayer later.

only through the gift of love that is the Holy Ghost . . . Other men that stand in the common way of charity, and are not yet so far forth in grace, but work under the bidding of reason, they strive and fight all day against sins for the getting of virtues; and sometimes they be above and sometimes beneath, as wrestlers are' (chap. xxxvi, p. 395).¹

The effect described here is that which theology attributes to the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, which modern writers in particular² make to play so large a part in contemplation. St Thomas describes them as *quaedam habituales perfectiones potentiarum animae, quibus redduntur bene mobiles a Spiritu Sancto*.³ They impart a certain docility and receptiveness to the soul, an aptness to respond to actual graces. But beyond this the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, and particularly the higher ones, may produce effects in the soul which are referred to, I think, by Hilton in chap. xliii. He says there that 'sometime grace putteth silence to vocal praying and stirreth the soul to see and to feel Jhesu in another manner'.⁴ And what that manner is he later explains. Just as our Lord threw new light on the sense of Scripture for the two disciples on the way to Emmaus, 'right so the ghostly presence of Jhesu openeth the wit of His lover that burneth in desire to Him, and bringeth to his mind by ministering of angels the words of the sentences of Holy Writ unsought and unavised one after another, and expoundeth them readily, be they never so hard nor so privy'.⁵ He then goes on to give the fourfold interpretation of Scripture common in the Middle Ages, which he describes as letterly, morally, mystically and heavenly. It need not surprise us that he expects the interpretation to be in one of these modes.

¹ References throughout are to Miss Underhill's edition, London, 1923.

² e.g., Garrigou-Lagrange, *Perfection chrétienne et contemplation*.

³ S. Th. IIa, IIae, Q. XIX, art. 9.

⁴ Chap. xliii, p. 443.

⁵ Chap. xliii, p. 445.

His point is that the manner of its acquirement is in this case supernatural. A little further on he brings out this idea again ;

‘See now then how grace openeth the ghostly eye, and cleareth the wit of the soul wonderly above the frailty of corrupt kind ; it giveth the soul a new ableness, whether it will read Holy Writ or hear or think it, for to understand truly and savourly the soothfastness of it in the manner before said, and for to turn readily all reasons and words that are bodily said into ghostly understanding. And that is no great marvel, for the same spirit expoundeth it and declareth it in a clean soul in comfort of it, that first made it ; and that is the Holy Ghost’ (chap. XLIII, p. 447).

This kind of enlightenment is that which modern theologians attribute to the Gift of Understanding, the gift of insight into revealed truths.

Later in the same chapter Hilton goes on to a further manifestation of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost.

‘Jhesu is endless might, wisdom and goodness, righteousness, soothfastness, holiness and mercy. And what this Jhesu is in Himself may no soul see nor hear. But by effect of His working He may be seen through the light of grace, as thus ; His might is seen by making all creatures of nought, His wisdom in ordinate disposing of them, His goodness in saving of them, His mercy in forgiveness of sins, His holiness in gifts of grace, His righteousness in hard punishing of sin, His soothfastness in true rewarding of good works. And all this is expressed in Holy Writ, and this seeth a soul in Holy Writ with all other accidences that fall thereto. And wot thou well that such gracious knowings, in Holy Writ or in another writing that is made though grace, are nought else but sweet letters, sendings made atwixt a loving soul and Jhesu loved ; or else if I shall say soothlier, atwixt Jhesu the true lover and the souls loved of Him’ (chap. XLIII, p. 449).

It seems possible to see in this description the effects of the highest of the Gifts, that of Wisdom, which enables us to see all things in their relation to God. The mind viewing created reality refers it back to the Creator. Hilton expresses it the other way round by passing from the consideration of God in his various attributes to the manifestation of them in the world.

We receive the Gifts of the Holy Ghost with sanctifying grace and it is particularly when a higher stage of grace has been attained that their operation becomes manifest. It is then quite in accordance with Hilton's view of contemplation as brought about by an intensification of sanctifying grace that the particular effects of the Gifts should become apparent in the contemplative soul.

2. *The effect of contemplation in relation to particular vices and virtues.*

In chapter xxxvii Hilton considers the effect of contemplation in particular upon pride, and describes the two ways in which meekness, or humility, may be produced. His treatment invites comparison with chapter xiii of *The Cloud of Unknowing*, where the same division of meekness is given. Hilton says:

'Thou shalt understand that there is two manner of meekness. One is had by working of reason. Another is felt of the special gift of love. Both are of love. But that one love worketh by reason of the soul; that other he worketh by himself. The first is imperfect, that other is perfect' (chap. xxxvii, p. 397).

He goes on to explain that the first is that into which a man can argue himself by considering his sins and frailty. It is good and necessary, but it is of an altogether different quality from that which comes to the soul when the Holy Ghost himself shows it 'how Jhesu is all'. It takes no care then even of its own unworthiness or that of other man, 'for he holdeth himself and all other men as it were even, alike nought of themselves anent

God'.¹ The world means nothing to the soul which has this knowledge of God, 'for the heart of a true lover of Jhesu is made so mickle and so large through a little sight of Him and a little feeling of His ghostly love, that all the liking and all the joy of all earth may not suffice for to fill a corner of it'.² *The Cloud's* presentation of this teaching is fundamentally the same, but it is somewhat differently set out. It begins with a definition of meekness—knowledge of self. The definition is substantially St Bernard's,³ and Hilton himself uses it in the first Book of *The Scale*.⁴ There are two causes of this meekness, *The Cloud* goes on, one is the wretchedness and frailty of man, 'another is the overabundant love and the worthiness of God in himself'.⁵ The second cause is perfect for it is always valid, even in heaven; the first cause is imperfect for it will fail at the end of life. And even in this life a soul may be in such a state that it 'shall have suddenly and perfectly lost and forgotten all knowing and feeling of his being, not considering whether he shall have been holy or wretched. But whether this fall oft or seldom to a soul that is thus disposed, I trow that it lasteth but a full short while. And in this time it is perfectly meeked, for it knoweth and feeleth no cause but the chief.'⁶ The reason *The Cloud* gives for the perfection of meekness acquired in this way, that it is valid also in heaven, is unexpected, but it is evident that it is equally with Hilton's perfect meekness the result of the soul's realizing in a flash of contemplation that 'Jhesu is all'.

In chapters xxxviii and xxxix, Hilton goes on to consider various other effects which 'reform in feeling', or contemplation, has on the soul. It produces patience

¹ Chap. xxxvii, p. 399.

² Chap. xxxvii, p. 400.

³ *De gradibus humilitatis*, cap. I.

⁴ Chap. lxvii, p. 164. 'He is meek that soothfastly knoweth and feeleth of himself as he is.'

⁵ Chap. xiii, p. 23, ed. McCann.

⁶ *Ibid.*

of a sort which cannot otherwise be acquired and overcomes covetousness, lechery, gluttony and that 'weariness in well-doing' which is known as *accidia*. It is to be noted that he considers these sins in their gross and material sense. In this he is reminiscent of the surprising frankness with which the author of the *Ancren Riwe* discusses gross bodily sins for the benefit of the three sisters, and in contradistinction to St John of the Cross, who in *The Dark Night* confines himself to, for example, spiritual gluttony, a lack of restraint in seeking for spiritual pleasures which overflow into the senses. There is no particular difficulty in the chapters. It is great mastery, Hilton says, for a man to acquire patience by his own efforts, and at the best he will have it but weakly, but it is not so for the true lover of Jesus. It is harder when the flesh is touched, yet even this can be borne with patience, as the martyrs bear witness. He will not allow that 'hypocrites and heretics' show fortitude other than through pride. Love, which is the Holy Ghost, brings it about too that worldly riches have no attraction, neither has impurity or gluttony. In connexion with the latter he advocates a wise discretion. The true lover of Jesus is to take 'that manner meat that least letteth and least troubleth the heart and may keep the body in strength, be it flesh, be it fish, be it but bread and ale'.¹ His only concern is to keep his heart steadfastly on God, and whether or not he practices particular mortification in food and drink is in itself indifferent to him. Hilton's advice in this matter coincides with that of the author of *The Cloud*² and is the theme of *An Epistle of Discretion*.³ He sums up by saying that the soul which is truly touched by the love of God will feel no attraction in the delights of any of the five bodily senses.

¹ Chap. xxxix, p. 412.

² *The Cloud*, chap. xlii.

³ *The Cell of Self-Knowledge*, ed. E. G. Gardner, London, 1910, p. 95.

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The idea that the divine action in contemplation is in itself purifying to the soul is of course common teaching and is to be found in *The Cloud*. 'It (contemplation) destroyeth not only the ground and the root of sin, as it may be here, but also it getteth virtues. For if it be truly conceived, all virtues shall be subtly and perfectly conceived, felt, and comprehended in it, without any mingling of thine intent. And have a man never so many virtues without it, all they be mingled with some crooked intent, for the which they be imperfect.'¹ In a notable passage, however, *The Cloud* goes beyond anything that Hilton says. As Dom Justin McCann has put it: 'He claims for this high life of contemplation a great social efficacy, and a more perfect charity than is contained in the busy activity of others. The silent effort of the contemplative prevails with God, for the welfare of living and dead, beyond all other prayer or activity. And, at the height of his working, he becomes in a wonderful way likened to our Lord in his redemptive work. The perfect disciple is crucified in spirit, as his Lord was bodily on the cross, and offers himself for all his brethren and sisters in nature; and not only for his friends and kindred, but generally for all mankind.'²

3. '*Mystical*' experiences in the more commonly accepted sense of the term.

Hilton's treatment of these phenomena is in the nature of a postscript. He devotes to them only the last three out of the twenty-six chapters of the second Book in which he treats of contemplation, and on the basis of such a summary treatment it is impossible to make a very dogmatic assessment of his teaching. He begins by a general description of what seems to be rapture or ecstasy, the state in which the imagination, intellect, will, and the external senses are all absorbed in God:

¹ Chap. xii, p. 22, ed. McCann.

² *Ibid.*, p. xxi. The source of this teaching is chap. xxv.

‘And therefore when it (the voice of Jhesu) soundeth in a soul it is of so great might sometimes, that the soul suddenly layeth aside all that there is, praying, speaking, reading or thinking in the manner before said, and all manner bodily work, and listeneth thereto fully, hearing and perceiving in rest and in love the sweet sound of this ghostly voice, as it were ravished from the mind of all earthly things’ (chap. XLIV, p. 452).

I take it that it is within this experience that the divine action manifests itself in a variety of ways, which Hilton goes on to describe. Before discussing them in detail, however, we may note what he has to say about these experiences in general:

‘For wit thou well that all the business that Jhesu maketh about a soul is for to make it a true perfect spouse to Him in the highness and the fullness of love. Because that may not be done suddenly, therefore Jhesu, that is love and of all lovers wisest, assayeth by many wises and by many wonderful means or it may come about; and therefore that it might come to effect of true spousage He hath such gracious speaking *in likeness to a wooer to a chosen soul*. He showeth his jewels, mickle thing He giveth and more He behoteth, and courteous dalliance He showeth’ (chap. XLIV, pp. 453-4).¹

This puts the matter admirably in its proper perspective, and Hilton drives the point home by continuing:

‘The drawing of a soul fully to perfect love is first by the showing of ghostly things to a clean soul, when the ghostly eyes is opened: not that a soul should rest therein, and make end there, *but by that yet should seek Him and love Him that is highest of all only*, without any beholding of any other thing than Himself is’ (chap. XLIV, p. 454).

St John of the Cross would have endorsed those words, though he himself is more austere and uncompromising in his attitude. ‘These things (visions of all kinds) the

¹Cf also chap. XLVI, pp. 462-3, and Bk I, chap. x.

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soul must not regard: yea rather it must renounce them wholly . . . In this way we shall reap from these visions that fruit only which God intends and wills, a spirit of devotion, for that is the chief end, and none other for which He sends them.¹

We may compare Hilton at the end of *The Scale*: 'These beholdings soothfastly grounded in grace and in meekness, make a soul wise and burning in desire to the face of Jhesu.'²

Before attempting a discussion of the experiences referred to by Hilton it may be well to summarize them. In the order in which they appear they are:

1. Some sort of revelations of our Lord, in which, he says, Jesus shows himself 'sometime as an awful master and sometime as a reverend father, and sometime as a lovely spouse' (Chap. XLIV, p. 452).

2. A revelation of the nature of reasonable souls both chosen and reproved (Chap. XLV, p. 456).

3. A revelation of the nature of angels; first of the damned and after that of the blessed (Chap. XLV, p. 457).

4. Another revelation of our Lord; first of his glorious manhood, and then after of his blessed Godhead (Chap. XLVI, p. 461).

5. A revelation of the Blessed Trinity (Chap. XLVI, pp. 461-2).

It is not difficult to equate these experiences in general with the visions described by St John of the Cross in the second Book of *The Ascent of Mount Carmel*, and it is tempting to see in the last two (4 and 5) St Teresa's experiences described in the Seventh Mansion of *The Interior Castle*,³ where she describes two visions of our Lord (particular visions occurring at a very advanced

¹*The Ascent of Mount Carmel* (Thomas Baker, London, 1906), Bk II, chap. xvii, 10. Elsewhere in *The Ascent* he refers to visions as 'means in the hand of God for guiding souls' (Bk II, chap. xxii, 18).

²Chap. XLVI, p. 464.

³*The Interior Castle* (London, Thomas Baker, 1921, seventh Mans., chap. ii, 1 and 2).

stage of her mystical experience, it is to be noted), which seem to correspond with those described by Hilton, and referred to under 4 above. However this may be, our Lord under one aspect or another is likely to be the object of visions and we need not be surprised at this reference of Hilton's or at those given under 1 above. More remarkable perhaps is the similarity between what he has to say about the revelation of the Trinity—'and then beginneth the soul for to perceive a little of the privities of the blessed Trinity'¹—and St Teresa's description of the same thing.²

All these phenomena (with the possible exception of the last) are familiar in mystical writers and to be expected, but the visions or revelations (given under 2 and 3 above) of souls, saved and lost, and angels, blessed and damned, are in a different category. It may be well to quote the relevant passages first.

'It is fair looking with the inner eyes on Jhesu in bodily creatures . . . but it is mickle fairer looking on Jhesu in ghostly creatures. First in reasonable souls both of chosen and reproved, for to see the merciful calling of Him to His chosen; how He turneth them from sin by light of His grace; how He helpeth them, teacheth them, chastiseth them, comforteth them; He righteth, He cleanseth, He feedeth; how He maketh them burning in love and in light by plenty of His grace. And this He doth not to one soul only, but to all His chosen, after measure of His grace. Also of all the reproved, how rightfully He forsakes them and leaveth them in their sin and doth them no wrong; how He rewardeth them in this world, suffering them for to have fulfilling of their will, and after this for to punish them endlessly' (chap. XLV, p. 456).

¹ Chap. XLVI, p. 461.

² *The Interior Castle* (London, Thomas Baker, 1921), seventh Mans., chap. 1, ix.

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'Also the sight of angels' kind; first of damned, and after that of the blessed. It is a full fair contemplation of the fiend in a clean soul, when grace bringeth the fiend to the sight of the soul as a clumsy caitiff bound with the might of Jhesu, that he may nought hurt. Then the soul beholdeth him, not bodily but ghostly, seeing his kind and his malice; and turneth him upside down, and spoileth him and rendeth him all to nought. It scorneth him and despiseth him and setteth nought by his malice' (chap. XLV, p. 457).

'Then beginneth the soul for to have great acquaintance of these blessed spirits, and a great fellowship. They are full tender and full busy about such a soul for to help it, they are masters for to teach it, and often through their ghostly presence and touching of their light drive out phantoms from the soul. And they illumine the soul graciously, they comfort the soul by sweet words suddenly sounded in a clean heart, and if any disease fall ghostly they serve the soul and minister to it all that it needeth' (chap. XLVI, pp. 460-1).

It is clear that there is no theological difficulty and that such things could be revealed, yet as related by Hilton they do not in fact seem generally to form part of the experiences of other mystics. There seem to be two possibilities. On the one hand in the *Spiritual Canticle* St John of the Cross speaks of the soul being initiated into the deep mysteries of God and man.

"We shall go at once to the deep caverns of the rock."

"This rock is Christ", as we learn from St Paul. The deep caverns of the rock are the deep mysteries of the wisdom of God in Christ, in the hypostatical union of the human nature with the Divine Word, and in the correspondence with it of the union of man with God, and in the agreement of God's justice and mercy in the salvation of mankind, in the manifestation of His judgements' (*A Spiritual Canticle*, London, Thomas Baker, 1919, Stanza XXXVII, p. 277).

This knowledge only comes at the summit of mystical experiences, in the so-called spiritual marriage, and from the way St John speaks of it it would seem that the soul, though not yet enjoying the beatific vision, does yet see these things *in Verbo*. It may be that this is what Hilton means. A passage in chapter XLV perhaps suggests it:

‘Holy Writ says in the Book of Songs of the spouse thus: *Surgam, et circuibo civitatem; et quaeram quem diligit anima mea*. I shall rise and I shall go about the city and I shall seek him that my soul loveth. That is, I shall rise into highness of thought and go about the city. By this city is understood the university of all creatures bodily and ghostly, ordained and ruled under God by laws of kinds, of reason, and of grace. I go about this city, when I behold the kinds and the causes of bodily creatures, the gifts of grace and the blisses of ghostly creatures; and in all these I seek him that my soul loveth. It is fair looking with the inner eyes on Jhesu in bodily creatures, for to see His might, His wisdom and His goodness in ordnance of their kinds; but it is mickle fairer looking on Jhesu in ghostly creatures’ (pp. 455-6).

But he is certainly not explicit on the point.

On the other hand St John of the Cross less clearly and St Bernard more clearly seem to teach the possibility of another kind of experience on a much lower level.

St John in his scheme of the various sorts of vision that are granted to man takes into account those of incorporeal substances such as angels and souls:

‘I say, then, speaking directly of the spiritual visions, independent of any bodily sense, that there are two kinds to which the understanding is liable; one of corporeal substances, another of disembodied or unembodied substances. The corporeal visions are visions of all material things in heaven and earth visible to the soul in a certain light emanating from God, in which the distant things of heaven and earth may be seen.

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The other visions of incorporeal things require a higher light; thus visions of incorporeal substances, as of angels and of souls, are neither frequent nor natural in this life' (*The Ascent*, *ibid.*, Bk II, chap. xxiv, 1).

It is not quite clear what he means by saying that they are not natural, as *ex hypothesi* all these experiences are supernatural, but in any case he is very guarded about visions of this kind and considers that there is great danger of delusion in them.¹ Moreover he is explicit that their occurrence is not frequent. However this may be, it seems possible that it was in the writings of St Bernard that Hilton found the source of his ideas. St Bernard perhaps comes nearest to Hilton's teaching when he distinguishes between the contemplation of God and the contemplation of the blessed in heaven, both angels and saints. In Sermon LXII in *Cantica* he says that it is in *foraminibus petrae* that the soul contemplates God himself, but in *cavernis maceriae* the creatures of God, souls and angels. 'In the hollow places of the wall', he says, 'the soul may 'now revisit the patriarchs, now greet the prophets, now join itself to the august assembly of the apostles, now mingle in the choirs of the martyrs; and beyond this it may with the speed of thought survey the condition and the abodes of the blessed Powers from the least angel to the cherubim and seraphim, as far as each one's devotion leads it'.² Then after describing the further experience which is directly of the Godhead itself, he says: 'Thus it is clear that there are two sorts of contemplation; one is of the condition and felicity

¹ *The Ascent*, *ibid.*, Bk II, chap. xxvi, 16. Hilton does not stress this point, though he mentions it (p. 452), but his whole attitude is different from St John's in this part of the work. He is describing these experiences in a post-script as accidental favours which may be given to the faithful soul. St John is elaborating his conception of the soul seeking God through the Dark Night of Faith, and he is pre-occupied with anxiety that it should not be side-tracked by these favours.

² *nunc quidem patriarchas revisere, nunc vero salutare prophetas, nunc senatui immisceri apostolorum, nunc martyrum inseri choris; sed et beatorum virtutum status et mansiones a minimo angelo usque ad cherubin et seraphin, tota mentis alacritate percurrendo lustrare, prout quemque sua devotio feret.* (P.L. 183, col. 1076.)

and glory of the heavenly city, where that great multitude of celestial citizens is engaged either in activity or leisure; the other is of the majesty, eternity, and divinity of the king himself. The former is in the wall, the latter in the rock.¹

This passage has certain similarities to the one from Hilton quoted above and one is tempted to think that Hilton must have been familiar with it, but the differences are perhaps more marked. St Bernard confines the object of this sort of contemplation to the occupants of the heavenly city, Hilton apparently thinks of it as the souls of the just and of sinners on earth, and he extends it to the fiend. 'It is a full fair contemplation of the fiend in a clean soul, when grace bringeth the fiend to the sight of the soul as a clumsy caitiff bound with the might of Jhesu, that he may nought hurt.'² He expatiates upon the contempt the soul will feel for the fiend, and his attitude is paralleled in St Bernard's Sermon XIII on the psalm *Qui habitat*,³ though the latter does not suppose any vision or revelation.

The fact is that these passages in both authors present some difficulty. Revelations about the fate of individual souls are not uncommon in the lives of the saints, and there is ample Scriptural warrant, to go no further, for the appearance of angels upon particular occasions, but contemplation as such is always regarded as being of the Godhead, and this kind of subsidiary contemplation, envisaged apparently as forming a not inconsiderable part of the soul's experiences, is difficult to account for.⁴ It could not be said that the sort of contemplation which

¹ quae cum ita sint, duo liquet contemplationis genera esse; unum de statu et felicitate et gloria civitatis supernae, quo vel actu, vel otio ingens illa caelestium civium occupata sit multitudo; alterum de regis ipsius majestate, aeternitate, divinitate. Illa in maceria, ista in petra. (*P.L.* 183, col. 1077.)

² Chap. XLV, p. 457.

³ *P.L.* 183, Col. 238.

⁴ It is interesting to note that this vision of the state of angels and of souls is referred to in three of the minor works attributed to Hilton, thus reinforcing the probability of the attribution. See *Minor Works of Walter Hilton* (Burns Oates and Washbourne, London, 1929) pp. 97, 142, 184.

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St John is speaking about in the *Spiritual Canticle* was in any way subsidiary; it was definitely of Christ in his Godhead, but St Bernard makes the distinction, and Hilton may well have had it in mind.

But however this may be, there is one point which deserves further mention and that is the part which Hilton gives to the ministry of angels in these experiences. In chapter XLVI he says:

'Then beginneth the soul to have great acquaintance of these blessed spirits and a great fellowship. They are full busy about such a soul for to help it, they are masters for to teach it' (p. 460).

And again in the same chapter:

'For wit thou well, that all this ghostly working of words and of reasons brought to the mind, and such fair likeness, are made by the ministry of angels' (p. 461).¹

And he even says that the visions of Christ and the Trinity already referred to² are achieved with the help of angels.³

This idea of the illumination and assistance of men by angels has its roots very far back in theology and crystallized into the doctrine of angel guardians.⁴ It does not, however, seem to have been taken up by mystical writers with the exception of St Bernard, and it is likely that Hilton derived his ideas from him, for I am not aware of any mystical writer between them who makes use of it.⁵ In Sermon XXXI on *The Canticle* St Bernard is explaining how the angels are solicitous for the spiritual welfare of men, and he describes the angel as follows:

'A faithful servant, who knowing the love that he and man both bear to God is not jealous, but seeks the

¹ Cf chap. XLIII, p. 445 quoted on page 272 above, and Bk I, chap. XI, p. 23.

² p. 279 above.

³ Chap. XLVI, p. 461.

⁴ See *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, Tome I, Col. 1216 ff.

⁵ The debatable subject of Rolle's 'angels' song' falls into another category. Ruysbroeck in *The Adornment of the Spiritual Marriage*, Bk II, chap. XXIV, seems to grant the possibility at least in the case of imaginative visions, but he lays much less emphasis on it.

Lord's rather than his own gratification. He is the intermediary between the two objects of his love, offering up service, bringing back rewards. He encourages the one love, satisfies the other. And at intervals, though rarely, he brings the two objects of his love together, whether by carrying up the one or leading down the other. For indeed he is an inmate and well known in the palace, standing in no fear of being denied access, and he daily sees the face of the father.¹

This passage would seem in a general way to attribute mystical phenomena to the ministry of angels as Hilton does, but in Sermon XLI on *The Canticles* St Bernard refers again to this ministry of angels in a passage of great interest. He describes how the soul even in this life can have some sort of knowledge of the divinity;

'While yet the state of faith endures and the substance of the clear Light is not yet made manifest, the contemplation of pure truth can yet anticipate its action in us, at least in part . . . For when something from God (divinitus) has momentarily and, as it were, with the swiftness of a flash of light, shed its ray upon the mind in ecstasy of spirit, whether for the tempering of this too great radiance, or for the sake of imparting it to others, forthwith there present themselves, whence I know not, certain imaginary likenesses of lower things, suited to the meanings which have been infused from above, by means of which that most pure and brilliant ray of truth is in a manner shaded, and becomes both more bearable to the soul itself, and more capable of being communicated to whomsoever the latter wishes. I think that these images are formed in us by the suggestions of the holy angels, as, on the contrary, evil ones without any doubt are 'inoculations' (immissiones) by bad angels.

¹ Fidelis paranympus, qui mutui amoris conscius, sed non invidus, non suam quaerit, sed Domini gratiam: discurrit medius inter dilectum et dilectam, vota offerens, referens dona. Excitat istam, placat illum. Interdum quoque, licet raro, repraesentat eos pariter sibi, sive hanc rapiens, sive illum adducens: siquidem domesticus est et notus in palatio, nec veretur repulsam, et quotidie videt faciem Patris (P.L. 183, Col. 943).

And very likely in this way is fabricated, as by the hands of Angels, that mirror and enigma through which the Apostle saw, out of such pure and beauteous imaginations: in such wise that we feel both the Being of God, which is conceived as pure and without any phantasy of corporeal images; and we attribute to angelic ministration whatever kind of elegant similitude wherewith it appeared worthily clothed withal' (*Serm. in Cant.* xli, 3 and 4).

This passage is commented upon by Abbot Cuthbert Butler in *Western Mysticism*,¹ and I have made use of his translation. It would seem to offer a solution of the perennial problem of the mystics, the translation of the perception of spiritual reality, 'the most pure and brilliant ray of truth', into 'intelligible species', to use the scholastic terminology—'more bearable to the soul itself', and capable of being expressed in language intelligible to others. The idea that the species under which it is apprehended are supplied by the angels is said by Butler to be 'a piece of purely personal speculation, which did not find a place in the tradition of mystical teaching'. This remains true on the whole, but it would seem that this theory of the ministry of angels in mystical experience advanced by St Bernard was taken up by Hilton, and it is of particular interest to find a passage in one of the minor works attributed to him which appears to provide exactly the same solution as St Bernard provides to the problem of reducing an ineffable experience to intelligible terms. In the little treatise called *Qui habitat* we find it said of angels:

'They may not make the light of grace in thy soul, for that falleth to God only himself; for he, through his unseeable presence maketh might, light and love and giveth to thy soul. But angels by their presence ghostly shall help thee and comfort thy soul much when thou art in this grace. For they stop out this press of

¹*Western Mysticism* (London, 1922), pp. 153-4.

unclean spirits. They cleanse the soul from fantasies and vain imaginations, and *they form fair likenesses in words and in reasons and temper the light of grace sufferably* in feeding of thy soul. They stir thine heart to the love of all goodness, and, if thou offend by frailty, readily they blame thee: thou shalt bear it no further, for they will suffer no sin to rest in thee. They comfort thee in bodily disease and tell thee of the joys of heaven wondrous privily, that thou shouldst not think too heavy the prison of this life' (*Minor Works of Walter Hilton*, Burns Oates & Washbourne, London 1929, pp. 151-2).

The thought of this passage corresponds closely to that of St Bernard in the passage quoted above and the general similarity between the whole treatise and portions of *The Scale* leaves little doubt that Hilton was its author.¹

It is perhaps worth noting that Hilton says, 'There is no sight of body nor figure in imagination in this manner working, but all ghostly of ghostly creatures'.² In other words, in the later terminology, they are intellectual visions. From which, as St John of the Cross says, 'the understanding elicits an act of intelligence or spiritual vision, without perceiving any form, image, or figure whatever of the natural imagination or fancy, which could furnish any foundation for it; for these things are communicated directly to the soul by a supernatural operation and by supernatural means'.³

Finally, we may note that the doctrine about the ministry of angels is quite explicit in the treatise *Of Angels' Song*,⁴ which is generally attributed to Hilton, and the matter is further complicated there by the introduction of the phenomenon, whatever it may be,

¹ Cf also for a more general exposition of the ministry of angels, St Bernard's sermons XI-XIII on the Psalm *Qui habitat* (P.L. 183, Col. 225-38).

² Chap. XLVI, p. 460.

³ *The Ascent*, *ibid.*, Bk II, chap. xxiii, 3.

⁴ Horstman, *Richard Rolle of Hampole and his followers* (London 1895), Vol. I, p. 178.

'THE SCALE OF PERFECTION'

which has given its name to the treatise. It is naturally of interest in view of the emphasis that Rolle laid upon it, but as it is not mentioned in *The Scale* it must be considered to lie outside the scope of the present article.

To sum up; of the specific kinds of mystical phenomena referred to by Hilton in these chapters, revelations or visions of our Lord (1 and 4 above) are what might be expected, and there is of course ample confirmation in the experiences of other mystics. The intellectual vision of the Trinity (5 above) seems certainly to be paralleled in St Teresa's experiences. The visions of souls, and of angels and devils (2 and 3 above), are unusual mystical experiences, though St Bernard seems to envisage something comparable, while Hilton's attribution of mystical phenomena in general to the ministry of angels certainly looks as though it derived immediately from St Bernard.

THE VALUE OF HISTORY

By THE ABBOT OF DOWNSIDE

WHAT is the value, for a Christian, of art and literature, science and humane culture, all the good things of this life, all that, for the unbeliever, sums up the possible good for man? The Christian is taught that he has, in the providential ordering of things, only one goal to aim at: the beatific vision of the Holy Trinity in the life to come. And he is taught that not the excellence of human making, but the moral goodness of human behaviour, is the means to the attainment of this goal—the action of grace being of course presupposed. He is taught, as in an impressive passage of Newman, that nothing can justify any, even venial, sin—not the saving of his own life, nor the happiness of those he loves, not the safety of his country or the preservation of all human culture; and, providing we understand aright what we mean by sin, this is true, not to say a truism. Does not all this mean that, in the only scheme of ‘values’ admitted by Christianity, all cultural achievement is simply worthless? It is the old question that has haunted Christians since the day the Church emerged from the Catacombs; a theoretical question, indeed, but one that has been agonizingly personal to many a good Christian. It is St Jerome’s question, and that of the Christian humanists. It was raised again by Friedrich von Hügel in his *Mystical Element of Religion*.

This question is being re-examined to-day, and Père L. Malevez, S.J., has distinguished (in *Bijdragen*, 1949, part 3) two divergent answers, that of ‘eschatological theology’ and that of the ‘theology of Incarnation’. Those who favour the former solution stress the fact that our final end, the Reign of God, is beyond our power to produce; it is something discontinuous with profane history; only by dying can our civilizations make

way for it. For 'the whole world is in the power of the evil one' (I John v, 19). The Gospel sets man against man. Human institutions will destroy each other, then the powers of heaven will be shaken and the end will come. 'I have not come to send peace but a sword'. It is not promised that all humanity will be converted, Christianized, but only that the Gospel will be everywhere proclaimed. In this world we are strangers and pilgrims; our fatherland, the Reign of God, is not realizable here below. We must renounce all things, and wait humbly for the Reign of God. The Incarnation is a remedy for human ills, but a terrible remedy, since it spells the Cross. It sows life in the world, but a life beyond death; a life, therefore, which urges this world to die. The Spirit of God is given to enable us not to embellish the world, but to confront its hostility. Our eternal destiny is born in a hard travail, and we pass from our divided world to God by a *salto mortale*. What we construct here below is an interior good, not any exterior achievements.

The theology of Incarnation, on the other hand, asserts that human action in all its forms, provided that it does not abuse created realities, prepares the coming of God's Reign. Christian action, in particular, is enriched by the presence of the Holy Spirit and a share in the attributes of the incarnate Word; thus it has an interior quality which disposes it gradually through the ages for receiving the good things of the Reign of God, which will be the gift of free grace and yet will consummate, not simply conclude, our long story. Time is the flower, eternity the fruit, and Christian action has a certain 'condignity' with eternal life. The whole man is regenerated by baptism; his body is Christ's member (I Cor. vi, 15). Adamic grace shows that of its nature grace tends to transform the body itself and its *milieu*. Jesus was the perfect man in his human nature; the normal repercussion of the Incarnation had to be restrained so

that his Body might be passible, but once the redemption was accomplished grace transfigured It. And since then history shows an amelioration; man has become more the master of his environment, especially in the West where Christianity has been most effective. The Church saved for man the values of ancient Rome; and Christianity will not be perfect if its recipients are and remain barbarians. To all this may be added evolutionary considerations, tending to show that Christianity is a higher stage in a long process culminating, before it, in *homo sapiens* (English readers will bethink them of the late Dr Temple's *Christus Veritas*). Christianity does not teach us to desert the world but that human effort is our duty. Thus the layman's tasks in the world are not incapable of sanctification. Even technical progress, it is argued, favours the mystical life.

It may be desirable to scrutinize a little more closely the New Testament bases of these two conflicting tendencies. The New Testament is not only a first precipitate of the Gospel revelation; it is an inspired deposit of tradition. The whole Christian doctrine is a development of the original teaching substantially recorded in its pages, and its contents are therefore normative for theology. Hence it is all to the good that this great debate should be argued first on the New Testament ground. But theology is a science, and Scripture does not speak scientifically, but rather 'prophetically'. It does not purport to give us a ready made system of thought, although it is pregnant with such a system. It does not teach scholastically; it preaches. There is a danger of distorting the Scripture message if we treat it as we do the Codex of canon law or the *Summa Theologica* of St Thomas Aquinas. Thus, when our Lord tells us to 'turn the other cheek', we must not treat this as a precept on the same level with the obligation to hear Mass on holy days; it is at once more and less than that. The Sermon on the Mount is not a treatise of moral

theology; it is more like a poem—it is, in fact, a sermon. We are faced here with a question of interpretation like that which Maritain has examined in connexion with St John of the Cross. St John of the Cross is profoundly Thomist. Yet you could draw up a list of his sayings, especially on the worthlessness and anti-spiritual character of creatures, that would seem to be in stark contradiction with St Thomas's teaching on the intrinsic goodness of all things and on grace as perfecting and 'crowning' nature. Much of the hostility to St John of the Cross's spiritual teaching rests on such misinterpretation.

There is also a particular consideration to be borne in mind in interpreting the New Testament. The New Testament writings are in large measure the deposit from a vast explosion of spiritual force, a sort of volcanic eruption, the accompaniment, part cause and part effect, of the supreme event in human history, involving a transformation in the religious element of that history. There had taken place a new birth, a 'generatio' in the fullest sense, involving a 'corruptio' of the previous form of religion. And the travail, the shocks and reactions of this tremendous event have left their mark on the New Testament literature, on its modes of expression, on its rhetoric. We must allow for this in assessing the New Testament teaching, especially when we are concerned to state with measured accuracy the relations between the Gospel and the world. In the initial stages of the new religion it was more conscious of, more anxious to assert and to emphasize, the infinite gulf of difference and discontinuity between it and its environment than to dwell with complacency on the homogeneities, the interconnexions, the mutual dependence that were, we may suppose, really there and really operative all the time. Perhaps the extreme limit of this emphasis on discontinuity was reached in Marcion's teaching that the Gospel had literally no historical, human, antecedents; that the Old Testament

did not record any revelation from the divine Father of Jesus Christ; and that Christ himself appeared suddenly from heaven, a grown man without human ancestry, to proclaim an utterly new religion. The Church, guided by the Holy Spirit, rejected this extreme position in favour of the Catholic standpoint of St Paul and St Irenaeus. This rejection should be borne in mind when we attempt to deal with the great questions raised in Père Malevez's article.

Père Malevez has conveniently labelled the two contrary tendencies in the Christian 'philosophy of history' as respectively eschatological and incarnational. But the convenience of this nomenclature must not blind us to what is the real *differentia* of the Christian Gospel. In fact, Christian eschatology and Christian incarnationalism are not mutually exclusive. Eschatology without Incarnation is not Christian at all, but Jewish. Incarnation without eschatology is—I know not what; Buddhism, perhaps, or Platonism. Born within the Jewish tradition, and of Jewish spiritual stock, Christianity has been eschatological from the beginning—from before the beginning, we might almost say. But its novelty was, not that it simply lodged the idea of incarnation within an eschatological framework, but that it proclaimed a real, 'mystical', 'sacramental' anticipation of the Last Things as the unique new gift that God was bestowing on man in the Gospel—and of this real anticipation the Incarnation is the epitome and the fountainhead. In other words, the Incarnation is itself an eschatological fact and can only be understood as such. We have not to choose between an eschatological and an incarnational outlook. Incarnation, for us, is eschatological, and eschatology is incarnated.

Hence Christianity holds fast to its central, differentiating, proclamation of the *two* comings of Christ. The novelty is not the second coming, which corresponds with the expectations of Jewish eschatology, but the

first coming. Yet the first coming is a coming of the Son of Man who is still to come. And as he will come, in his second coming, to perform the great post-historic Act of God, to inaugurate the perfect Reign of God, so in his first coming he came to anticipate that final Act and to inaugurate, not a shadow or semblance, but a real historical unique anticipation of that Reign. As the end of every movement is implicit in its beginning and in all its stages, so the post-historic Reign of God is implicit in the history of the 'Christian fact' from its beginnings. And already in these beginnings this anticipation is an act of God, it is prevenient grace; yet always, as grace always is, it is a grace that assumes nature to itself and habilitates it for a goal that is at once the goal of nature and of grace.

And if the Incarnation is, in the sense outlined above, an eschatological fact, it is also true that Christian incarnationalism must profoundly modify Christian eschatology. The post-historic Reign of God is no longer for us, what it might have been without the Incarnation, in sheer discontinuity with history. It will be the ratification and glorification of something that has become part of the texture of history—it will show history for what it really is, and will not abolish but transfigure historical values. The post-historic harvest is homogeneous with the historical seed, and in its growth that seed exercises its mysterious biological alchemy upon the inanimate matter upon which it feeds.

It seems to me that only such an interpretation of the Christian proclamation can give full meaning to many striking New Testament passages, and indeed to the New Testament as a whole. St Paul is strictly unintelligible on any other view. When he tells us, for instance, that we are dead and buried with Christ and with him are risen to a new life, and yet affirms that we are redeemed *in hope*, warns us against relapsing, and himself desires to be dissolved and to be with Christ, he is implying

the view of Christianity as a 'sacrament' of the world to come, an efficacious symbol of it, really pregnant with it, and yet studiously respectful of our historical conditioning and of the *posse peccare* that belongs to our state of probation.

When we turn back to the Gospels, we note that our Lord's message is summarized by St Matthew in the words: *Repent, the kingdom of heaven is at hand*. If we remember to whom our Lord was speaking, and the thought-world in which they lived, we can hardly avoid the conclusion that the 'kingdom of heaven' (that is, the Reign of God) is the divine Act which terminates our mundane history. But was this Act 'at hand' when our Lord spoke? As we measure the 1900 years that have elapsed, the obvious answer is No; but it is one that no Christian can tolerate, making Christ into a false prophet. Nor can I think it adequate to point out that in one sense this final Act is always imminent, always 'just round the corner', on the grounds that man's temporal experience is for ever a passing moment lodged in the framework of eternity. For in that sense the Reign of God was no more imminent when Jesus began his mission than in the days of the 'many prophets and just men' who 'desired to see' what the disciples of Jesus saw 'and saw it not'. It seems to me that the Reign of God was 'at hand' in an entirely novel sense in the mission of Jesus, and yet mysteriously so: it was its anticipatory, 'sacramental' advent that was imminent, and was indeed effected by his mission. This sacramental advent was, I suggest, the core of those 'mysteries of the Reign of God' to understand which was the privilege of the disciples of Christ.

This real but mysterious advent of the Reign of God, as the result and meaning of Christ's mission, explains why St John Baptist was 'greater than the prophets'. The prophets had announced the advent of God's Reign from afar, but St John Baptist's work was, in the order

of public revelation (as our Lady's vocation was in a more profoundly ontological order) the penultimate disposition for that advent; so that a greater than he was not to be found in the past public history of institutional religion, though he that is least in the new order of the sacramental Reign of God is greater than the Forerunner. The ultimate disposition for God's Reign was and is the mission of Jesus himself, continued in the mission of his 'little flock'. And an ultimate disposition is at once the cause and the *effect* of the reality with which it is pregnant.

Hence our Lord could claim that 'if he by the Spirit of God cast out demons' the Reign of God had supervened upon those who were witnesses of his work. It had supervened obviously not in its post-historic perfection but in a real sacramental anticipation. And in this sacramental form, by a paradox that was 'to the Jews a scandal', the Reign of God was even to be subject to the vicissitudes of history, though always triumphant over them. It is the object of violent struggle, and the prize of those who are prepared to pay the price of strenuous effort on its behalf. It is the pearl of great price and the hidden treasure, to be purchased by its Lord, and thereafter by his followers, at the cost of every other value. And yet we must suppose, since it really is God's Reign, that it contains within itself, reintegrates and establishes on an eternal basis, every other value through the whole range of all that is desirable. For the Jewish-Christian tradition differs from Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism and all other ultimate dualisms by refusing any form of spiritualism that maintains itself at the expense of matter, any form of supernature that destroys nature.

It is perfectly true that expressions of apparent dualism can be culled from the New Testament. 'We know that we are of God, and the whole world lies in (the power of) evil.' 'The world is crucified to me, and I am crucified

to the world.' 'He who loses his life for my sake shall find it.' But in order to understand such expressions and the profound truth that lies behind them we have to remember two things. To begin with, as we have already reminded ourselves, the advent of a new form has its inevitable *negative moment*—it involves the *corruptio prioris*; yet all that is of positive value in that which is superseded may yet be taken up into the new substance, and such is the very nature of growth and evolution as contrasted with mere change and substitution. Secondly, in the particular case with which we are dealing, the consequences of sin and the Fall have to be taken into account. These consequences, as Père Bouyer (quoted by Père Malevez in the article above referred to) reminds us, are no mere superficial disfigurements of the world, but a 'deep-seated cancer'. They plunge right down to the roots of human nature, though never corrupting its ontological goodness. And man in the historical order is fallen man. The advent of the Reign of God must therefore spell 'death' to historical man, precisely because it brings 'resurrection' to ontological man.

It is just here that, as it seems to me, a fatal exaggeration is possible; an exaggeration whereby cultural values are surrendered to man as fallen, not only in their empirical actuality but in the ontological potentialities which they actualize. It is quite true that cultural achievements are, except as flowing from a principle of grace, commonly the products of man as sinful, and that in that sense they are embellishments not of the City of God but of Babylon. But the potentialities which they thus not only actualize but deform are potentialities of ontological man and, as such, may participate in the 'resurrection' of grace. They and their products are therefore susceptible of supernaturalization and can be made to subserve the Reign of God, in which indeed they will be glorified. 'Created nature has been condemned to frustration . . . with a hope to look forward to; namely, that nature

in its turn will be set free from the tyranny of corruption, to share in the glorious freedom of God's sons. The whole of nature, as we know, groans in a common travail all the while' (Rom. VIII, 20-2). Now it is a fact that, as St Paul in this section of the epistle to the Romans points out, the redemption of nature, like our own redemption, is an object of *hope*, and is therefore a post-historic consummation. But it would also seem to be true that, like our own future redemption, it is mysteriously anticipated in the 'eschatological sacrament' of Christianity. We do not enjoy a few stray 'advances' upon our eventual inheritance. It is the *whole* of that future inheritance that is mysteriously anticipated in grace. And it might seem to follow that every human achievement, at every level of human interest, that is done or pursued 'in grace' will find its apotheosis in the post-historic Reign of God. 'There shall never be one good lost; what was, shall be over again, not its semblance but itself.' In the beatific vision we shall see not only God 'in himself' but God in creatures and creatures in God. We cannot afford, if we value the beatific vision, to depreciate anything that is capable of this apotheosis, for every such thing will enhance heaven for us, and enhance God's glory in our happiness.

In this connection it may be pointed out that the metaphor of the Christian 'way' to the heavenly 'fatherland' is in one respect misleading. It is derived from Judaism, that is from a religion in which 'eschatology' had not yet been 'incarnated'. It may erroneously suggest that our purpose in this life is to pass through it, get it over, and arrive, without luggage but personally safe, at the end of the journey. The Christian, however, has a different calling. *He has to take with him all that he acquires on the road*, and what he has to declare at the final customs house will determine for ever his enjoyment of the fatherland. It will be *in* the experience that he has stored up while on earth, in that experience eternalized

and transfigured, that he will see God. If it is true that even on earth our 'subconscious memory' forgets nothing, this is at least an analogy, and perhaps something more, of the fully actuated condition of the blessed.

It is not irrelevant, it is in the highest degree apposite, to refer here to the teachings of mystical theology. The spiritual life starts from a first conversion and proceeds by successive conversions, each of them under the sign of St John of the Cross's *Nada, nada, nada*. But it proceeds *towards* the unitive way and the spiritual marriage, in which (in principle) the transitional disharmony and conflict between (fallen) nature and grace have been transcended. It may indeed be argued, since it is only in the final stages of mystical progress that this harmony is achieved, that therefore for all souls during most stages of the progress, and for the overwhelming majority of souls till death, the disharmony persists and creatures must be rejected. But in the first place it should be observed that this is a question of practical ascetics, and does not affect the truth of what we may deduce from the characteristics of the unitive way, namely that creatures are fully 'supernaturalizable' and are not in any more than accidental, transitional, opposition to the Reign of God. Secondly, the complete 'abstraction' that is taught by St John of the Cross is abstraction from creatures precisely so far as they present themselves as competitors with God; not in so far as they are viewed in their true nature and redeemed status. Finally, it may be said that the life of prayer, the spiritual life, of a soul in grace is homogeneous in all its stages; its end is implicit in its beginning.

Perhaps we may now turn back to examine some of the assertions of the historians of the 'eschatological' school. (1) The Reign of God is 'beyond our power to produce'. This is of course utterly true. But the Reign of God will consist for each of us in the beatific vision; and this vision, though produced in us by God and

entirely beyond our own unaided powers of attainment, will yet be a 'seeing' in which we are raised to the summit of our activity and actuality—we shall 'see him as he is'. And on earth efficacious grace is not a substitute for human action but an actuating influence upon it. The anticipated Reign of God is thus all God's doing, yet summons forth in us, and is manifested in, our own activity. (2) The Reign of God is 'discontinuous with profane history'. This again is true. But this discontinuity is analogous with that which divides life from inanimate matter, although life evolves in matter, animates what was before inanimate, and actuates potentialities in matter. (3) 'Only by dying can our civilizations make way for it.' There is a dangerous equivocation here. Considered as effects of man *so far as he is fallen and sinful*, our civilizations are of course doomed to death and destruction. But this is an abstract view and they were never merely such. They flow from a nature that is ontologically good, and none of them is entirely graceless. As St Augustine saw, we cannot make an empirical distinction between a stream of history that is all Babylon, and another stream that is all the City of God. We have to make a practical judgment every time we are called upon to act, but only God can effect the ultimate discrimination. (4) Our 'fatherland' is unrealizable here below. This seems to me very much like a negation of the differentiating Christian truth that the Reign of God is mysteriously anticipated through the missions of the Second and Third Persons of the Holy Trinity. (5) The Incarnation is a crucifying remedy. This again is a truth that can be misunderstood. The mystical 'death' whereby grace 'heals' nature is the death of nature *considered as fallen*; it is at the same time the resurrection of nature as God created it, of nature in its fullness. (6) What we construct here below is an interior good, not any exterior achievement. This seems to me to involve an impossible Kantian psychology of

the good act. An act is formally good, no doubt, by virtue of its interior qualities; but no act is possible without an object apprehended as good, and all behaving is with a view to 'making', whether of our souls or of some exterior thing. As creatures of flesh and blood we cannot dispense with exterior action nor with the making of things exterior to ourselves—things which we cannot make without judging them to be good.

In general, I should argue that the 'eschatological' attitude and mood are an exaggeration to which minds are specially prone in a time of secular calamity, breakdown and foreboding. They constitute a temptation for Christians at such times as insidious as the comfortable 'bourgeois' optimism that makes its appeal in periods of stable prosperity. Our task is, surely to preach hope in a time of public despair, and to emphasize the Gospel warnings in times of complacency. Mr Christopher Dawson's second series of Gifford Lectures on Religion and the Rise of European Culture seems to me to be useful reading at a time like the present; and it is hard to believe that the positive cultural influence of Christianity in the formative centuries of the Middle Ages was a total misdirection of the forces of religion.

I have fewer criticisms to offer of the 'incarnational' school. I should myself say that human action is not only preparatory of God's Reign, but—when informed by grace—is an effect of the anticipated Reign of God. And I should make a similar observation with regard to the 'parable' of Père Congar, in which, I gather Père Malevez finds the sort of position which he would himself adopt :

A master puts a pupil to work on a set of very difficult problems. The pupil will not find the right answer, though he will get more or less close to it and tries over and over again. His master will tell him the answer, but only when, by dint of his own efforts, he has developed his mind and his powers in

a way which he would never have dreamed of if the answer had been given him at the start. The pupil will have in some way raised himself to the level of the solution; he will only really receive it because, in his effort to discover it for himself, he will have as it were expanded himself so as to be capable of it.

Few parables are completely adequate allegories, and this one is deficient in so far as it suggests that our mundane efforts are not themselves, as preparatory of the Reign of God, the effects of grace and therefore of the anticipated Reign of God; or that they do not survive, in their transfigured fruits, in the post-historic Reign of God.

There is one question which may still be asked: Are *all* human achievements, done in grace, capable of apotheosis in the post-historic Reign of God? Do we not ordinarily distinguish between ends, that is objects willed for their own sake, and means, that is objects and courses of action that are chosen only for the sake of some ulterior end? Are 'means' capable of 'apotheosis'?

This distinction of ends and means seems to me, for our present purposes, unsatisfactory, if only because so many of our objects and modes of activity are at once, though under different aspects, ends and means. It may be more helpful to remind ourselves of the hierarchy of human faculties, and the consequent hierarchy of values. Man's *differentia* in the animal kingdom is his possession of intelligence, and the intellect is his highest faculty. We can distinguish two elements in intellectual activity, the ratiocinative and the contemplative, and of these the former is 'with a view' to the latter. In contemplative activity we are in touch with the real and are united with it, and there is nothing beyond union with the real. By virtue of memory these moments of union are incorporated into the abiding stuff of our soul, so that it is when we contemplate, in so far as we contemplate and in so far as we contemplate the most worthy objects, that this world becomes for us a 'valley of soul-making' and is at

the same time taken up into our own immortal being. I therefore suggest that our activity in this life is capable of being 'eternalized' in so far as it is contemplative.

It should be added that in this suggestion there is no implication of an exaggerated intellectualism. In contemplation we hold commerce not with concepts but with realities, and especially with personalities. We contemplate those whom we love, and love those whom we contemplate, above all the Holy Trinity. And I would further add that contemplation, as I use the word here, is an element in all human action and experience, though occurring in very various degrees of depth and significance. Its focus and *raison d'être* are found in the liturgy, where with Christ, through him and in him, mankind comes into the right cognitive and affective relation with *Ens a se*, and therefore with all that in any sense is.

THE WORLD OF THE SENSES IN PAGAN AND CHRISTIAN THOUGHT

By PROF. A. H. ARMSTRONG

IN the first three centuries of the Christian era Christians found themselves confronted with a variety of attitudes among their educated pagan contemporaries to the world of which we are aware in sense-experience, the material universe. Of these the most important were the unqualified religious veneration of the material universe as divine which we associate particularly with Stoicism, the Platonic outlook which became dominant in the third century A.D. and was already influential before, and the radical pessimism of the Gnostics. There was also, at least in the first two centuries of our era, a vigorous minority who professed with imperturbable dogmatism the naïve materialism of Epicurus and continued the protest of their master against the veneration of the universe as divine and all its implications; but it will not be necessary to discuss Epicureanism here, as it was regarded as beyond the pale by all religious persons, Christian as well as pagan, and did not influence the development of Christian thought, though we shall notice one striking coincidence between Epicurean and Christian ways of thinking about the material universe. The other three attitudes must, however, be considered carefully, because they (with of course innumerable personal variations and intermediate stages) go to make up the 'climate of opinion' in which the early Christian thinkers worked out their own views of how the teaching of Scripture and Tradition about man's relation to his material environment and his own body was to be understood. This investigation is by no means of merely historical interest. The reactions of the first Christian thinkers

to their pagan intellectual environment have had a continuing effect on Catholic thought down to our own times, and the problems with which we find them grappling are often still actual and by no means completely solved. The present study cannot of course do more than give a sketchy and inadequate survey of a vast and much discussed complex of subjects, but it may serve to stimulate further discussion and investigation.

We begin with what we may call for convenience the 'cosmic religion'.¹ By this is meant either, quite simply, a religious attitude of mind which sees the Cosmos, the material universe in its order and beauty, or at least its highest part, the heavenly bodies and the aether or fire of which they are made, as divine, and the supreme divinity: or an attitude of mind which recognizes some sort of extramundane divinity but sees the Cosmos and especially the Upper Cosmos of the heavenly bodies as the supreme manifestation of divinity and the only way for the mind to ascend to the divine, and for which God is essentially a cosmic god, completely expressed in the Cosmos and with no other function except to be its first principle and directing intelligence. The first certain appearance of this cosmic religion in Greek thought² is in the later dialogues of Plato, especially Book XII of the *Laws*, and the *Epinomis*: but Platonic religion, as we shall see, was never simply cosmic religion, which owes its full philosophical formulation

¹ A vast amount, of very unequal value, has been written on this subject. An excellent and extremely comprehensive recent work is the second volume of Père Festugière's *Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste, Le Dieu Cosmique* (Paris, Gabalda 1949). Cumont's great studies of late pagan beliefs about the life after death, *Le Symbolisme Funéraire des Romains* (Paris 1942) and *Lux Perpetua* (Paris 1949) are of great value and interest in this connexion.

² Bidez and Cumont seem to have established that astral religion and the belief in astral immortality came to the Greeks from the 'Magusaeans', Magians from Persia settled in Asia Minor, whose beliefs show signs of strong Babylonian influence cp. *Les Mages Hellenisés*, Paris 1938 and Cumont *Lux Perpetua*, chap. III. They hold that early Pythagorean doctrine already shows signs of this Eastern influence, but our evidence for early Pythagoreanism is so scanty and uncertain that this must remain doubtful.

rather to Aristotle and the Stoics. Its influence was extremely widespread, affecting the minds of a great many who adhered to no particular philosophical school and extending well beyond the circle of those who had received any tincture of philosophical education, as Cumont's studies have shown: but it was essentially a learned and scientific rather than a genuinely popular way of thinking.

It is not possible here to discuss all the varying formulations of the cosmic religion which resulted from the interaction of Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic and Neo-Pythagorean ideas in the period between the third century B.C. and the third century A.D. (they will be found fully discussed in Festugière's book referred to above). We may, however, attempt to summarize those doctrines of the cosmic religion which were common to all schools and widely accepted by educated men of no precise philosophical allegiance, with some indication of the possible variations. According to this way of thinking the material universe is formed and ordered by a divine intelligence, immanent or transcendent, and is consequently good and beautiful, manifesting the divine intelligence particularly in the order and regularity of its movements. It is the perfect manifestation of the divinity and is therefore unchangeable as a whole, either everlasting or repeating itself exactly in every detail in an endless series of cycles. Man can only find God in or through the contemplation of the universe, and especially its upper and outer part, the region of the heavenly bodies: for the Upper Cosmos is generally considered far more good and beautiful and a better manifestation of God than the Lower Cosmos, the sublunary world, though the sharpness of the contrast varies. The heavenly bodies and the outer sphere of heaven itself are divine (either the supreme or subordinate divinities). Fire, light, aether are either the intelligent divine substance themselves or very closely akin to it.

Man's soul is itself of divine nature and substance and, because it is, can contemplate the divinity in the universe and will after death either be re-absorbed into the general mass of the divinity or will return to its proper home in the Upper Cosmos among the stars (and spend a happy eternity watching them go round). The circular motions and spherical shape of the heavenly bodies are considered far more perfect and beautiful than the irregular shapes and straight-line movements of the beings of our sublunary world. In the sharp contrast which is characteristic of the later forms of the cosmic religion between the poor little beings here below in the sublunary world with their jerky incomplete movements in pursuit of external and unsatisfying ends, in a moist fog of corruption and pollution in the most ignoble place in the universe, and the eternal dance of the immeasurably vast spheres of fire, pursuing their self-contained circuits in the regions above the moon where all is brightness, purity and intelligent order, there is a curious kind of pseudo-otherworldliness which has had a considerable effect on the minds and imaginations of Europeans in later centuries.

As we have already remarked, the cosmic religion, like so much else of importance in later Greek thought, had its origin in Plato: and right down to the end of paganism we find pagan Platonists, Plotinus, Julian, Proclus, Simplicius, vigorously defending the cardinal doctrines of the cosmic religion, the eternity of the visible universe and the divinity of the heavenly bodies, against Gnostics and orthodox Christians. But none the less the Platonism of the first centuries of the Christian era regards the material universe in a way which must be clearly distinguished from the cosmic religion just outlined. Platonic religion was never merely cosmic religion. The Platonists remained faithful to the teaching of their master in maintaining the existence of the transcendent spiritual World of Forms, beyond and far higher

in value than the visible universe. The contrast between the material and spiritual worlds was for Platonists far more important than that between the Upper and Lower Cosmos. And for them the supreme object of the human intelligence was not simply to return to the stars but to rise to its proper activity of disembodied contemplation of the Forms and their First Principle, the One or Good: and it was very much a matter of temperament how much importance a Platonist attached to the contemplation of the heavenly bodies as a preliminary approach to the divine. The greatest of the Platonists, Plotinus, though he produced an admirable defence of the essentials of cosmic religion against the Gnostics,¹ certainly did not attach much importance to it. The way to God for him lay straight from his own soul through his intellect: his approach was essentially interior, not from the external world. Further, for Platonists the material universe as a whole was not absolute perfection, and the highest conceivable perfection, as it was for the Stoics. It was only the best possible universe that could be produced under difficult circumstances. There was and always remained in it an independent element of evil and disorder which the divine intelligence had to bring under control as best it could. The Platonists of the Empire certainly never wavered in their conviction that the material universe as a whole was good, beautiful and manifestly the work of the divine intelligence. But they insisted very strongly on the contrast between its necessary imperfection and the perfection of the intelligible world; and they took a strongly other-worldly view of the destiny of man, seeing the sense-world and the life of the senses as a hindrance to the soul, something to be escaped from and transcended; indeed their language at times in this sort of context is not far removed from that of the Gnostics, though their fundamental position remains very different.

¹ *Enneads* II, 9.

The pessimistic Gnostics¹ of course take a radically unfavourable view of the material universe. Not only was matter for them evil, but the formation of the material universe was not the work of God but the aberration of a fallen or rebellious inferior spiritual power. The object of the Gnostic was to escape by his secret knowledge from this evil and imprisoning environment and ascend to the transcendent spiritual world. And Manichaeism, coming from a background of Iranian dualism, condemned the material universe even more radically as the work of the Evil Principle, the eternal enemy of God.

It was in the context of these divergent lines of thought, with their mutual influences and reactions, that the Christians had to work out their own view of the place of sense-experience and the sense-world in human life, a view which would do justice at once to man's everyday experience and to the revealed facts of his absolute creaturely dependence on God, his redemption through the Incarnation of the Word, the sacraments and the whole activity of the visible Church, and his final end which is at once purely spiritual, a transformation into the likeness of God who is Spirit and union with Him in the Beatific Vision, and involves as a necessary and essential part the Resurrection of the Body and the glorifying of the whole material creation. Even without the complications introduced by late-Hellenistic ways of thinking this would never have been an easy task. The Catholic Faith does not permit any facile and obvious solutions in this matter. And it was a very great achievement that by the later patristic period so much that was unsatisfactory in contemporary thought had been rejected, so much that was valuable had been taken over and transformed, and the Catholic position

¹ Among those who speak the language of a secret *gnosis* or saving knowledge there are writers who take a thoroughly positive and optimistic view of the material universe. Several of the pagan gnostic treatises which make up the *Corpus Hermeticum* expound the cosmic religion in a form like that of the pseudo-Aristotelian *De Mundo*, though others are thoroughly pessimistic and dualist.

in many ways clearly and satisfactorily stated. The two extremes, the idolatry of the cosmic religion and the Gnostic and Manichæan blasphemy against the Creator, were finally rejected and condemned. St Leo, in the great passage of his seventh Christmas sermon¹ where he rebukes the Christians who still turn to salute the rising sun before they enter St Peter's, states the essential points of the Christian outlook on the material creation with his usual classic balance and clarity and magnificence of language. The passage is worth quoting at length. After some extremely vigorous remarks about the behaviour of the persons in question St Leo goes on: 'What is the sun, and what is the moon? They are only parts of the visible creation, things which give bodily light.' Then follow some observations on the practical usefulness of the heavenly bodies, very much in the vein of Hellenistic popular theodicy, and then St Leo continues: *'Expergiscere, o homo, et dignitatem tuæ cognosce naturæ. Recordare te factum ad imaginem Dei; quæ, etsi in Adam corrupta, in Christo tamen est reformata.'* 'Man, awake, and recognize the dignity of your own nature. Remember that you were made in the image of God; and though it was spoilt in Adam, it has been re-made again in Christ. Use these visible creatures as they ought to be used, as you use earth, sea, sky, air, springs and rivers; and praise and glorify the Creator for everything fair and wonderful in them. Do not devote yourself to the light in which birds and snakes, beasts and cattle, flies and worms delight. Feel bodily light with your bodily senses and clasp with all the strength of your mind that true light which "lightens every man coming into this world" and of which the Prophet says "Come to him and be enlightened, and your faces shall not be ashamed". For if we are the temple of God, and the Spirit of God dwells in us, what everyone of the faithful has in his own soul is more than what he admires

¹ *In Nativitate Domini Sermo VII* (XXVII in Ballerini-Migne).

in the sky (*Si enim templum Dei sumus, et Spiritus Dei habitat in nobis, plus est quod fidelis quisque in suo habet animo, quam quod miratur in caelo*). We are not of course, dearly beloved, telling you this to persuade you to despise the works of God, or to think that there is anything against your faith in the things which the good God has made good; but so that you may use every kind of creature, and all the furniture of this world, reasonably and temperately. "For the things which are seen", as the Apostle says "are temporal; the things which are not seen are eternal." So, since we are born to the things of this present life but reborn to those of the future life, let us not devote ourselves to temporal goods but be set on eternal ones; and, that we may be able to look more closely on our hope, let us consider in this very mystery of the Birthday of the Lord what the grace of God has given to our nature. Let us listen to the Apostle when he says "For you are dead, and your life is hid with Christ in God. When Christ your life shall appear, then you will appear with him in glory"; who lives and reigns with the Father and the Holy Spirit for ever and ever. Amen.'

This may all seem to us straightforward and even obvious enough, and certainly an authentic echo of the teaching of the New Testament. But there is a great deal in it which will repay detailed consideration. First we may note that St Leo's insistence that the sun and moon are just material things, *corporeae lucis elementa* and that redeemed humanity surpasses the heavens in dignity and interest, which may seem to us simple common-sense and elementary religion, would have been profoundly shocking to St Leo's few pagan contemporaries, and would have outraged the finest religious sensibilities of most educated men a couple of centuries earlier. Even Plotinus, to whom the cosmic religion meant less than to any other pagan Platonist, regards a similar claim by the Gnostics to a kinship with the divine which

they deny to the stars as an intolerable piece of blasphemous arrogance.¹ This, from the point of view of adherents of the cosmic religion, was the great blasphemy of which Epicureans, Gnostics and Orthodox Christians were alike guilty. It is one of the very few points in which Epicurean and Christian thought coincide. We find Lucretius proving on Epicurean principles against believers in the cosmic religion that the heavenly bodies cannot be alive and intelligent²; for the Epicureans intelligence is found only in the anthropomorphic gods of the *intermundia* and in man, so that man is akin to the divine in a way in which the stars are not.

But St Leo's manner of disposing of the cosmic religion has deeper implications, more immediately relevant to ourselves. His *plus est quod fidelis quisque in suo habet animo quam quod miratur in coelo*, with what follows, shows us that interiority, that assertion of the absolute primacy of spirit, which is surely an essential part of any authentic Christian thinking about body and soul and the world of the senses. God is Spirit, and he comes to us so that we come to him in and through our spirit, and man's spiritual activity as knower and lover of God has an unconditional primacy over his external bodily activities in the sense-world. It was by teaching St Augustine the nature of spirit and the way to God in the spirit that Plotinus led him back to St John and St Paul: and it is the fundamental community of outlook on this point which justifies the use which the Fathers made of Platonism and especially of the most spiritual of Platonists, Plotinus, and the continuing influence of Plotinus on Christian thought. It is true that this insistence on interiority and spirituality must not lead us into any concessions to crypto-Manichaeism or the bad side of Platonism; it must not lead us to deny the real

¹ II, 9, especially chapters IX and XVI. Plotinus's general attitude to the material universe in this treatise is in most ways much more acceptable to a Catholic than that of his gnostic opponents.

² V, 122-45.

co-operation of the body and the senses in the activity of the spirit, or to fall into that despising of the good things God in his goodness has made against which St Leo immediately warns us (to this we shall have to return); but St Leo's final quotation from St Paul reminds us that in some very real sense a death to the things of this world is a necessary condition of Christian life.

The change from cosmic to interior and spiritual religion has important consequences for the Christian attitude to natural science. For the adherents of the cosmic religion natural science either actually is theology, the study of the nature and behaviour of God, as it was for the Stoics, or at least the only way to God conceived as a quasi-spatially transcendent *deus extramundanus* who makes the cosmos work from outside and has no other function, but is completely expressed in its order and beauty.¹ But in Christian thought (and already in the thought of Plotinus) natural science is no longer confused or integrated into a false synthesis with metaphysics and theology, and this is to the advantage of both. Metaphysical thinking is recognized as something distinct from the science which is pre-occupied with the quantitative and measurable aspects of things; it becomes a reflexion on immediate spiritual or intellectual experience leading to an intuition of being (this does not necessarily imply that the body or the senses have no part to play in intellectual experience or that man exists in two distinct worlds with different sets of entities, the spiritual or intelligible and the material, though this is a delusion which easily arises from this way of thinking); and natural science is set free to find its own methods and go its own way because particular scientific theories no longer form part of theology (cosmic theology

¹This is the conception found most clearly expressed in the pseudo-Aristotelian *De Mundo* and which had a great influence on late pagan thought. It reappeared again later, and in eighteenth century Germany was mistaken for the orthodox Christian doctrine of God. Cp. J. Pieper *Wahrheit, der Dinge*, chap. II, 10, pp. 48-50.

included as essential parts a particular cosmology and a very special sort of materialist psychology). Of course the ancient cosmology of the sublunary world and the æthereal spheres continued for centuries to be believed in and taken very seriously by Christians and provided the imaginative setting for their thinking, in particular about the life after death¹; but the essential link has been broken. The acceptance by Catholic thinkers of Plotinus's refutation of materialistic ways of thinking and Plotinus's 'interior' approach to metaphysics have had the very satisfactory result that a Catholic philosopher or theologian can accept any scientific theory that the evidence seems to require (provided that it is a genuine theory of natural science and not a piece of disguised philosophising) without its affecting his philosophy or theology in any important way. This is the reason why the final disappearance of the old cosmology as a result of Copernican and post-Copernican developments in astronomy has really made so little difference to orthodox Christian thought; those people who continue to insist that it ought to make all the difference in the world and was in fact a decisive point in the history of our thinking about God and man perhaps do so unconsciously because the change in cosmology provides a good symbol for a change in the outlook on man, nature and God which came about for quite unastronomical and unscientific reasons.²

There is a corollary to all this which may perhaps be less pleasing to Catholic natural scientists than what has just been said. The way of thinking just described surely implies that the study (and still more the exploitation) of the material universe in its materiality by the

¹ Cumont gives many perfectly valid examples of this in *Lux Perpetua*, but he does not seem to see the point here being made about the breaking of the essential link between cosmology and metaphysics and theology. We still of course use, and shall probably always use, much of the admirable symbolism which derives from the ancient cosmology, especially the symbolism of light.

² I owe this suggestion to a conversation with Mr S. L. Bethell.

methods of natural science should never be of great importance or interest to the Christian community or to most individual Christians. Natural science is good and legitimate, because the material creation is good, and it may provide the scientist with motives for praising God in his works: but it is not on the normal direct way to God. *Lucem corpoream sensu tange corporeo et toto mentis affectu illud verum lumen amplectere . . . Plus est quod fidelis quisque in suo habet animo quam quod miratur in coelo . . . non temporalibus bonis dediti sed aeternis simus intenti*: this is the authentic spirit of the New Testament, but it is hardly an encouragement to any community or individual to devote the major part of their energy and resources to the pursuit of pure or applied science. The proper position, in fact, of natural science in a healthy Christian community appears to be a marginal and relatively obscure one. The Catholic apologist seems to be justified in pointing out the great contributions made by mediaeval Christendom to the development of modern natural science, and in asserting that in principle the Church gives all legitimate freedom to the scientist. But the non-Christian 'scientific humanist' also seems to be right in seeing religion, and in particular the Catholic religion, as an obstacle to the sort of large-scale, rapid, scientific progress which he approves and wants to see continued at an increasing rate, and which, it seems likely, is only possible in a fundamentally irreligious society.

We have seen from St Leo how the Christian mind rejected the cosmic religion without falling into the opposite error of pessimistic Gnosticism; and in commenting on St Leo we have been able to see something of the positive contribution which Platonism, and especially the Platonism of Plotinus, brought to Christian thought. We now have to try to consider the negative contribution, the deleterious influence of the bad side of Platonism on Christian thinking about the body and

the sense-world. Platonism was so much the dominant philosophy of the third and fourth centuries A.D., and the Platonic outlook was so close to the Christian, that it was extremely difficult for Christians to disentangle their thought about the body and the sense-world from the less satisfactory elements in Platonism (St Irenaeus, who lived before the period when Platonic influence was strongly felt in the Church, has a more satisfactory view of the unity of body and soul and their common redemption than some of his successors). On other great fundamentals, Creation and Grace, the most 'Platonist' Fathers made no concessions to the point of view of pagan Platonism. And we should not forget that it is after all the deeply Plotinian St Augustine who has stated most admirably the difference which the Incarnation makes between Christian and pagan Platonist ways of thinking¹: nor of course did any 'Platonist' Father ever deny or evacuate of real meaning the Incarnation, the Sacraments, the visible Church or the Resurrection of the Body. The unsatisfactory influence of Platonism on Christian thought has been something more subtle than heresy, actual distortion of dogma, and perhaps for that reason more persistent. Platonism has in different ways been a living force in Christian thought in every period of the Church's history, and never more so than to-day. Because of the size and complexity of the subject it is quite impossible to deal with it here historically. All we can do is to state the main issues in a formalized and summarized way, noting as we go the very great contribution brought by St Thomas to the proper valuation of the place of the body and the sense-world in the Christian life, and keeping our attention fixed on the present situation and what remains to be done.

The first way in which Platonism has had an unsatisfactory effect on Christian thinking is by leading it to too great an insistence on the inferiority of body and

¹ Confessions, VII, 9. *De Civitate Dei* X, 24, 28, 29.

sense-experience, by presenting them as always essentially a hindrance, never a help to the spiritual life, as something to be escaped from; and particularly by leading Christians to think of sex and of man's whole animal-biological make-up and activity as something essentially unsuitable to his true nature, fitting his spirit ill, an encumbrance in some way intrinsically bound up with original sin (for pagan Platonists the proper state of the human spirit was either complete disembodiment, or embodiment in an æthereal or astral body, spherical and sexless). Here St Thomas's influence ought to be decisive. His drastically modified form of Aristotle's doctrine that the soul is the act and form of the body makes a clean break with the undesirable sort of Platonism just described: for it means that the soul, though it is still thought of as having activities which transcend the body as spirit and intellect, as knower and lover of God, also forms a unity with the body, with this particular male or female body in this particular environment, so close that there are not two distinct lives, a body-life and a soul-life, but a single human life, though one lived on different levels of experience and activity, in which soul and body cannot do without each other but soul is active in all bodily activities and perceptions and the highest spiritual activities need bodily support and co-operation (this at least seems to the writer to be good Thomism, whether or not it is all to be found explicitly in St Thomas or his commentators). And in a great article of the 'Summa Theologiae', *Utrum in statu innocentiae fuisset generatio per coitum*,¹ he disposes magnificently of the Platonic disgusted shrinking from sex in the form which it took in some Eastern Doctors, notably St Gregory of Nyssa with his theory of the connexion of sexual generation and original sin.² (It should be noted that

¹ I, 98, 2: the first article of the question is also worth reading in this connexion.

² *De Hominis Opificio*, chaps xvi and xvii.

St Thomas is here following a lead given by St Augustine.)¹ Unfortunately in spite of the admirable teaching of St Thomas and the general lip-service paid to his principles there is still a good deal of 'affective' Platonism about, a way of feeling and speaking about the body and sex which has outlived the philosophical theory on which it depends. Perhaps it is rather a special obligation for those of us who are 'Christian Platonist' rather than 'Thomist' in general outlook to do our best to see that in the present theological and philosophical revival this distortion of feeling is got rid of as completely as possible (it is now pretty generally recognized as an evil).

The second adverse effect of Platonism (obviously closely connected with the first) is what may be called the two-world delusion. By this is meant the drawing of too sharp and absolute a line between the two levels of experience, sensible and intellectual, so that the soul when it thinks truly is thought of as operating by itself, quite detached from the body and the senses, in an intelligible world other than the world of the senses (to deny this does not of course involve making any foolish attempt to explain the higher in terms of the lower, intelligence in terms of sensation and material reactions; it simply means to say that the soul when it thinks truly contemplates the intelligible being of the things of sense-experience, and so becomes aware of God). This means that the body can be of no real help to the soul in its highest and proper activity. This of course is generally recognized to be the point of disagreement between St Thomas's view of human knowledge and that of the 'Platonist' Fathers. But in official Thomism, at any rate, certain ways of talking about *species* and 'dematerialization', together with too sharp a distinction between the *ordo cognoscendi* and the *ordo essendi*, and also some views of the nature of abstraction, seem to show the two-world delusion creeping back in a disguised

¹ *De Civ. Dei* XIV, chaps. xxi-xxvi.

form. The following sentences from a recent article by Dom Illtyd Trethowan provide a very good starting-point for right thinking on this subject. 'It seems to me that we become conscious of ourselves as acted upon by other "things" and of other "things" as acting upon ourselves. Our knowledge of God arises as the knowledge of the source of all this activity—but whether primarily as the source of the activity of other "things" or of our own activity in knowing them it is hard to say'.¹ The context shows that the consciousness of other things here referred to comes in sense-experience. We are kept firmly in one world while giving knowledge its highest range. The passage also suggests a way of answering another not irrelevant question, that of how far extension of our knowledge of creatures helps us to attain our end of knowing and loving God. From this point of view knowledge of creatures, like possession of creatures, appears in itself, without further specification, indifferent, good or bad according to circumstances. Knowledge of creatures will be good if it is of a kind and amount to intensify our awareness of God as 'the source of all this activity', and bad if it distracts us from that awareness. Obviously the extent of knowledge which is helpful and valuable will vary greatly from person to person. But it does seem as if, starting from this point, we should be able to arrive at some conclusions about the *kind* of knowledge of creatures which is valuable: the present writer at least has decided views on the subject which he has tried to make clear in several recent articles and papers and is prepared to argue further.

Closely connected with the two-world delusion is that preference for the general, abstract and mathematically

¹ 'Second Thoughts on Certainty.' THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW, Spring 1950, No. 212, p. 162. The next sentence 'It would appear, however, that we find God least obscurely when our attention to sense-presented objects is reduced to a minimum and we are predominantly aware of his action on our own souls', is in entire accordance with the way of thinking just outlined in my comment on St Leo.

regular, that despising of the irregular, dislike of the unusual, and denial that the individual can be an object of true knowledge, of which we find so much in Aristotelianism as well as Platonism, for Aristotle in this way as in others remained very Platonist in his outlook. It is in fact characteristic of classical Greek thought, and classical Greek art in general, and is apparent wherever classical Greek culture exercised its influence, in the enthusiasm of ancient orators for the commonplace, the *locus communis*,¹ for instance; or in the division, so characteristic of Hellenistic humanism, between the theoretical art of music, a study of mathematical proportions which formed part of the education of a gentleman and had nothing whatever to do with music in our sense, and the despised and vulgar trade of actually producing pleasing sounds.² But it finds its supreme philosophical expressions in the Theory of Forms as stated by Plato himself and in Aristotle's doctrine of the species-form individuated by matter. (We should note that this is a point where the outlook of the modern scientist coincides with that of the classical Platonist; they are both 'essentialists', to adopt a modern distinction which is useful here. On the other hand it seems to the present writer that Plotinus is not really an 'essentialist', and that in general in the late-Hellenistic world, the period of the Roman Empire, there was a general movement of thought away from 'essentialism'—one aspect of the so-called 'decadence' or 'decline of rationalism'—which was a necessary preparation for the conversion of the ancient world to Christianity.)³ The

¹ Cp. Cicero *Orator*, 36, 126, *De Oratore* II, 133 ff.

² Cp. St Augustine, *De Musica* I, 4-6. H.-I. Marrou, *S. Augustin et la Fin de la Culture Antique* (Paris 1949), pp. 197-210 (this book, with the 'Retractatio' attached to the 1949 edition, is most relevant to the whole subject matter of the present article).

³ And perhaps had its uses even from the point of view of the development of science. Cp. H.-I. Marrou in the 'Retractatio' published with the second edition of his *St Augustin et la Fin de la Culture Antique*, pp. 678-83 (and pp. 152-7 of the original work).

The whole 'Retractatio' is of very great importance as a discussion of this question of the alleged decadence of the first Christian centuries.

consequences of this sort of Platonism in the field of æsthetics can be grotesque enough; we may think of the extraordinary discussion of 'pure pleasures' in the *Philebus*¹ or of St Augustine's insisting, in the teeth of the evidence drawn from the practice of the greatest Latin hexameter poets, above all Virgil with his continual variation of rhythm, that a hexameter is only really satisfactory if it has a strong caesura in the third foot.² But its consequences when applied to the structure of created beings and our knowledge of them are a good deal more serious. It is a grave distortion of our experience to insist that only the specific and not the particular and unique characteristics of an individual thing belong to its form and that we have no real knowledge of the individual because true knowledge must always be abstract and conceptual. Of course we must not exaggerate. Things do really have common characteristics, and it is often necessary to concentrate our attention on them (i.e., to abstract) and to base general laws on our observation of them. But the individual in its particularity is primary in being and knowledge. We must recognize that the goodness and beauty of God manifested in creatures can be seen, and seen most vividly, in the particular, the irregular, the strange, and not only in universal mathematical regularities, as St Augustine thought, at least when he wrote the *De Musica*.³ After all it is in the individual and extraordinary, the unique person or event, rather than in the regular and general that the Bible finds the manifestation of God.

This very sketchy survey of the effect of Platonism on Christian thought about the body and the sense-world should at least be enough to show that a great deal of thinking remains to be done and that, great though the contributions of the Fathers and of St Thomas have been, they have not settled everything. It is a field in

¹ 50 E ff.

² *De Musica* V, 3-4.

³ VI, 10.

which distortion and exaggeration are easy and we should be particularly grateful for good guides. There has recently appeared a book by the French moralist Gustave Thibon, *Ce Que Dieu a Uni*,¹ which seems to the present writer to be certainly the most enlightening and helpful treatment of the unity of body and soul in the light of Catholic doctrine that our period has produced (it is also admirably written). It is not a book which can be summarized or reduced to a formula, because a great deal of its virtue lies in the delicacy and exactitude of its detailed observation of human experience. But it can at least be said that it is outstanding in that it gives their very fullest due to the body and the life of the senses and insists on the necessity of their frankly recognized co-operation in the life of the spirit without losing sight of the need for asceticism, and while maintaining to the full the primacy of spirit. It is a book which is in the best sense both 'Platonic' and 'incarnational', respecting both body and spirit in their degree and their unity. Much of its content might find symbolical expression in that great image of the Charioteer and his two horses in the *Phaedrus*, which can so easily be made to express an idea of the unity of man beyond anything at which Plato consciously arrived and which, so interpreted, with its picture of the intellect carried to heaven by the horses of bodily passion and emotion which it masters and guides, is perhaps the finest symbol of our nature at which poetic intuition has ever arrived.

¹ Paris-Lyon, Lardanchet, 1947.

THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE

By THE REVD HUMPHREY J. T. JOHNSON

'CATHOLICS and atheists', wrote Professor Sherwood Taylor in *The Catholic Herald* of 12th August 1949, 'have the same scientific evidence about the present races of man and the remains of ancient man-like organisms: but the Catholic accepts a piece of revealed information that the atheist rejects—that all men are descended from Adam—whatever those four letters may signify.' He then asks the question whether the Catholic scientist is to let that fact, not derived from science, enter into his scientific world picture. The first thought which may suggest itself to some of us on reading these words is that if the four letters ADAM can mean anything which we would like them to mean can we really be said to have a piece of revealed information at all? If the atheist can understand them in any way that he wishes, what is left for him and the Catholic to quarrel about? For he too will cheerfully subscribe on this condition to the doctrine that all races living and extinct are descended from 'Adam'. A century ago an orthodox Christian, Catholic or Protestant, had a clear picture of Adam in his mind. Our first parent was a more real person than William the Conqueror and if the details of his life were less abundant they were nevertheless more sure. For they came to us not on the authority of any human chronicler but were dictated by the Holy Ghost himself. A history of the world written by a Christian must, it was held, have the story of Adam and Eve standing at its head.

There are those who in 1950 feel on this subject as it was felt in 1850. An American professor of 'Fundamentalist' opinions and a not unintelligent man not only accepts the whole biblical story of our first parents in

its most literal form, but claims that he can deduce further information from it.¹ He believes that he can fix the precise hour of the day at which Adam began to give names to the animals, and the length of time which it took him to name them and the hours at which he began to feel first lonely and then drowsy. The great bulk of Protestant opinion has moved in an opposite direction. For it Adam and Eve, Cain and Abel, even Noah and his sons, have left the solid earth and taken flight to the realms of mythology, peopled by the divinities of Babylonia and Egypt and the heroes and demi-gods of Graeco-Roman antiquity. In the Catholic camp divisions of opinion are now discernible. We too have our fundamentalists, more numerous and more vocal than their Protestant counterparts. But fundamentalism in its extreme form seems to be disappearing from among us. Probably no living theologian would hold it to be an article of faith that mankind is only 6,000 years old. Few, if any, would regard it as *de fide* that man originated in Mesopotamia. Some would perhaps consider it so that the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil were what would be recognized by botanists as trees. Many more would hold this without regarding it as an article of faith. A still larger number would hold that man was formed out of clay, but those who would maintain that this was a piece of revealed knowledge are growing steadily fewer. The great majority of theologians would unquestionably treat as factual the physical production of Eve out of Adam, but it may be questioned whether they would regard it as a part of revelation, though many undoubtedly would do so.

The widest measure of unanimity would be found on the question whether mankind descends from a single pair. Denial of this proposition would even twenty years ago have been generally stigmatized as heretical or at least almost so—'temerarious' would perhaps have

¹F. L. Marsh, *Evolution, Creation and Science* (Washington, 1944).

sounded hardly strong enough. So inseparable from orthodoxy was this belief held to be that its definition as an article of faith was under consideration when the Vatican Council took place. Chapter xv of the proposed 'Dogmatic Constitution' was devoted to this question, though in fact it never reached the point of discussion. The draft of the proposed decree is, however, of much interest as revealing the state of theological opinion some eighty years ago. '*Imprimis itaque*', it ran, '*tam veteris quam novi testamenti revelationi innixi profitemur et docemus, totum humanum genus ab uno primo parente Adam ortum habere. Ipse enim Adam, cui cum uxore sua Heva matre cunctorum viventium benedicens Deus mandavit replere terram, a Spiritu Sancto in libro Sapientiae (x, 1) dicitur primus formatus a Deo pater orbis terrarum, et discrete apostolus gentium praedicavit, fecisse Deum ex uno omne genus hominum inhabitare super universam faciem terrae (Actus xvii, 26). Immo negata hac veritate, etiam alterum revelatum dogma peccati originalis ab uno genitore in omnes homines transfusi et redemptionis omnium per unum mediatorem Dei et hominum hominem Jesum Christum violatur, contra doctrinam ab eodem apostolo traditam: sicut per unius delictum in omnes homines in condemnationem: sic et per unius justitiam in omnes homines in justificationem vitae (Rom. v, 18). Unde sub anathemate damnamus errorem, quo haec unitas et communis origo totius humani generis negatur.*' (Mansi-Petit, Conciles, Tome XIV, col. 70). An annotation says that this doctrine is connected with the whole economy of revelation, but that in our own age it has been called in doubt '*ab hominibus quibusdam ex levissimis rationibus geologicis aut ethnographicis*' (ib. c. 108).

The grounds for the proposed definition are two-fold: that a multiple origin for humanity conflicts with the testimony of Scripture and that it is opposed to Catholic doctrine touching the transmission of original sin. It is of interest to note that the proposal that the descent of mankind from one pair should be made an article of

faith is an indication that in the opinion of the theologians who drew up the suggested decree it had not up to that period been declared to be such. It has not been defined since the Vatican Council, and it seems certain that the belief that it is a proposition to be held as directly *de fide* is open to question. Probably the current theological opinion on this point is that the proposition is what theologians term a 'dogmatic fact', that is to say, something which, while not the formal object of any papal or conciliar definition, is so closely bound up with the Faith that it cannot be rejected without danger of falling into heresy. '*De fait, l'église a toujours considéré*', say P. Curveilher and L. Pirot (Supplement to Vigouroux's *Dictionnaire de la Bible*, Vol. II, col. 603, 604), '*l'unité du genre humain comme un fait dogmatique dont l'historicité était nécessaire à ses doctrines sur le péché original, sur la grace, sur la rédemption . . .*' The decree of the Pontifical Biblical Commission touching the interpretation of Genesis I-III issued on 30th June 1909 mentions the unity of the human race as one of the propositions of which the 'literal sense' must be retained, associating it with the foundations of the Christian religion. The unity considered seems to be descent from one pair. It was not, of course, within the province of the Biblical Commission to define the Faith of the Church.

Let us then direct our attention to an examination of three questions. Does the Bible explicitly teach the doctrine of the descent of humanity from a single pair? Is the dogma of original sin inextricably bound up with this belief? Can modern science adduce any facts which make for an at least *primâ facie* case for a reconsideration by Catholic theologians of the question of the unity of the human race? In the seventeenth century the exegetical eccentricities of Isaac de la Peyrère contained in his works *Praeadamitae* and *Systema Theologicum ex Praeadamitarum Hypothesi* sought to read into Genesis two separate accounts of the creation of mankind, one in

the first chapter and another in the second. The first he referred to the creation of preadamite man, from whom the Gentiles were supposed to be descended, and the second to the creation of Adam, the ancestor of the Jews. No one would now maintain such a position and the preadamite theory as expounded by de la Peyrère was condemned. Those who now question whether Scripture explicitly teaches the unity of mankind do so on another ground. It must be apparent to the most casual Bible reader that the sacred writers display a tendency to personify families, tribes and nations, referring to them as though they were individual men. The difficulties created, by the rise of the science of prehistoric archæology and increased knowledge of the ancient east, to the customary interpretation of the early part of the book of Genesis have brought us face to face with the problem whether this tendency to personify ethnic units may not have gone further than was formerly supposed. The question is extremely complicated. The Patriarchal narratives, says Père R. de Vaux, abound in individual traits irreducible to a collective sense. On the other hand, certain characters or episodes in them are susceptible of an ethnic one. We must remember, he continues, that the life of a chief conditions that of his group and that on the other hand tradition may ascribe to the ancestor some experiences of the group.¹ That the names in the 'Table of the Nations' in Genesis x are mainly those of peoples or tribes personified would now hardly be called in question. Admission of this fact makes it difficult to resist the conclusion that the names of at least the Cainite ante-diluvian patriarchs are not to be taken as those of individual men but rather as names of cultural groups associated with various phases in the progress of civilization. There are, however, those who shrink from

¹ *Revue Biblique*, July 1946, *Les Patriarches Hébreux et les découvertes modernes*, p. 326.

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such a conclusion, asserting that once it has been made we have no solid grounds for refusing to go one step further and to see in Adam not an individual man but a mere abstraction, a personification of mankind. That this is a *possible* interpretation of the story of Adam as related in Genesis seems hardly open to doubt and is now being admitted by Catholic scholars and exegetes. Père Dubarle, O.P., makes this admission under the *imprimatur* of the Vicar General of the Archdiocese of Paris, the *imprimi potest* of the provincial prior of his order, and the *nihil obstat* of a master in theology and a reader in theology.¹ The late Abbé Chaine, with the full approval of the authorities of the Archdiocese of Lyons, tells us that the book of Genesis does not by itself settle the question whether mankind is descended from a single pair. This question involves an appeal to the *magisterium* of the Church.² In a brochure which appears under the *imprimatur* of the Vicar-Apostolic of Johannesburg, the Abbé Henri Breuil, the foremost living authority on the art of palaeolithic man, while not denying the descent of mankind from one pair, says that the names Adam and Eve cover a whole stage, the longest one in the development of Humanity.³ Cain and Abel he regards as generic names given to two parallel types of Neolithic civilization.⁴ To assert, however, that the book of Genesis does not clearly teach the descent of mankind from a single pair is something different from saying that this idea was altogether alien to the minds of the author or authors, and there is an alluring simplicity in it such as we miss in the alternative supposition that at least the greater ethnic groups had diverse origins.

The few references to Adam in the later books of the Old Testament do not add information to what is contained

¹ *Les Sages d'Israël* (1946), pp. 19-23.

² *Le Livre de la Genèse*, pp. 54, 55.

³ *Science and Religion. Are they incompatible?* p. 10.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

in Genesis II-III. But a Catholic who feels drawn to a polygenist standpoint meets with greater difficulties when confronted with the teaching of St Paul. The passage in the Acts in which the Apostle says that God '*fecitque ex uno omne genus hominum*' (xvii, 26)¹ could perhaps be explained as meaning that he gave them the same nature rather than that all descended from a single pair, though this explanation seems a little forced. More difficult of explanation on the polygenist theory is Romans v, 17-19, '*Si enim unius delicto mors regnavit per unum . . .*' where *delictum unius* and *inobedientia unius* are set in opposition to *justitia unius* and *obeditio unius*. It remains of course true that whether mankind is derived from a single pair or not some particular man must, historically considered, have been the first sinner, but if the idea of such a unity is abandoned the passage loses much of its impressiveness, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid the conclusion that St Paul thought of Adam as the progenitor of all mankind. Did he hold that this proposition was an integral part of the Christian revelation, linked inseparably to the doctrine of Christ's mission as Redeemer? That he held it to be at least indirectly a part of revealed truth would up till yesterday have been universally accepted. But in an article entitled *Polygénisme* in the *Dictionnaire de la Théologie Catholique* the Abbés A. and J. Bouyssonie have asked for a re-examination of this question. This article, which is of highest interest, appears of course under an *imprimatur*. The authors are prehistoric archæologists of international repute, and have been led to raise the question on account of the possibility that future discoveries of remains of early man might give support to the belief that humanity as we know it is derived not from one, but from two or more stems. Need such a discovery, they invite us to consider, effect any radical change in our religious

¹ Some MSS contain *αἷματος*. This word implying that all mankind shares the same blood is, however, generally rejected by modern scholars as a gloss.

beliefs, since it is not the function of Scripture to settle problems of anthropology for us ? With due deference to the *magisterium* of the Church, they ask, therefore, whether St Paul was not concerned rather to lay stress on two fundamental truths, the universality of the reign of sin and the universality of the offer of Redemption, than to insist on the descent of mankind from a single pair as a proposition of equal importance. Furthermore, they ask, is it not possible that it was the collective guilt of a group rather than the guilt of a single individual which placed man in need of Redemption ? In other words, they suggest that we consider or reconsider the question whether the Bible really gives us any ethnological information or whether such problems as the relation of *Eoanthropus Dawsoni* to *Sinanthropus Pekinensis* can be discussed without reference to Genesis or to the Epistle to the Romans.

To this question it is difficult to give an answer which is absolute and unattached to any conditions. The authors of the article, pre-occupied with its scientific aspects, do not advert to whether the descent of mankind from a single pair is a proposition imposed on us, at least indirectly, by the Council of Trent, in the decree on original sin formulated in its fifth session. The decree contains phrases which give at least a good *primâ facie* case for this view; '*Si quis non confitetur, primum hominem Adam, cum mandatum Dei in paradiso fuisset transgressus, statim sanctitatem et justitiam . . . amississe . . . A.S.*'. The third paragraph of the decree declares original sin to be transmitted *propagatione, non imitatione*, a belief less easily held if a polyphyletic or even a group origin for mankind is supposed. In considering the bearing of the Tridentine decree on the question of the unity of the human race two facts should be noted. It cannot be considered in itself to contain a formal definition of this proposition; the proposal to define which at the Vatican Council implies that it was something not already defined,

though considered definable, and that one who denied it was not technically a heretic. The second fact which demands our attention is that, although the decree expressly calls Adam the first man, a number of Catholics during the last hundred years have asserted belief in the existence of men before Adam without having their orthodoxy in any way impugned. The preadamite theory as propounded in the nineteenth century differed from that put forward in the seventeenth in that it did not suppose that a portion of existing humanity was derived from a preadamite stock. It assumed that preadamite man had become extinct before the creation of Adam. This theory was excogitated for the purpose of evading the conclusion that palaeolithic man had lived at a time long ante-dating the traditional date of this event. It appeared to draw a measure of scientific support from the fact that the archæologists of the day believed that there had been a *hiatus* between palaeolithic and neolithic man during which Western Europe had been uninhabited. The discovery of the mesolithic cultures deprived the theory of such slender scientific basis as it could claim.

Preadamites have not yet quite disappeared from our theological textbooks, though probably they will do so before very long. The most interesting thing about them was that it was not considered heretical to believe in them, notwithstanding that the Council of Trent affirms Adam to have been the first man. Undoubtedly the bishops and theologians attending the Council believed him to be such, though it is not clear that they intended to make this a matter of faith. The main purpose of the Tridentine decree on original sin is obviously to condemn the errors of the Reformers and not the speculations of modern anthropologists. Whether it does in fact imply that a strictly monogenist view of the origin of mankind is a proposition which could be defined is a question which the writer must leave to professed theologians. Such a theory is certainly the only one

easily reconcilable with the doctrine of the transmission of original sin by generation, though it would perhaps be going too far to assert that it is impossible to harmonize this doctrine with the opposite view, at least if it be supposed that each of the men originally created abused the gift of freewill.

Do ethnology and prehistoric archæology really create grave difficulties in the way of acceptance of monogenesis? Plainly they can never establish the monogenetic view in its strict sense, that is to say, demonstrate that all mankind descends from one pair. All they can do is to tell us whether the theory of a polyphyletic or a monophyletic conception of human origins best fits in with the scientific data. The problem seems to have first presented itself at the time of the discovery of the New World, an event which led certain minds to enquire whether there might not have been two separate creations of man, one in Asia and another in America. Grotius in his *De Origine Gentium Americanarum* sought to obviate this supposition by arguing that the New World might have been peopled from the Old by way of Greenland. This theory has found advocates even in quite recent times, but has now been superseded by one according to which the ancestors of the aborigines of the Americas came from North-Eastern Asia either by way of a now sunken land bridge or having navigated the narrow sea separating it from Alaska. The geographical argument against the unity of mankind soon faded away to be succeeded by the ethnological one. Linnaeus, it is true, would have none of it. In his *Systema Naturae*, though he recognizes four varieties of man, he asserts that they all belong to one genus and one species. But his contemporary Voltaire leans, though discreetly, to the polygenist view. In the introduction to the *Essai sur les Moeurs* he says that only a blind man can doubt that White men, Negroes, Albinos, Hottentots, Lapps, Chinese and Americans are different races, though not

very long afterwards he speaks of the Negroes as a different *species* on account of their physical and mental peculiarities. If one asks how the natives of America originated, he continues, one must put the same question with regard to those of Australia, and the answer is that the same Providence which placed men in Norway did so also in America and in the Southern hemisphere, just as it planted trees and made grass to grow there. Here the idea of separate creations is clearly adumbrated, but no less so is that of evolution. For Voltaire, who, strangely enough, seems ready to credit the existence of satyrs, says that some savants believe that certain races of men or of animals near to men have perished.

In the following century polygenists came out boldly into the open, Virey, Desmoulins, Bory de Saint Vincent, Pouchet and Gobineau, the diplomat and orientalist, in France, Nott and Gliddon,¹ and the more famous Agassiz in America. All wrote before the *Origin of Species* and the arguments on which they rested their case were not strong ones. Agassiz, the best known of these writers as a scientist, believed that he saw an analogy between the distribution of human stocks and that of animals. The original circumscription of these primordial groups of men corresponded he thought 'in a large general way with the distribution of animals and their combination into faunas'.² With the growth of the science of human palaeontology and the acceptance of the theory of evolution the controversy between the monogenists and the polygenists entered on a new phase, though Darwin in the *Descent of Man* says that evolution had evacuated it of its meaning.³ This statement contains some exaggeration, since acceptance of evolution still leaves open the

¹ Gliddon appears in Edgar Allan Poe's tale *Some Words with a Mummy* in which we are told of a belief in the spontaneous generation of five vast hordes of men, 'simultaneously upspringing in five distinct and nearly equal divisions of the globe', a curious sidelight on the *status quaestionis* in pre-Darwinian times.

² *Life and Correspondence*, Vol. II, p. 497.

³ *The Descent of Man*, second edition, p. 174.

question whether the existing races of mankind separated from each other before the common ancestor had reached what would be recognized as a human status. The monogenetic theory does, however, encounter certain objections drawn from the findings of the palaeontologists, though these are not, in the opinion of the writer, insuperable ones. They are derived from the undoubted fact that in remote times the races of mankind, at least in so far as their skeletal remains are concerned, differed from each other as much as and sometimes more so than they do now. This fact was appealed to even before the Neanderthal man had been recognized as a separate type. Edouard Lartet and Henry Christy, the explorers of the caves of South-Western France, write that 'the Quaternary race of the Dordogne (Cromagnon) differs from the Quaternary race of the Belgian caves, as much at least as dissimilar modern races differ from each other'.¹ This fact, they argue, tells against the monogenist supposition. That was the verdict of two distinguished pioneers in prehistoric archæology.

The physical anthropologists were more outspoken. Karl Vogt in 1865 advocated the theory of two long-headed races of mankind issuing from the gorilla and the chimpanzee and a round-headed race issuing from the orang-utan. A similar theory was propounded early in the present century by Hermann Klaatsch, who argued for a gorilloid origin for Neanderthal man and the descent of the races of the Aurignacian period from the orang-utan. These two theories may be safely set aside as fantastic, but polygenism still has advocates on grounds which must be admitted to show a certain plausibility. These are the undoubted fact that in the early part of the pleistocene period the races of mankind appear to have differed from each other more than they did at the end. This is obviously contrary to what we should

¹ *Reliquiae Aquitaniae* (1875), pp. 98, 99.

expect on the assumption that mankind is descended from a single pair. Stated in its cruder forms the polygenetic hypothesis of human origins was effectively refuted by Professor H. Vallois in an article entitled *Preuves de l'origine monophylétique de l'homme* which appeared in *l'Anthropologie* in 1929 (pp. 76-101). He believes that those anthropologists who derive living human races from different anthropoid stems are driven to do so because they can find no other explanation of man's racial characteristics. In reply he points out that men resemble each other more than they resemble apes and that the characters proper to man are well marked before his birth. Comparative anatomy supports the monophyletic view of man's origin. '*Il n'existe*', he concludes, '*absolument aucune preuve sérieuse en faveur des théories polyphylétiques.*' Vallois's words carry weight, as since the death of Professor Marcellin Boule he has become leading French authority on human palaeontology.

But in a modified form the polyphyletic theory continues. Some palaeontologists believe that modern races, though not descended from different anthropoid ancestors, do derive their origin from stems which separated in pre-human times. Sir Arthur Keith has been for some years an advocate of the theory that the existing races of man can be traced to different palaeolithic stems, the aborigines of Australia to the *Pithecanthropus* of Java, the Mongolian race to the *Sinanthropus* of Peking, the Bushman race to an early South African one, *Homo Rhodesiensis*, and the White race through an early Palestinian one to Neanderthal man. In his recent book *A New Theory of Human Evolution*, in which he reasserts this theory, Keith attributes the present unity of mankind to an 'evolutionary convergence'. 'All the races of mankind', he says, 'seem to have inherited an evolutionary trend common to everyone of them' (p. 265). In a less crude form than those of Vogt and Klaatsch the polygenetic hypothesis has of late years been experiencing

a revival. For the highly significant discovery made by Mademoiselle Henri-Martin at Fontéchevade (Charente) in August 1947 of a fossil human skull-cap and a small fragment of a second skull reveals the presence in France, in the warm interval preceding the last glaciation, of a man more nearly approaching modern man than the later Neanderthal type. Is it then possible, suggested Vallois, in a recent lecture in Cambridge, that two separate hominid stems contributed to the formation of *Homo Sapiens*?¹ This question had already been given an affirmative answer by Professor Ruggles Gates, who in his book, *Human Ancestry from a Genetical Point of View*, derives the present races of mankind from five separate pre-human stocks. His thesis is so complicated that it is unlikely to meet with wide acceptance and, apart from the question of its scientific merits, polygeny now encounters opposition on political grounds as it formerly did on religious ones.²

The palaeontological arguments in favour of a polyphyletic origin for mankind are not such as can be dismissed as unworthy of attention. They must be seriously considered, though in the opinion of the writer they are not unanswerable. At the beginning of the present century men of science believed that the problem of human evolution was a simple one. They thought that *Pithecanthropus Erectus* and the Neanderthal man were evolutionary stages in the derivation of *Homo Sapiens* from a stock akin to the great apes. With a richer

¹ The term *Homo Sapiens*, introduced by Linnaeus, is now used by anthropologists to designate races of the modern type. This involves a certain amount of confusion as races which had certainly a human mentality are excluded from the designation.

² The *Journal of Heredity* published by the 'American Genetic Association' in its issue of May 1948 contains two hostile reviews of Professor Ruggles Gates's book. In a foreword to these the editor writes: 'the main conclusion of the author that the human species is uniquely polyphyletic is, if true, astounding indeed. Even if this claim is discredited, the book is so admirably adapted to certain sinister purposes that it will undoubtedly become a primer of racism and fascist reactionism.' A hundred years ago the polygenist theory was advocated in America as providing justification for the institution of Negro Slavery.

harvest of fossil remains this hypothesis is now seen to be inadequate, and to require displacement in favour of a more complicated view. The most noticeable distinguishing characteristic of the existing races of men is, of course, the colour of their skin. Egyptian wall paintings of the second millennium before Christ show that this characteristic was as obvious then as it is now. But it was probably acquired only relatively recently in the history of the race, and it is not unlikely that at a period not later than at least the middle of the palaeolithic age all the races of men possessed a skin which was light brown. But no comparisons can, of course, be made in this respect between existing races and those of the palaeolithic age. With regard to the skeleton, which may in favoured circumstances resist for vast periods the disintegrating forces of nature, such a comparison is possible. The skeletons of existing races of man differ from each other only in a minor degree, certain races exhibiting some slight ape-like traits, and the later palaeolithic races differed no more from contemporary ones than these differ from each other. Far back in the pleistocene age, however, are to be met with types of man, Neanderthal man, Peking man and Java man, who differed from later races to a much greater degree than do these from each other, the difference lying in their possession of well-marked simian traits.

But it is now known that side by side with these early races there existed another type approaching more nearly to *Homo Sapiens*. Even setting aside remains whose claims to high antiquity may be regarded with suspicion, such as the Galley Hill skull found in the Thames Estuary sixty years ago, the existence of this type is attested by remains found at Piltdown, Swanscombe, Steinheim and recently at Fontéchevade. The existence in remote pleistocene times of two parallel human types differing very widely from each other has led some French students of human palaeontology to formulate the question in a

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tentative way whether the doctrine of the unity of the human race can in its old form be any longer maintained. Though wishing to adopt a fittingly deferential attitude to these authorities, the present writer feels that the difficulties which they raise are far from insurmountable. The discovery in Palestine and in Moravia of human races in which a combination of modern and Neanderthaloid features is met with suggests that the two stocks may be less widely separated than has been supposed, this supposition being supported by the fact that those Neanderthal skulls in which the pithecoïd traits are most accentuated are chronologically the most recent, an indication that retrogression has been at work. The burial customs of Neanderthal man moreover furnish evidence not only that his mental status was fully human but that he shared certain ideas in common with existing races. We may probably account for the dissimilarities in cranial form to be met with among the pleistocene races of mankind by the supposition that humanity was then passing through a phase of morphological instability which has long since passed away.

There are other considerations which militate strongly against the view that mankind is derived from more than one prehuman ancestral stock. There is the prevalence of what the French anthropologist, Paul Broca, called *eugenesis*: that is, unlimited interfertility between the most diverse races, and there is the basic mental similarity which exists between them. The words of the pre-Darwinian ethnologist James Cowell Prichard may still be quoted: 'The same inward and mental nature is to be recognized in all races of men. When we compare this fact with the observation, fully established, as to the specific instincts and separate psychical endowments of all the distinct races of sentient beings in the universe, we are entitled to draw confidently the conclusion that all human races are of one species and one family.'¹

¹ *Natural History of Man.*

It is, then, the conclusion of the present writer that the belief which derives all races of man both living and extinct not merely from a single group but even from a single pair is not one which need be relinquished. A consideration which, though it may be subjective, strongly appeals to him is that it seems antecedently improbable that God in the beginning would have created more than one pair of rational beings when this was sufficient for his purpose.

The problems on which we have been bestowing our attention are not merely academic. In an article entitled 'Catholics and Evolution' in THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW for October 1949, the present writer called attention to the desirability that those who popularize theology should have some knowledge of the state of educated opinion. The problem of how to explain the Catholic doctrine of the fall of man to a public which has come to regard Adam and Eve as creations of mythological fancy is clearly a harder one than that of expounding it to those whose outlook approaches a fundamentalist point of view. The problem is one which presents itself not only to preachers who may have non-Catholic hearers but also to schoolmasters and schoolmistresses, as well as to speakers and writers. It seems, therefore, that a certain change of emphasis is desirable, and that more stress should be laid on the impressive case for the doctrine of the fall which can be made out from the condition in which the human race now finds itself.

MOTHER ANGÉLIQUE AND PORT-ROYAL¹

By NIGEL ABERCROMBIE

MOTHER ANGÉLIQUE wrote this *relation* in 1655, when the distinguishing characteristics of French Jansenism, as established by her brother Antoine, were already determined. Although it is permissible to maintain the quasi-paradox that the Abbey of Port-Royal was not itself a focus, or even a hot-bed, of doctrinal Jansenism, nevertheless the house and the movement were linked by several close ties. Many of the nuns, including most of their leaders, belonged to the Arnauld family or were connected with it, or with other families of the first generation of Saint-Cyran's disciples. The spiritual direction of the nuns had for many years been in the hands of Saint-Cyran and his devoted pupil, Singlin. The famous *solitaires* (a sort of General Staff for the movement) formed, as it were, a Third Order attached to the Abbey. When the hierarchy subsequently required nuns to subscribe a formula of condemnation of Jansenism, nearly all the daughters of Mother Angélique refused—this was at least symptomatic of the connexion, as was the immediate attribution of the name 'Port-Royalist' by the reading public to the author of the *Lettres à un Provincial*. The nuns themselves had for some time been deeply influenced by the knowledge of their separation from the normal directions of French monachism and spirituality; some of them already believed in a distinct mission, soon to be confirmed by the miracle of the Holy Thorn.

In these circumstances, several nuns of Port-Royal had written individual chronicles of the Abbey's recent history, that is, from various dates not earlier than its

¹ *Relation écrite par la Mère Angélique Arnauld sur Port-Royal*. Edited by Louis Cognet. Pp. 200 (Bernard Grasset, Paris, 1949) n.p.

reformation in 1609. Mother Angélique herself was hard to persuade, but her contribution was so obviously the most important of all that Singlin put her under obedience to write her own *relation*. She took for a starting-point her succession to the office of Abbess at the age of ten, in 1602; her work was interrupted, so that the story ends—dramatically enough—with the imprisonment of Saint-Cyran in 1638, that is, two years before the publication of *Augustinus*.

A priori, it would appear likely that this text should be vitiated, as a record of events belonging to the main stream of the Counter-Reformation, by the author's later involvement in controversial developments altogether irrelevant to the concerns of the first four decades of the seventeenth century. A reader with any experience of Jansenist writings would naturally expect Mother Angélique's account of her earlier interior life, written in 1655, to be deeply coloured by the theology of the 'defenders of Grace, efficacious by itself', notwithstanding the anachronism of such influences in relation to the period under review. Neither suspicion is justified. The *relation* contains two or three allusions to the 'persecution' of Saint-Cyran and his friends, but these are clearly expressed as parenthetical comment, of posterior date to the narrative. Mother Angélique's retrospective appreciations of St Francis de Sales and of Sébastien Zamet as directors are, indeed, much distorted by the tremendous effect on her judgement of her later subjugation to Saint-Cyran: this is essentially documentary, and merely differentiates the work, as a chronicle, from the journal-form. There is no reason to suppose that these passages would have been written otherwise if *Augustinus* and *De la fréquente Communion* had never appeared.

In short, this *relation* is a reliable source. It has been accepted as such by all historians of French Jansenism and Port-Royal, and by Saint-Cyran's biographers, in-

cluding the latest, Dr Orcibal, who is (properly) acknowledged in the notes to the present edition as incomparably the best authority, Bremond not excepted. As Mother Angélique's work is only accessible in eighteenth-century collections of Jansenist pamphlets, and so must normally be read in State libraries or not at all, there was adequate reason for reprinting it. The opportunity might have been taken to produce a critical text, though the late date and questionable authority of the best manuscript copy would make it hardly worth the trouble. The editor of the present edition claims, indeed, that he has 'scrupulously' preserved the archaisms and even the incorrections of his author, modernizing only her spelling and punctuation. In fact, he has systematically revised her language throughout, eliminating most of the syntactical features which date it, and substituting for a characteristic prose of its period a colourless pastiche of no period at all. With a degree of candour which only just fails to be disarming, he has, however, allowed excellent photographs of two pages of his manuscript to be produced with the book, thus furnishing direct (and abundant) evidence of his lack of scholarly 'scruple'.

His introduction and notes are helpful in elucidating the chronology of events, and in identifying the many personages whom Mother Angélique mentions without naming. Most readers will, however, feel the want of anything in the way of historical commentary—situating the story in its wider context.

For example, since Mother Angélique gives a most vivid and detailed picture of life at Port-Royal during her first five years as Abbess, the reader is curious to know how this life compares with that of other convents in the reign of Henri IV. No doubt it was in many respects above average. The Night Office was sung at 4 o'clock instead of 2 o'clock; but Mother Angélique, in 1655, had no other fault to find with the execution of the '*opus Dei*'. Abstinence on four days of the week was a

relaxation of the primitive Cistercian obedience, but amply covered by regular dispensations: in the matters of general dietary, heating, infirmary service, and so forth, Mother Angélique's excellent Prioress was only able, by unremitting solicitude and with the generous assistance of M. and Mme Arnould, to maintain at best a standard which was still sufficiently austere. In fact, during this period (1602-1607), something that may with propriety be called a 'material' reform was begun in advance of the spiritual reform that was to follow. The troubles of the wars of religion, the incapacity of Mother Angélique's predecessor as Abbess, and the flagrant immorality of her Prioress, had brought the convent into a deplorable condition. Mme Arnould, whose father's interest with the Abbot of Cîteaux had secured the reversion of the Abbey for her daughter (at an uncanonical age), was scrupulous to insist—successfully—upon the elimination of gross scandal (hence the change of Prioress); and, with her husband's help, active in securing a reasonable minimum of hygiene, if not of comfort, in the living conditions of the dozen nuns whom Mother Angélique was to govern. In the result, there was achieved a degree of regularity which more than satisfied the Abbot of Cîteaux, and—above all—*peace*. Mother Angélique indeed disclaims for herself any share of credit for the peace of her community. She attributes some to her predecessor, who had received only very young girls as novices, and inured them to a sort of governess's discipline; but most to her own parents and the new Prioress, who, by improving the nuns' standard of living, disposed them to love their child-Abbess (the Prioress being careful to maintain in every way the nominal authority of her superior).

All that was lacking to Mother Angélique and Port-Royal at this time was the spirit and practice of contemplation. The nuns without exception were totally ignorant of mental prayer, and of the meaning and

purpose of claustration. Mother Angélique herself repined continually against her lot (though an obscure instinct taught her to shun all temptations to break her—irregular—vows), and welcomed increasing opportunities to alleviate it by distractions. This unstable mental condition, aggravated by her mother's prudent remonstrances, led (in 1607) to 'a very violent double tertian fever', and a spiritual crisis, from which the Abbess returned with durable resolutions of amendment. Thus she was disposed to receive, and further, the sanctifying influence of a series of Capuchin fathers who came to preach at Port-Royal and to give intermittent instruction to such of the nuns as sought it. One of these preachers (not himself an exemplary religious) was privileged to be the instrument of Mother Angélique's own definitive 'conversion' in 1608, when 'Dieu me toucha tellement que, dès ce moment, je me trouvai plus heureuse d'être Religieuse, que je ne m'étais estimée malheureuse de l'être'. It would be impossible to express more simply, or more powerfully, the content of such a decisive illumination. The impulse prevailed over luke-warmness and opposition among the nuns and at Cîteaux, and over the absence of wise, or even tolerably competent, directors, and eventually issued in the re-establishment of primitive observance and primitive fervour, not only in Port-Royal, but in a whole series of Cistercian convents.

Port-Royal was one of a great number of French religious houses 'reformed' in the first decades of the seventeenth century. Mother Angélique's chronicle shows that, in this example, the process of reform exhibited the whole series of phenomena which can, by historical analysis, be discovered (more or less completely) in most analogous cases. Being herself in one of the trees, she naturally could not see the wood; the phases and symptoms which can now be classed as diagnostic had no special significance for her: but they are faithfully recorded. The first two are obvious enough—elimination

of private property, and observance of the enclosure. It is of interest to see this very practical Abbess's mature conclusion about the former: she was warned by the Prioress that the nuns would not take nearly so much care of their things when these were no longer their own—'*ce que j'ai expérimenté n'être que trop vrai, la cupidité étant plus active et plus puissante que la charité, qui est un sujet de grande humiliation*'. (Pascal must have enjoyed this, if he knew it.) As for the enclosure, this produced a well-known dramatic scene, when, on 25th September 1609, Mother Angélique refused to let her father come into the convent. Her own account is a masterpiece of restrained emotional writing. It is perhaps especially characteristic of her that, when she has movingly described her father's first outbreak of anger, her own extreme grief and his reluctant consent to see her in the Parlour, and the unexpected arrival and tactless speech of her Confessor, renewing M. Arnauld's indignation to such a point that the latter persuaded the Abbot of Cîteaux to remove this priest from Port-Royal, she concludes: 'I was not sorry for this, because I recognized that while he (Dom Claude de Kersaillox) feared God, he had not everything we needed, and it was time he left'.

It was not enough, in seventeenth century France, for an Abbess and her nuns, however holy and persevering, to be sincerely devoted to a strict observance of their Rule: three administrative measures were normally indispensable if reform was to survive. These were:—placing the house under the jurisdiction of the Ordinary; removing it from the country into a town; and securing freedom to elect the Abbess. The first was the only way in which the persistent opposition to reform, maintained by the Abbots of Cîteaux and Clairvaux and their colleagues in most other congregations, could be turned. The second alone enabled the religious to get a minimum of instruction and direction from such educated

clergy as were to be found; it was also, in many cases, a pre-requisite for the establishment of moral discipline. The third protected a reformed house against the intrusion of unsuitable Royal nominees—a form of patronage which the Crown was commonly most unwilling to surrender.

The translation of the nuns (their number now multiplied six-fold) from the insanitary mediaeval Port-Royal des Champs, to Paris, was made in 1625. Mother Angélique mentions that 'many people' had for some years been advising her to take this step. Both before the actual move, which was made possible by the incessant activity of her mother (who bought the house in Paris, solicited the authorities for permission, organized transport, etc.), and after it, Mother Angélique seems to have been chiefly impressed by its various practical disadvantages—'tout étant plus cher à Paris qu'aux Champs', for example; and the nuns were cramped (there was only room in Choir for a quarter of their number, and they had to work shifts in the Refectory). However, it was from 1625, and precisely because of the move to the Capital, that she and her nuns began to enjoy the regular ministrations of the famous directors who made Port-Royal what it became—especially Zamet and Saint-Cyran.

Sébastien Zamet, though he owed his preferment to the See of Langres to the fact that his father was a favourite of Henri IV, was an edifying prelate. He had, besides, much experience in guiding the reformation of religious houses; undiscouraged by difficulties and failures, he still hoped to be allowed to found a new Institute of nuns, in honour of the Most Holy Sacrament. His charm, his zeal, and the good offices of St Jane de Chantal, alike commended him to Mother Angélique, who found herself involuntarily committed to participation in his plans. These eventually crystallized into a project of uniting with Port-Royal a reformed convent which he

had recently removed from Tart to Dijon, and establishing the new Institute from the two communities together. In pursuance of this arrangement, Port-Royal, following Notre Dame de Tart, was brought under episcopal jurisdiction (1627), and obtained the right to elect its own Abbess (1629)—this only after devious intrigues, and much anxious solicitation in high places. Thus, twenty years after the 'journée du guichet', and in ways which appeared often fortuitous, the reformed estate of Port-Royal was at last securely established.

Mother Angélique's account of this development is all coloured by her strong feelings about Zamet. These were at first most favourable. 'He seemed to me a man full of zeal, mortification, and true devotion . . . Indeed the counsel he gave me at first was very holy, and most profitable to me.' But 'this Bishop, who, when we first saw him, was full of God and seemed quite dead to the world, changed altogether'. His ideas for the government of Port-Royal and the new Institute, were sharply at variance with those of Mother Angélique. He, and the Oratorian fathers whom he recommended, would have all the nuns able to read and write; a cheerful mien and witty conversation, they taught, could and should accompany the severest penitential exercises; in Zamet's new Institute, habits, napery, and *décor* should be sumptuous, and the Rule of Saint Augustine should there be mitigated for the sake of delicately-nurtured novices. Worst of all, perhaps, 'because I was not clever enough to understand which parts of a strict observance were compatible with polite living, he did not want me to be Mother Superior, though I was named in the Bull'.

Just as this disappointment was approaching its climax, Mother Angélique was learning to appreciate the worth of Jean Duvergier de Hauranne, (non-resident) Abbot of Saint-Cyran; she had first met this enigmatic priest ('the Oracle of the Cloître Notre-Dame') about 1620,

through her eldest brother, Robert, who was a fervent disciple. He had impressed her as a man of profound learning, and earned her respect by characteristically severe *dicta*—as, ‘that he had known many Abbesses reform their Convents, but few reform themselves’. It was about 1633, when the new Institute was first founded, that Zamet himself threw these two together in the special relationship of director and penitent. The event was decisive for Mother Angélique and for Port-Royal—it may be, as Dr Orcibal has argued, that it was hardly less decisive for Saint-Cyran, if he learnt from Mother Angélique and her nuns to esteem simplicity above learning, and penitential regularity of life above doctrinal refinement. The Abbess recognized in the ‘forte, sainte, droite et éclairée conduite de ce serviteur de Dieu’ the ideal of the religious life which a visiting Capuchin’s sermon had first revealed to her in 1608, the fulfilment of all the aspirations which had upheld her in the long work of reform: this recognition frightened her. ‘Je ne le voulais pas tromper, ni abuser de la grâce que Dieu me faisait, que j’avais tant désirée, de trouver un homme duquel la force de l’esprit dans la vérité accablât le mien’—here was the supreme novelty, which even St Francis de Sales had not afforded her; for when she represented to the Saint (himself capable of disconcerting asperity, as she knew) that she was picking and choosing among directors for her herself and her nuns, and so indulging her own preference, he had slightly shocked her by answering ‘that there was no harm in seeking from various flowers the honey that was not all to be found in one’. But when at last (in 1635) she made her general confession to Saint-Cyran, she experienced a degree and kind of spiritual consolation unique in her life, the recollection of which, twenty years later, moves her to absolutely lyrical expression, so that she must break off with ‘I ought not to say this, being only to write what concerns the guiding and providence of God in this House’.

The providence of God in Port-Royal, as Mother Angélique understood the matter, was chiefly visible in the elimination of every influence but that of Saint-Cyran himself: she traces the process with great candour, so that the reader who cannot share the singleness of her devotion to Saint-Cyran will often be offended at the human means adopted to this end. But the very sincerity of her record enhances the value of her testimony, and compels attention to the few passages where she speaks directly and intimately of her master—for example: 'He was wonderfully careful to cut off every occasion of sin. For this purpose he was attentive, in Confession, to the most trivial circumstances, so as to understand precisely the drift and inclination of each heart. His strictness was no burden to the souls in his care: on the contrary, we knew it was not natural hardness or scruple, but simple upright charity; so we got much consolation from it, and a good hope that God would give us health, since we had fallen by his will into the hands of so excellent a physician.'

Mother Angélique then, and—no doubt—most of her nuns, had found at last the guide who would lead them in the chosen path. There were among the sisters some at least who preferred other ways. The most tragic example was Sister Marie-Claire, Mother Angélique's own sister after the flesh. She had been sent to Notre-Dame de Tart, as had several nuns of Port-Royal, about 1629, when Zamet was preparing the union of the two communities by exchanges of personnel. In 1635, after Saint-Cyran's definitive installation at Port-Royal, these nuns came back. All were at first dismayed to find how much had been changed in the life of the Abbey since Zamet and the Oratorians were extruded—the more, of course, because at Dijon they had remained within Zamet's personal influence. Mother Agnès Arnauld (another sister of Mother Angélique) was one of these: she quickly succumbed to Saint-Cyran, significantly

observing that ‘*without making comparisons*, never had man spoken like this one’. But Sister Marie-Claire seems to have been unable to avoid making comparisons. Mother Angélique says that this exemplary religious—‘fervent in prayer, and in charity towards everyone, especially the sick, and conspicuously punctual in her observance of the Rule’—prayed earnestly day and night, and with tears, that the rest of them might be disabused and converted from their blindness and perfidy in turning away from the old courses. It is generally supposed, though Mother Angélique does not say so, that Sister Marie-Claire’s early death in 1642 was hastened, or even brought about, by inconsolable grief. Despite Mother Angélique’s *ex post facto* reflexions that she had originally accepted the ministrations and proposals of Zamet precipitately, imprudently (as though she sought to excuse a manifest deviation), it seems that the period from 1625 to 1635, when Zamet was in control, was the beginning of a golden age for the Abbey. Saint-Cyran, one of whose personalities was perfectly congenial to Zamet (as to Bérulle and Condren), was preferred by Mother Angélique, perhaps chiefly, for his human ‘force de l’esprit’; he could be acceptable to Mother Agnès, and many others (without making comparisons), perhaps because of all he had in common with Zamet and the rest of the ‘*école française*’; but he was intolerable to Sister Marie-Claire and a few more (as to St Vincent de Paul, and Richelieu), perhaps only because of the irreducible singularity of his temper, and of some of his views and opinions. (Thus, in his direction of the nuns in Zamet’s Institute of the Holy Sacrament, he encouraged them—because of a private notion about the practice of the primitive Church—to abstain from Communion for months at a time: yet the ardour of his devotion to the *Corpus Domini* was such that he gladly undertook a learned public defence of a meditation by Mother Agnès, written under Oratorian inspiration, which seemed to

other theologians to outrage orthodoxy by the baroque extravagance of its language in relation to this mystery.) If this account be accepted as a probable explanation of the facts, then we may suppose that Port-Royal, in 1638, was in the main still true to the outline pattern of holiness imprinted in it from the first, by Capuchins and Oratorians; but that the marks of peculiarity were already discernible.

It is true, and no historian will forget it, that Saint-Cyran was the primary instigator of the French Jansenist movement, being the author of the Party, or Sect, which, as Bremond wrote, 'crée l'hérésie, comme la fonction crée l'organe'. Nothing that Mother Angélique knew or wrote can obliterate this indictment. In the light of history, it is easy to see that Zamet's introduction of this man to Port-Royal was the worst calamity that ever befell it. From this point of view, the whole trend of Mother Angélique's *relation* is misguided, and mischievous. Yet it can be read as a truthful record, by a fervent religious and prudent superior, of graces received through the ministrations of good men: it describes, besides, an integral part of one of the most striking movements of renovation in the Church's history; and if there is much shade in the picture, it will not on that account be found unconvincing.

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Je veux voir Dieu by Fr Marie-Eugène de l'Enfant-Jésus, O.D.C.
Pp. 471 (Les Editions du Carmel, Tarascon) 600 frs.

IN this, the first of two volumes on the spiritual doctrine of St Theresa of Avila, the author makes it clear from the beginning that his aim is exclusively practical, and that he will speculate only when a theological explanation is required; even then he is careful to remain in the safe positions of classical Thomism. We should not therefore expect a properly theological book, the more so as, before being printed, its contents were written as lectures for laymen; and the author severely warns 'intellectualistic' theologians of the harm they can do when they apply their 'intellectualism' to spirituality (p. 435). Now and again, however, the theologians, even when they are not 'intellectualistic', will regret that Fr Marie-Eugène takes some illegitimate liberties with theology, as when he writes, 'She (St Theresa) has left Jesus Christ behind (elle a dépassé) . . . beyond Him she has found the total Christ, the Church' (p. 116).

The first part, 'Perspectives', is an introduction to St Theresa and particularly to her *Book of the Mansions*. The second part, 'First Phases', comments on the first three Mansions in the usual Carmelite tradition, though, one may fear, far too literally. The third part, 'Mystical life and contemplation', is a theological introduction to the last four Mansions, which will be studied from the point of view of practice in the second volume, not yet published.

This introduction is made mostly in the light of St Thomas's doctrine on the gifts of the Holy Ghost, although these, we are told, 'are not mentioned by St Theresa' (p. 299). Let us point out at once that this seems to be one of the weaknesses of the book. A theology of mysticism, that of the gifts of the Holy Ghost, is applied to a testimony which was written, to all appearances, in ignorance of the gifts. Such an application looks very much like an ill-timed 'intellectualism'. The starting point of another explanation might have been found in St John of the Cross's statement, 'Faith is alone the proximate and proportionate means whereby the soul is united with God' (quoted on p. 441).

Fr Marie-Eugène holds that St Theresa's doctrine has two aspects. In the 'Life' and the 'Way of Perfection', it is purely contemplative; in the 'Mansions', it is 'a spiritual doctrine of the apostolate', which is 'higher, wider and more complete' (p. 123). Both aspects

treat of the mystical life, which is 'all life under the influence of the gifts of the Holy Ghost in general' (p. 309); but the mystical life cannot be identified with mystical experience: 'the action of God through the gifts is definitely different from the experience that we can have of it, so that the former can be without the latter' (p. 309). Mystical experience, or contemplation, is, in the words of St John of the Cross, 'an infused and loving knowledge of God' (p. 427), which is the work of three gifts, knowledge, intelligence and wisdom (p. 408). The reality given by all gifts, whether they are contemplative or not, is always the same, God; so that the question is raised whether all men are called to partake of the mystical life, which will be contemplative or not according to the predominating gifts. To this question the author answers that both the universal and the proximate calls are addressed to all; in practice, 'all who have experienced hunger and thirst for God must consider that the proximate call is, for them, beyond discussion' (p. 143).

On the whole, this is an interesting position, which is in accordance with the usual Carmelite doctrine on contemplation and avoids the over-systematization with which the question of the 'call to contemplation' is often answered. Logically, the mystical life, as the full development here below of friendship with God, is open to all. Yet we should be careful not to presume upon the ways of God or condemn all those who, to all appearances, are not contemplative mystics. The author's solution implies that there are mystics who have no special gift of contemplation; it is their apostolic activity, or simply the practice of their duties of state, which is transformed by God's intervention. In the history of the Church, a mysticism of action runs parallel to a mysticism of contemplation. In St Theresa, and no doubt many others, they were joined.

But this is not the only possible solution. To the reviewer's mind, the proximate call to mystical life is similar to a 'substantial word', which is necessarily heard; thus we can hardly conceive of a proximate call of which one has remained unaware. When he comes to this point, the theologian may rightly be afraid of running foul of a fact; are all Christians conscious of that call at some time in their life? More probably, no, if we speak of a detailed knowledge; yes, if the consciousness of it is no other than the indefinite expectation of God which is at the bottom of all spiritual life. As such, it might be understood as a sharpening by faith of the natural desire for God which is con-

stitutive of man's personality. In the course of life, however, and the perfecting of faith, God will mould that expectation according to his own intention for each man; and the manner in which he will answer it remains his own secret.

Such as it is, together with a few other good remarks, the author's solution strikes a more original note than the great bulk of the text. The author seems to have forced himself, on principle, to avoid all brilliance of style and—too often—of thought. Some allusions to the history of spirituality are even inaccurate. In particular, the 'French School' of the seventeenth century does not owe its devotion to Christ primarily to St Theresa (as is said on p. 76, n. 1), but to a theological reflexion on the hypostatic union. Besides, St Theresa herself has no special originality on this point, for, a long time before her, the mediaeval mystics, particularly the Cistercians and Franciscans, had defined, in theory and practice, the Christological structure of Catholic mysticism.

G. H. TAVARD, A.A.

Johannes. Betrachtungen über sein Evangelium. Band I, Das Wort wird Fleisch, Kapitel 1-5 by Adrienne von Speyr. Pp. 429 (Johannes-Verlag, Einsiedeln, 1949) 19 frs.

ADRIENNE VON SPEYR has written four volumes of meditations on the Gospel of St John. The complete work is very long (over 2,000 pages), but a fair idea of the spirit, method and content of the whole may perhaps be gained by a brief study of the first part.

She has chosen St John as the subject of her meditations because he is the beloved of Christ and has therefore been vouchsafed the clearest vision of Love, that is, of God made man. This is a simple summary of her fourteen page introduction, by far the most involved part of an otherwise clear and straightforward book. The first chapter, covering a third of the book, is devoted to the first eighteen verses of the Gospel ('Prolog'). The rest deals with the outstanding events of Christ's life up to John v, 31 ff ('if I bear witness of myself, the witness is not true'). The latter part of the book is perhaps the more successful, as it is rooted in practical realities such as the marriage feast at Cana, the conversion of the woman at the well, the healing of the sick man of Bethsaida. The authoress seems more at home here, where her psychological insight and discursive practical intelligence can get to work more readily than in the philosophical depths of the Prologue. There too, however, she achieves a balance between theory and reality, as her meditation

invariably turns to the actual before it reverts to the mystery—thus she has a series of reflexions on the sacraments which are ‘the true light which enlighteneth every man’ (chap. I, 9).

It is difficult to give an adequate idea of the spirit of this book, as it is quite unlike any English, and still less like any French book of meditations on the Gospel. The authoress is a doctor of medicine by profession, and although she has, for a lay person, an astonishing grasp of the theological background, this is manifest by implication and by a certain almost austere reticence and accuracy, rather than by direct evidence of learning. Her tone is throughout unpretentious, her sentence structure is simple, her style and vocabulary (with the exception of a few overworked modern verbal nouns such as ‘die Schau’) singularly straightforward, her field of images, for she is an artist, not in any way esoteric. It is as though she were speaking quietly to herself (which possibly accounts for the length of the book); but she is speaking out of the depths of a mind filled with the peace and the humility of prayer, so that her personality does not obtrude itself. Some may indeed find that this quiet flow of someone else’s reflexions is in itself an obstruction interposed between the mind and the words of the Gospel. This book is not for them. But many will find this gentle, unemotional and intelligent train of thought a helpful bridge to a more wholly personal understanding. There is no attempt to give a ‘composition of place’; an occasional shrewd character sketch, such as that of Nicodemus, is the nearest she gets to that. Her technique, if one may use so formal a word for something so undeliberated, is that she begins either by an analysis of the actual words of the Gospel (e.g. John I, 46, ‘come and see’), or by developing the thought of the text by means of circumscription and association, or by picking out a fact which strikes her (such as John II, 23, ‘many believed in his name, seeing his signs which he did’—where she points out that these signs and miracles are not described, and goes on to meditate on the connexion between faith and miracles, in Christ’s time, and now). A personal application is unobtrusively achieved by the help of the pronouns ‘I’ or ‘we’ or ‘you’ in the thoughts which follow and which deal with a wide range of experience of the individual member within the Mystical Body.

The book may be taken up at any point and used in a personal way, as each train of reflexions on a verse is complete, or at any rate intelligible, within itself. She has no preconceived theory which has to be worked out at all costs; she simply allows reflexions

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to arise on the stream of her intelligent and prayerful consciousness. Although her material implies much reading as well as thought, she makes no reference to other theological works, as her book is evidently not to be regarded as a work of scholarship. A more puzzling because seemingly deliberate omission is any reference by quotation to other parts of the New or the Old Testament.

A translation of a characteristic passage, will serve as an illustration of her procedure (on John iv, 28-9, 'The woman left her waterpot and went into the city'):

'She leaves her water pot. She does not carry back the water, for she is overwhelmed by the message of the Lord. At this moment the things of earth have vanished for her and are consumed by the things of heaven. As yet she does not understand that the two experiences are enacted at different levels. Perhaps she really imagines that from now on she will be able to do without earthly water. She is the archetype of those who have caught their first glimpse of the whole and who think that from now on it will fill them so completely that their ordinary occupations will fall away. They see the uncontingency of Christianity but not as yet its adaptability. Without having been called they expect to achieve contemplation. And so this woman is in a normal state of Christian development which is nothing but a transitory state. Later on she will understand that for her faith does not mean the throwing over of everyday duties; but rather her present surrender will gradually and of its own accord be moulded to the pattern of her workaday existence.'

Adrienne von Speyr is very much a woman of her own time, a contemplative whose spirit of prayer has developed amidst the unfavourable conditions of her own age; her book is written for contemporaries with a like background, but is of a type which makes a wider appeal in German-speaking countries than elsewhere. She has, however, achieved a work of singular grace, where scientific simplicity blends with the simplicity of real prayer, a modern book of devotion and of personal commentary which avoids on the one hand the pitfall of devotional overemphasis, and on the other that of arid intellectualism.

ELISABETH STOPP.

Early Christian Baptism and the Creed by Joseph Crehan, S.J.
Pp. x + 189 (Burns Oates) 21s.

THE profound scholarship of this study in the sources of Ante-Nicene theology is what we should expect from the Bellarmine Series. The moment for its publication is felicitous, since much has recently been written on Baptism. It originated from the desire to follow up a clue to the famous difficulty that Acts speak of baptism 'in the name of Jesus' while in Matt. xxviii, 19, our Lord tells the apostles to baptize in the names of the Divine Persons. The difficulty has led critics to deny the authenticity of Christ's command to baptize, and even a writer like Mr Flemington, in his valuable book *The New Testament Doctrine of Baptism*, while arguing that Christ gave a command, denies authenticity to the text.

After showing that the baptism of John required belief 'in the One who was coming after him, that is in Jesus' (Acts xix, 4), Fr Crehan examines the earliest recorded baptisms and concludes that 'baptism in the name of Jesus' referred to the invocation of the name of Jesus by the baptizand. It was baptism in the faith that Jesus is Lord. He points to the fuller account of St Paul's conversion in Acts xxii, 16, 'be baptized and wash away your sins, calling upon his name'; and as the words 'I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God' are attested by Irenaeus at least for the middle of the second century in the account of the baptism of the Ethiopian eunuch, they may furnish another clue. St Peter seems to require just such an invocation of the name, cf Acts ii, 21, 36; x, 43, and this may help to explain the famous crux of I Peter iii, 21.

We cannot develop here the very interesting discussion of the meaning of 'in the name of Jesus' in St Paul, except to indicate that rabbinical usage warrants the senses 'for the sake of', 'in regard to' or 'through the instrumentality of', and does not favour the view of Coppins in his article *Baptême* in the Supplement of the *Dictionnaire de la Bible* that it can mean 'by the authority of Jesus'. For Fr Crehan, then, 'baptism in the name of Jesus' is 'baptism with the faith that Jesus is Lord' and this is the reason why Christians were called 'those who invoke the Name', cf Rom. x, 9. He has made out a very strong case, but we feel that he has somewhat oversimplified the matter and that there is more to be said for some texts showing a mystical inclusion in Christ, for example by the parallelism of I Cor. vi, 11, where Christians are washed and sanctified 'in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and in the Spirit of our God', and by that of Rom. vi, 3, 'into Christ Jesus . . . into his death'.

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Fr Crehan's fascinating thesis, followed up with great learning through early patristic evidence, is that this confession of faith in Christ, sufficient in the earliest period, led to the grouping of 'facts about Christ' in a short formula to make a Christ-creed. About the middle of the second century, to meet the danger of Marcionite views, the mention of God the Father was added. The prominence given to the Church around the second half of the century, together with the challenge of Montanism, brought into the Creed the 'facts about the Holy Ghost', namely that he hallows the Church, forgives sins and is the pledge of immortality. Meanwhile the growth of legal ideas in the Church, part of her universal inheritance, led to interrogations being substituted for the candidate's profession of faith. Among the Appendices of this book is an especially valuable one upon the correct reading of John 1, 3-4, which concludes from 'the inner structure of the text, the earliest orthodox comments thereupon and the weight of tradition in the days before Nicaea' that verse 4 is to be interpreted of the supernatural activity of the Logos quickening all mankind, and should begin 'That which was made, was life in him'.

DOM RALPH RUSSELL.

The Epistle to Diognetus. Edited by Henry G. Meecham. Pp. xii + 165 (Manchester University Press) 18s.

THE present edition of what is in some ways a most attractive piece of early Christian apologetics is a thorough and satisfying work of scholarship. The editor, the Principal of Hartley Victoria College and Lecturer in New Testament in the University of Manchester, has printed F. X. Funk's Greek text of the *Epistle* with some slight variations (an *apparatus criticus* is given) and has provided a translation, a long and valuable introduction of 73 pages with what looks like a very complete bibliography, and full and illuminating notes. There is much in the introduction and the additional notes which will be of interest not only to specialist students but to all who are interested in the thought of the early Christians; we may mention in particular Additional Note D on 'Guarded Tradition', an excellent summary of the important part played by tradition in Christian teaching from the very beginning which is an indication of the degree of agreement on the facts over a wide field which now exists between the best Catholic and the best Protestant scholarship.

The Epistle to Diognetus is not perhaps a work of major importance for our understanding of the Christian thought of the second century

(to which it probably belongs), though our evidence is so scanty that any contemporary document is of value. The author of the first ten chapters seems to have been a simple and sincere Christian, not at all a profound thinker and with only a smattering of Hellenistic popular philosophy, but one who knew his St John and St Paul extremely well and had a great love of God the Father and of our Lord (the work of the Holy Spirit is not mentioned in the *Epistle*; it is one of the most curious features of its rather incomplete and undeveloped theology). The Christology of these chapters is of a simple and primitive kind, somewhat Subordinationist in language but not unorthodox, and pointing forward to later developments, especially in what is said in chap. ix about the Atonement. The famous description of the Christians in chapp. v and vi is certainly attractive: but the strictly polemical part of the *Epistle* is less satisfactory. The author has no understanding whatever of the point of view of the educated pagan and treats the subject of idolatry superficially and unconvincingly along the lines of conventional Jewish apologetic (which of course owes a good deal to the Greek philosophers' criticisms of the popular religion): and he dismisses the philosophers in a few lines of abuse based on information obviously acquired from some popular lecture or doxographic handbook (chap. viii). His attitude to Judaism, too, is unrelievedly hostile and uncomprehending, and quite incompatible with the true Christian tradition.

The last two chapters, with their strong sense of the Church, their suggestion of a Christology like that of Hippolytus, and their elaborate symbolism, are clearly by a different author. The present editor is inclined to accept the view of Dom Hugh Connolly that these chapters are by Hippolytus himself. A. H. ARMSTRONG.

Thomas d'Aquin by St M. Gillet, O.P., titular Archbishop of Nicea and formerly Master General of the Dominicans. Pp. 282 (Dunod, Paris) 360 frs.

IT has been very properly observed by the reviewer of this book in *La Vie Spirituelle* that a presentation of St Thomas's achievement in this readable form is possible only to a scholar who is steeped in his subject. Mgr Gillet is certainly very easy to read for those who have an acquaintance with Thomism. And those who have not will find in this book an authoritative account of the principal Thomist positions which relates them at every point with the problems of the day; whether they will be convinced of the truth of all these positions, unless they are already in sympathy

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with them, is more doubtful. For the author dismisses some difficulties in a very casual manner (the scope of his book dictating this treatment), and says nothing at all about a great many others. Indeed it must be confessed that the *tone* of the book, despite its apologetic pre-occupations, is condescending rather than conciliatory, and often merely denunciatory. The evils which Mgr Gillet denounces are (for the most part) flagrant enough; but he does not seem likely to gain much of a hearing among the unconverted who are put off by an unfamiliar approach and by an *ex cathedra* manner. This is a pity, for he has a gift for lucid and effective exposition and makes many excellent comments and applications.

The shelving of difficulties is most noticeable in the strictly metaphysical part of the book, but it would be impossible to discuss these matters usefully in the space of a review. It seems better to give a brief illustration of both merits and demerits by referring only to the final chapter. In this we have an admirable account of St Thomas's views on education in which the need for a synthesis of the intelligence, the will and the sensibility is effectively urged; and in this connexion there is a passage on the nature and function of the liturgy which deserves all praise. But this is followed by a further insistence on St Thomas's 'originality in introducing reason into theology so as to make of the latter a science in the service of Revelation', a claim which has a perfectly acceptable sense but which is constantly made (it is the *leit-motiv* of the book) in so unqualified a way as to leave on the mind of the unwary reader a most unfortunate impression about St Thomas's precursors. It is true that a few pages have been devoted at the outset to St Augustine's position, but the conclusion that his theology cannot be called 'scientific' is, without further explanation, misleading. In so far as theology is not a merely scientific (in the sense of discursive) process, St Augustine was right to be 'unscientific', some of his defenders would say, and Thomism was wrong. And on the last page of the book we are told, in effect, that the only decent course for theologians, in our present disturbed times, is to sink their differences and unite—apparently under the banner of the strict Thomist observance.

DOM ILLTYD TRETHOWAN.

Contemplations—Essays presented to the Glasgow Chapter of Dominican Tertiaries on the occasion of their Silver Jubilee. Pp. ix + 68 (Blackfriars Publications) 7s. 6d.

BESIDES the note of achievement, of thankfulness for what has already been done, this small volume of essays strikes a note of promise. Small though it is, the English Dominican province (including the four Scots contributors to this volume) has won a notable status for itself in intellectual circles, and these essays give assurance that its status will be well maintained. Fr Ivo Thomas on *The Logical Square* is a model of logical precision; from him we may expect a fundamental work on logic, semantics, and their relation to theology. Fr Anthony Ross writes on *The Glasgow Blackfriars of the Middle Ages* with a disciplined reverence which excites our desire to hear from him the full story of the Scottish Dominicans. In Fr Drostan Maclaren's interpretation of St Thomas's teaching on property we have a sane guide for this highly complex subject. But perhaps the most interesting contribution for readers of this REVIEW is found in Fr Ian Hislop's clear exposition of why St Thomas rejected St Anselm's Ontological argument (or the 'onotological' argument if the wicked printers insist upon their page headings !)

From the scrupulous fairness with which Fr Ian lists the points of debate, as well as from his essays in other places, one sees clearly how his devotion to St Thomas only leads him to a deeper appreciation of other thinkers; that he has a strong sympathy for the 'Augustinian' as well as the 'Aristotelian' tradition is beyond doubt. Therefore the following brief notes are intended as a response to his invitation to meditate upon this tantalizing theme.

Fr Ian reaches to the roots of the disagreement between St Thomas and St Anselm in the last few lines of his essay when he says, 'St Thomas and St Anselm part company because they have different theories of knowledge'. Those few words, it seems, might be taken as the basis for discussion between those who defend strict Thomism and those who, with all reverence for St Thomas, cannot admit that Thomism achieved that entirely successful absorption of Aristotelianism into Christianity which is often claimed for it.

This discussion might be initiated from three different bases. Firstly, imbued with a sharp concern for precise meanings, one could examine in detail the implications of the Aristotelian-Thomist view that 'the proper object of the human intellect is the quiddities

of material things'. Is it, for instance, a mistake to speak as though an 'intellect' were the subject in the act of knowing? St Thomas, it is true, says that it is neither the 'intellect' nor the 'senses' which know, but 'man through both'; but the ease with which the 'intellect' becomes hypostatized is painfully apparent in many 'Thomist' theses. The subject of the act of knowing is always, in fact, a person. And its object? 'The quiddities of material things', says the Thomist—an answer to which it is not easy to attach any precise significance because of the many ambiguities concealed in the question which it answers, i.e. 'What is x ? or y ? or z ? etc.' Some of the ambiguities in this question have recently been revealed in Robinson's book on 'Definition'; more would be revealed in the course of discussion. Without some such preliminary excision of superfluities little profit is to be derived by anyone.

The second angle of approach would be to examine the process by which, between St Anselm and St Thomas, philosophy was granted autonomy, because (as Père Audet, O.P. has recently shown in '*Etienne Gilson, Philosophe de la Chrétienté*') the relations between theology and philosophy, between faith and natural reason, are the key to the differences between St Anselm and St Thomas. Was it not, once more, a process of hypostatization? Philosophy received autonomy at the same time as it was given existence (false hypostatization); in fact, there is no such existent as 'philosophy'—there *are* philosophers, whether Christian or anti-Christian, good or bad. The question, in other words, as to whether *philosophy* is independent of theology cannot be answered, because it asks a pseudo-question. On the other hand, to ask whether certain philosophers were, or were not, influenced by Christian teachers, is intelligent. An intelligent reply can be given.

The third way would be to re-examine the objections to St Thomas's teaching which were made in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Tempier maintained that Christianity was being paganized through Aristotle, and it would be worth while to try to determine the justice or injustice of these objections in the light of subsequent thought. In other words, if 'the proper object of the human intellect is the quiddities of material things', how can it ever know anything else?—and, most crucial of all, how can it come to know the Divine Essence in the Beatific Vision?

Such would appear to be the three most promising approaches to the very thorny question which Fr Ian has left his readers to tackle.

Turning from these compressed allusions to the promise it holds

out and towards the note of achievement in *Contemplations*, one finds a delightful sketch of Fr Vincent McNabb by Fr Bernard Delany, and an equally attractive and simple picture of Bl. Martin Porres by Fr Giles Black. Fr Tindal Atkinson on *The Little Office* and Fr Terence Netherway on *The Rosary* provide traditional Dominican nourishment for the spirit. But in some ways the most impressive contribution comes from a Dominican Tertiary. This is the completely unpretentious sketch of the Glasgow Tertiary Chapter by Brother Thomas McGoldrick. Reminiscent of the spirituality of the Order's first beginnings in the thirteenth century, it proves, without trying to prove, that the life of prayer is being lived as intensely as ever by humble souls unregarded by the world. Of one dead brother, Brother Thomas says:

'Married and with a family to support, and living in the lean, workless years of the '30's in the Lanarkshire coalfield, he was invariably cheerful, thankful for his daily bread, and always ready to help others when he could. He was so devoted to prayer that he sometimes spent the whole nights in church in prayer. (This was learned from a curate in St Anne's at the time.) That, and similar things carefully hidden by him, came to be known by a few. Knowing that he was dying he thanked all who had attended him, instructed his wife to send word to his Brethren in Glasgow to come and dress him in the Habit for burial, and very willingly died.'

While there are such men, the Word of God is being heard wherever they move, whether in Lanarkshire or the Gorbals, whether preaching by their words or by their silence.

DONALD NICHOLL.

Etude sur les Sacramentaires romains. Première partie: Les textes primitifs, by the Abbé Emmanuel Bourque (Studi di Antichità Cristiana: pubblicati per cura del Pontificio Istituto di Archeologia Cristiana, XX, Rome, 1948) Pp. xiv + 400. n.p.

THIS extensive work, by a professor at Laval University, Quebec, appeared in 1949; it was the fruit of long and minute research, begun in Rome itself, completed in the early days of the war (1940). Though, since then, ten years have passed, it will long remain a work of the first importance for all that concerns the Roman Sacramentaries. It is a systematic and apparently exhaustive study of the origin and development of the Sacramentary. Not only is there reference to all that has been written on this immense subject, but the substance of the positions held by earlier writers has been reproduced and examined afresh.

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Simply as regards documentation, the book provides a collection up to the present unparalleled, and for this reason alone is essential to the conscientious student.

The author first considers the euchological activity of the first four centuries and the earliest attempts at *Libri missarum*. Then comes a long and detailed study of the 'so-called Leonine Sacramentary' (pp. 63-169), of the Gelasian (pp. 170-298), and of the ancient Gregorian (pp. 299-391).

M. Bourque has deserved high praise. I do not think one could point to a single question, whether general or particular, that has not been set out and examined with all the care one could desire; and it goes without saying that the questions are numerous and many of them of capital importance.

The author's method is the historical, so successfully employed by Mgr Duchesne. Rigorously applied, it guarantees the solidity of his general conclusions. As regards the Leonine, one may say there is a strongly marked tendency to treat that work as somewhat suspect, almost as an offender; at any rate, the author cannot be accused of an excessive tenderness towards it. All the same, the sifting to which all the texts contained in that ancient collection have been submitted has been a perfectly fair one; and the conclusion does not seem exaggerated '... the great bulk of the formularies are later than 440, and more than half later than 500' (p. 144).

I wonder, however, if the historical method is the only one that should be used when dealing with what are above all literary texts. For these texts were written by some one or more authors, who could not fail to leave on their work the imprint of the personality, the special literary endowments and so on, that were theirs. And it happens that since the very time when M. Bourque brought his work to a close (1940) another method has been applied by more recent students to this question of the compilers of the three Sacramentaries, a method which, taken as a whole, may be called philological. In fact, since 1940, the use of this method has disclosed with certainty the presence in the Leonine of complete formularies written by Pope St Gelasius (A.D. 492-96), and in the Gregorian of a certain number undoubtedly the work of St Gregory the Great (A.D. 595-604). Indeed M. Bourque, at the time when he brought his vast researches to an end, was not without a presentiment and a hope that internal criticism of the text, when carried further, would prove the authorship of these Popes beyond a doubt (p. 391).

I am perfectly sure that, while the historical method remains strictly indispensable as a basis of inquiry, the methods of philology and internal criticism are more decisive in this sphere, and that they will very shortly allow M. Bourque's labours, already important enough, to be brought to perfection.

Meanwhile this study should be read and meditated by all students of the origins of Roman euchology. I earnestly hope that we shall soon see the two volumes which form the second part (Gelasians of the eighth century, the 'Hadrianum', Alcuin's supplement, the later mixed Gregorian Sacramentaries) and which will be provided with all the necessary detailed tables.

LOUIS BROU, O.S.B.

Saint Francis of Assisi, a biography by Omer Englebert, translated and edited by Edward Hutton. Pp. 352 (Burns Oates and Washbourne) 16s.

SINCE the outstanding lives by Joergensen and Cuthbert—the finest of all, Sabatier's, was tendentious and distorted by an unreal opposition between prophetic and priestly religion—the sources of Franciscan biography have been more thoroughly studied and important manuscripts have been discovered. There was therefore room for a new life of St Francis employing the most recently discovered documents and taking account of the assured or most probable results of research. Such is the present life by the Abbé Englebert. Unfortunately it is and must remain impossible to draw a clear line of demarcation between historical fact and legendary embroideries.

Even if a biographer were to confine himself to the episodes recognized by Mr Moorman as the reminiscences of Brother Leo and other companions of the Saint—though such a book would be well worth writing—his life would rest on the obviously fallible judgement of a single investigator. The present biographer is content to retell the generally accepted story with its inevitable blend of fact and legend—but always with reference to his source. In the cases of the wolf at Gubbio and the Portiuncula indulgence he discusses the evidence.

As regards the latter, in our opinion certainty is impossible. The Abbé Englebert's conclusion that St Francis did obtain the indulgence has to face a difficulty greater than the lack of early evidence, namely the apparent incompatibility of such a request with the Saint's strong objections to seeking favours from the Holy See. On the other hand the declaration by Blessed Benedict of

Arezzo (that Brother Masseo told him that he was present when Pope Honorius granted the indulgence) is weighty evidence in its favour. Whether by the author's or translator's oversight the note on p. 184 calls those who reject the authenticity its 'defenders', those who accept it defenders of 'the opposite thesis'. The Abbé discusses the delicate question of St Francis's chastity before his conversion and concludes that he had not always been chaste. Though certainty cannot be reached, the evidence as he states it strongly suggests the contrary. The original wording of the hymn:

Plus suis nutritoribus

Se gessit insolenter

implies surely not unchaste but riotous conduct.

The reception of the stigmata is insufficiently treated. The fact, it is true, is certain. But the further question should have been discussed whether the stigmata were strictly miraculous or the natural effect of a divine action upon the soul of the recipient. The bibliography does not mention Fr Thurston's studies of stigmatization and of St Francis's in particular. We do not understand how the Abbé can say that 'the history of mystical phenomena offers nothing similar'. Since St Francis a very considerable number of women have been stigmatized, and in our own day another man, an Italian friar, a fact which can hardly be unknown to the writer. Elsewhere, indeed, reference is made to the invisible stigmata of St Catherine. Moreover, since the latter are commemorated in the Dominican Order by a feast on 1st April, it is scarcely accurate to speak of the Feast of 17th September as a unique privilege of St Francis, though the author perhaps means that this is the only feast of the kind in the calendar of the universal Church. The Carmelites keep a feast to celebrate a similar phenomenon, the transverberation of St Theresa's heart.

Though, as we have said, it is impossible to distinguish with any certainty between fact and legend, and even the late Fioretti incorporate reminiscences handed down from the Saint's companions, we do not think that the stories of Brother Juniper should have been told as on the same footing of certainty as the stories of the Saint which have come to us from several sources. Perhaps however the reviewer's scepticism has been unduly influenced by the story of Brother Juniper and the pig's trotter. Every other notice that has come down to us of St Francis's attitude to animals shows him as their friend and protector. In this one instance he is represented as approving an act of gross cruelty, the mutilation of a living pig. It is not easy to reconcile this with his normal conduct, and

we may at least be permitted the hope that the story is untrue, though we cannot exclude the possibility that on this occasion compassion for a sick friar blinded the Saint to the unnecessary cruelty to the pig. We regret that we are not allowed to read 'how Francis cured a cruel pig', according to Moorman a genuine Leonine reminiscence.

On the quality of this life it is not easy to speak. It is substantially reliable, and is abreast of the most recent research. We learn, for example, the family to which St Clare belonged and that Pietro Bernardone was dead by 1215. The life is free from any serious fault. Nor can any truthful life of such a Saint as Francis lack the value and interest of the subject itself. But the present work is without positive qualities. The treatment is conventional. The biographer is not content to let his hero speak for himself, but keeps on, as it were, plucking the reader's sleeve to insist on his holiness. This is particularly true of the preface, which is in fact the least satisfactory portion of the book.

The translation is often too verbal, insufficiently stripping the sense to reclothe it in English idiom. For example, the use of 'vestments' for a layman's clothes (p. 60), 'desolated' instead of disconsolate, no doubt to translate 'désolé' (p. 149) and 'I was standing in this city' for 'I was staying' (p. 248). In the preface this literalism is at its worst, worsening what was already badly written ('And, O prodigy, recognizing herself in this ingenuous interpreter nature puts off for him her reserve and hostility').

In his introduction Mr Hutton seems, not unnaturally, torn between sympathy for the Franciscan ideal and respect for the decision of the Church that it could not be imposed on the Order. But he also points out what was the ultimate and, as he says, should have been the original solution, two allied but distinct bodies, the strict observants and the majority from whom that observance could not be exacted. On the other hand, we cannot agree that St Francis alone of the Saints dared to take our Lord literally. It would be difficult to exceed the poverty of such men as St Antony of Egypt or St Benedict Joseph Labre. Moreover, neither Mr Hutton nor the author seems to have perceived that the rule of life which St Francis drew from the Gospel was given as the marching orders of a temporary mission and that our Lord himself had a purse. St Francis therefore was not 'a true imitator of Christ' when he 'execrated money' (p. 223). His was in fact a distinctive vocation to which he and a comparatively small group of disciples were called by God but which could not be the rule of a large Order.

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It is interesting to know that the deed of gift of La Verna by Count Orlando has come to light. But we should like to know how it could be made to the Friars so early as 1214, when St Francis refused to regard their hermitages as their property and the final solution, ownership by the Holy See, had not yet been found.

We do not understand what there could be to condemn in St Clare's spiritual elopement and St Francis' assistance in it (p. 142). She had every right to embrace the religious life.

To speak of a catechism in the Middle Ages is an anachronism. Catechisms were first introduced in the sixteenth century as a counterblast to the catechisms which from Luther's catechism onwards had been one of the most powerful Protestant weapons. Sabatier, we think, was not a pastor, but a layman.

Reviewing recently Karrer's Franciscan anthology, we said that in his Testament St Francis ordered that a heretical friar should be handed over to the Inquisition. The complete text here given shows that he is in fact to be handed over to the Cardinal Protector, Ugolino. Since, however, this was in effect to hand him over to the justice of the ecclesiastical authority, and since, moreover, Ugolino became the Pope who organized the Inquisition and for the first time prescribed the death penalty, the mistake was immaterial.

Vie des Saints et des Bienheureux by the Benedictine Fathers of Paris. Vol. VIII, August. Pp. 640 (Letouzey et Ané, Paris) 700 frs.

HERE is another excellent volume critical, interesting, never officiously edifying. It is particularly valuable because its corresponding volume in Attwater-Butler has cut down very drastically the minor saints of the month. Naturally Gallican and French Saints have a prominent place and their lives are told at length when the sources allow. Such are Victricius, Radegund, Sidonius Apollinaris, Cæsarius of Arles, Syagrius. Philibert, Ouen Herluin the founder of Bec, St Bernard, St Louis, and in more recent times St John Eudes, St Jane Chantal, Jeanne Elizabeth Bichier des Ages, Jeanne Delanoue, Emile de Vialar and the Curé D'Ars.

The notice of St Mommolus, Abbot of Fleury, translates the oldest and substantially reliable account of the expedition sent from Fleury to bring back from the ruins of Monte Cassino the bodies of St Benedict and St Scholastica. In the course of these lives many interesting details are given, often unexpected. One is rather surprised to learn that St Alphonsus Liguori was most exacting

as to the print and format of his books and insisted that the paper must be good and white since this would attract purchasers. He ought surely to be made the patron of publishers.

It was interesting to read that Fr Cassien, the Franciscan missionary in Egypt, finally martyred in Abyssinia, introduced Coptic monks of the desert to Canfield's *Abrégé de toute la vie spirituelle à ce seul point de la volonté de Dieu* and the *Introduction à la vie spirituelle* by Père Joseph, Richelieu's mystical coadjutor, the Grey Eminence.

And there is a charming and revealing story about St Philip Benizi, the Servite General. Accosted by two prostitutes, he spoke gently to them and gave them what cash he had in hand, asking them in return to live chastely at least for three days. Then he turned to his friars and denounced the wealthy men whose avarice drove the poor into sin. Touched by his kindness, the women were converted and became the first Servite Nuns.

It was also surprising to discover that, as early as the sixth century, St Cæsarius of Arles, finding that the laity did not appreciate the Divine Office, made a selection of simpler Psalms for their use interspersed with hymns. This must be the earliest instance of extralitururgical public devotions.

Of the desert fathers we have Poemen, with a large selection from his apothegms, and Moses, a negro bandit who could devour an entire sheep, became a monk and was finally ordained priest.

No doubt the Saints whose lives are here told vary greatly in their types of sanctity. Sidonius Apollinaris, holy as he became, was never a John Vianney. But of the entire number in this volume only two seem to have been unworthily accorded the honours of sanctity by misplaced popular devotion. They are Swentibold of Lorraine, a tyrannical and brutal ruler, and Arigius, archbishop of Lyons, who undoubtedly worked hand in glove with the great but unscrupulous Brunhilda, and who stands suspect of contriving the murder of St Didier and kicking St Romaric when he came to court to ask for his rights. It seems unfortunate that the latter 'Saint' receives liturgical honours at Lyons on 11th August.

The account of St Hippolytus is that commonly accepted by modern scholarship to which Dom Connolly largely contributed. It was disquieting to learn from the note that this account has been recently questioned and that in the writer's opinion the matter has not been finally settled, so that although 'in default of fuller information' (from what source can we expect it?) he has followed the accepted view. He regards it as resting at several

points on a weak foundation. One had regarded these discoveries about St Hippolytus and his works as a flood of light on the history and liturgy of the Roman Church around the year 200. Certainly they present a consistent story, and moreover a consistent picture of the Saint's character, his conceited self-assurance and resentment against those who did not agree with him, confirmed by the Roman statue representing his paschal calculus.

On one or two points we think scepticism has been pushed too far. Surely the *Iumena* of the disarranged fragments found in 1802 must be restored as *Filumena*. It is difficult to think of any other name and the tiles have admittedly been placed in the wrong order to mark a second interment. We can therefore at least be certain that the original occupant of the *loculus* was called *Philumena*.

Nor can we think that the allusion to flames in St Damasus's inscription in the basilica of St Lawrence was inserted merely for versification. He must have believed that burning had been part at least of the Saint's martyrdom. And although we are convinced by the writer's demonstration of the unreliability of the *acta*, it is difficult to believe that if St Lawrence had been simply decapitated like the six other deacons of pope Sixtus he would have received the extraordinary cultus of which this life speaks at length, a vigil, twelve Masses in the Leonine sacramentary, more dedications in Rome than anyone except our Lord and his Mother. Surely there must have been some extraordinary circumstance about his martyrdom to account for this. It is, however, true that, as this author points out, the authentic *acta* of the Catanian martyr, St Euplus, here translated, have failed to give him the wide cultus extended to his compatriot, St Agatha, whose acts are legendary. But a suffering maiden is more calculated to excite popular devotion than a man who moreover insisted on giving himself up.

We confess that we were not edified to read that Cassian saw the Egyptian hermit, Chaeremon, walking on all fours like a baby. It savours of senility rather than sanctity. The conclusion of the notice of St Cyriacus, 8th August, concludes that there were two martyrs of that name besides the founder of the Roman title. The notice has, however, made it clear that there were only two Cyriacuses, the martyr buried on the Ostian way and the founder of the title. Another instance in this volume of the later canonization of a founder of a title is St Sabina. One is sorry to read how in the seventeenth century Spanish pressure practically forced on a reluctant Pope official recognition of the non-existent Martyrs of Cardena. The Life of St Roch is not wholly satisfactory. His

Legend is related at length, but with no attempt to sift what measure of truth there may be in it. It is an exaggeration to say that St Oswald of Northumbria became known throughout Europe. His cultus spread though the Low Countries and Germany. but he was hardly known in the Latin countries. A few slips must be noticed. The Shogun should not be confused with the Emperor of Japan (p. 353). At the epoch of the persecutions the latter was a *roi fainéant*. On p. 305 'Carolingian' is an obvious mistake for 'Merovingian'. Another slip is the date 406, assigned to the Council of Agde on p. 527. On p. 530 the correct date 506 is given. Innocent II (p. 285) should be Innocent VIII. It is misleading to say that King Henry III and the Barons accepted the arbitration of St Louis. For the latter refused to abide by the *mise* of Amiens. And Norfolk can hardly be called a south-eastern county.

In the notice of a Persian martyr, Hormisdas, the writer points out that he was named after the good God of Zoroastrian religion, Ahura Mazda. What then of Pope Saint Hormisdas whose feast belongs to the same month? How came it that a Roman Pope of the sixth century bore the name of Ahura Mazda? It suggests surely that, presumably owing to the Sassanian persecutions, there had been an influx of Christian refugees from Persia to Europe, and that the Pope was of Persian descent. Further evidence of a considerable immigration of displaced Persians is the fact, noticed in the July volume of this series (p. 539), that 'between the fifth and eighth centuries orientals brought many relics to Gaul' and in particular brought to Provence the relics and cultus of five Persian martyrs who were identified later with New Testament characters in the Provençal legend of St Mary Magdalen. These relations between Persian and Western Christianity deserve a special monograph, for they can hardly have been without influence on liturgy and sacred art.

E. I. WATKIN

Religion and the Rise of Western Culture by Christopher Dawson.
Pp. xvi + 286 (Sheed and Ward) 15s.

THAT a profound eclecticism lies behind European culture has long been accepted; the difficulty has always been to reconcile the various elements which make up the whole—for some of them appear almost self-contradictory—and to estimate the factors which ultimately were operative. For many years Mr Dawson has given himself to this examination and his second series of Gifford lectures here published is both an expansion

and a final summing-up of his conclusions. Religion, he has already shown us, is 'the dynamic element in culture'. In the present lectures his work has been to trace the various factors which have gone to make up European culture and to show how their enduring qualities have their source in religion, or in religious forms transmuting economic or social facts.

A work of synthesis is always an exacting task for any modern historian; for almost all modern academic historians have deeply rooted in their minds the concept that events, and the interpretation of events, rest upon the intrinsic potentialities of any given situation, potentialities which are both the cause and the interpretation of their own environment. To such thinkers deliberate human action can do little but either retard or accelerate a process rendered inevitable by the intrinsic nature of the 'movements' working in any given age. The popular modern historical catch-phrase 'the climate of opinion' symbolizes this outlook. The study of history is therefore to most modern historians but an examination or analysis of these movements or factors, and synthesis can do little more than range them in an ordered evolutionary whole.

It is the absence of this deterministic factor which makes Mr Dawson's historical writing at once so refreshing and so valuable. His history has a creative element; it is always looking outside itself to further, ultimate, ends which provide the real key to the meaning of events. It was the tragedy of the Renaissance that men tried to attain truth by the analysis of material causality rather than the quest for those final causes which alone can discover the real nature of the object to be interpreted.

There is no need here to follow Mr Dawson through his brilliant examination of the various elements which became the matter informed by religion or to retrace with him the processes by which Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Celtic, Scandinavian and Teutonic elements were transmuted into a civilization which, for the most part, accepted the positive and enduring elements of all. Nor need we trace the part played by institutions—especially by monasticism—in this absorption and rebirth; Mr Dawson has done this process for us with an almost unerring skill and penetration.

One of the most interesting and provocative sections of the book is that in which the author traces the origins of political liberty back to the constitution of the mediaeval 'free-city'. Unfortunately, nowhere does Mr Dawson define his concept of 'liberty' and, as far as I understand it, I gather that he sees political liberty

to lie in representative institutions and the absence of tyrannous control from without. Thus he regards the *commune* as 'one of the greatest social creations of the middle ages' and quotes with approval Troeltsch's statement that 'the mediaeval city was a pattern of Christian society as we find it in Thomist theory'.

I find it hard to accept these conclusions. In the first place the corporate character of the *commune*, though decked out with the notion of the organic unity of Christians and with its implications, interpreted this unity in the sense of a narrow esotericism. The corporate organism of the city of Pisa had as often as not nothing but enmity for, say, the corporate organism of the city of Genoa. Again, the political theory of the *commune* not seldom tended to base itself upon a false notion of the equality of human status which, being of its nature a *doctrinaire* theory in opposition to plain fact, resulted in perpetual internal conflict. Further, a concept of almost unlimited political and economic freedom was frequently taken to imply that what people wanted was what they should have—here one can only quote the words of the great English fifteenth century constitutional lawyer Sir John Fortescue who, stating that there must be limits to power, continues: 'It is no poiar to mowe aliene and put away, but it is poiar to mowe have and kepe to himself; as it is no poiar to . . . wex olde or that a man may hurte hym self'. Again, though it is true that the gild system did often represent a high ideal of corporate and religious solidarity, the fact remains that, at root, the gilds were nothing more than organizations of economic restriction designed for the protection of trade in an age of falling money-values. Few or no gilds are found in the early middle ages simply because it was an era of expanding commerce.

Representation, like all constitutional systems of checks, though often infused with religious and moral qualities, is at root a product not of ideals but of fear (though in England its origin was simply that of a convenient piece of governmental machinery for collecting taxes). It was too frequently mere fear—and economic fear at that—which produced the amazing systems of election to office in certain Italian cities; in some of them this was done simply by casting lots—a system termed by Mr Dawson 'supremely democratic'. Maybe; but at root surely a principle of plain anarchy. Indeed it is hard not to hear in the tumultuous voices of the mediaeval *communes* the rattle of the tumbrils of the French Revolution and those wild cries of the mob at Vienna in 1848 which Metternich termed with such biting sarcasm 'the voice of God'.

Mr Dawson has presented the liberty of the city-state as an expression of liberation from feudal tyranny; but I cannot join him in his assertion that the 'feudal system rested in the last resort on a foundation of serfdom'. Feudalism had two distinct stages. First there was a hieratic phase in which everyone had rights. It is useless in this phase to imagine the feudal castle as the oppression of the countryside; rather it was looked upon in the same way as we regard a police station as a symbol of law and order. True, the serfs had to work on certain days for no payment and were not free to move from place to place, but in return they had a security, a certainty of the means of livelihood and inalienable human rights which we cannot afford to-day to decry. Rather, it was the second stage in which feudalism changed from being a hieratic system into a stratified one which may well be the target for criticism. Here we have privilege without responsibility, and riches the passport to rule rather than the necessary instrument of it. It is surely wrong to judge a system by its ultimate development, a development which owed its origins to the fact, as Professor Postan has shown, that the serf was bound to enrich himself at the expense of his overlord whether land-values went up or down. One can quote here the recent statements of Professor Cam (by no means a historian of 'right-wing' views): ' . . . It would be as wrong to identify the monsters who "built castles and filled them with devils who tortured men"', with the average fendatory as it would be to identify a London police station with the local headquarters of the Gestapo . . . ' And again, ' . . . It is bastard feudalism, as it has been called, that is largely responsible for the bad character that the feudalism has acquired in the history books. . . . '

Finally, I would ask, if democratic principles of representation are part of the religious heritage and culture of Europe, why it is that these principles are totally other than those which Christ chose for the government of his church? It is curious that a system condemned so clearly by Plato and Aristotle, one which tends to a false equality—ultimately only to an equality in vulgarity, should be regarded as one of the heritages of the Middle Ages to our own. If it is, it is a *damnosa hereditas*, the bitter fruits of which have not even yet been wholly plucked.

If I have criticized one aspect of Mr Dawson's thought at some length, I should not like it to be considered that I do not regard this book as a most valuable, able and discerning study of European culture.

DOM AELRED WATKIN.

The Cocktail Party by T. S. Eliot. Pp. 168 (Faber and Faber) 10s. 6d.

MR ELIOT's new verse play gives fresh support to the view that Comedy is not incompatible with a serious purpose and that the difference between Tragedy and Comedy is one of degree not of kind. For here tragic and comic issues are carefully interwoven and directed to an end now familiar to us in all Mr Eliot's work—the discovery of the truth about ourselves through the painful acquisition of a saving humility and the unmasking of pretence and insincerity.

In one place in the play Mr Eliot illustrates a point by referring to the momentary bewilderment accompanying the discovery that there is one more step at the bottom of a staircase than had been expected. A kindred sensation is that of *not* finding a step one had expected: primed by one's memory of *Murder in the Cathedral* and *Family Reunion* one can bring to this play certain poetic expectations which are somewhat surprisingly unsatisfied. In the two preceding plays one was always aware that verse was the medium employed and perhaps the chief part of Mr Eliot's achievement lay in his power to use verse for both exalted and humdrum contexts. In this play, however, much of the verse devoted to trivial conversation is so flat that one can only wonder why verse is used and not prose: did not Mr Eliot himself once remark that if something can be as well expressed in prose as in verse then prose is the better medium? The play contains a number of passages in which the verse is distinguished alike for profundity and dramatic power, but the very vapidness of some of the conversation (rightly vapid, of course, because trivialities are dramatically relevant at these points) seems to demand prose. There are examples enough in Shakespeare's plays of poetic drama in which prose alternates with verse without diminishing the total poetic effect. These remarks, it should be borne in mind, are made by one who has not had the opportunity of either seeing the play on the stage or hearing it broadcast.

To find out things about oneself one shrinks from facing, and then to make a new start—that is the lesson which all the characters in need of it come to learn under the direction of a psychiatrist, and the unravelling of the intricate cross-relationships governing this discovery is one of the most interesting features of the play. With remarkable insight and skill Mr Eliot succeeds in showing how lives previously aimless and frustrated take on a new confidence born of the realization that life has now a meaning and a pattern

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and that by a solidarity in conversion those who before were blind and selfish can now assist others not yet enlightened. Under the stimulus of such a theme Mr Eliot's verse shows at times not only his former intuitive perception of the complexities of human values but also the clarity and emphasis which poetic drama specifically demands. The underlying thought is that which we have met in some degree in the *Quartets*, and it is the measure of Mr Eliot's versatility that at his best in this play he can find an adequate 'objective correlative' for themes so subtle and elusive. Sometimes, however, it is difficult not to feel that certain characters, who later prove to be confederates of the psychiatrist in his work of straightening out personal problems, give this assistance with a readiness and competence much more convenient than convincing. One may come to agree that Julia's garrulous curiosity about other people's affairs concealed all along shrewd concern for their welfare (though would even she so openly admit that the spectacles she conveniently leaves behind—she wants an excuse for returning—were without one lens?) but that Alex should prove to have such far-flung connexions enabling him to provide the most opportune openings for his friends seems suspiciously *ad hoc*.

In this play though there is no explicit provision for the choric commentaries on the inner meaning of the action which we find in *Murder in the Cathedral* and *Family Reunion* there is, however, a quasi-choric passage beginning on page 132 in which Reilly, Alex and Julia 'proceed to the libation' when the psychiatrist's consultations have ended. Here the modulation from the level of conversational comment to vatic benediction reads rather awkwardly and abruptly. On the stage, of course, the transition may cause less difficulty.

Apart from such rather adventitious manipulations, there is much to amuse and much to admire in the construction of the play. It both begins and ends under the aegis of a fictitious aunt, hastily invented by one of the characters whose wife has deserted him to account for her absence at the cocktail party, which in the flurry of her flight she had forgotten to cancel. Renewed reflexion reveals the intricate skill with which the train of events thus set in motion is developed through interwoven complications to a final solution. There are some critics who regard any concern of Mr Eliot's with Christian values as a betrayal of art for propaganda, but an unprejudiced approach will surely recognize the artistic tact and integrity with which certain principles of the spiritual life have been projected and organized in the play.

DOM HILARY STEUERT.

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The Concept of Deity by E. O. James, D.LITT., PH.D., D.D., F.S.A.
Pp. xiii + 187 (Hutchinson's University Library) 18s.

WE are told in the Preface, that this volume 'contains the substance of a part of the material collected for three courses of Wilde Lectures in Natural and Comparative Religion in the University of Oxford', and the author explains: 'by training, outlook and inclination I am myself primarily an anthropologist'. So we must not look for an elaborate metaphysical discussion in this book; the reader will find himself carried rapidly over a vast field, anthropological, philosophical, theological, and historical, which in a comparatively short space can be viewed only summarily. We start with a chapter, on the Primitive Conception of Providence, in which the idea of Providence is pointed to as the truly religious aspect of Deity: 'unless the High God is also the ever-present ground of creation upon whose support it depends at every moment of its existence, he fails to supply the most fundamental requirement in any effective conception of Deity'. Then, after a discussion of the worship of nature and oriental pantheism, there is a chapter on anthropomorphism and analogy. The references to the metaphysical side of this latter question are clear, but brief. Then follow chapters on monotheism and dualism, and after this a short account of the philosophy of theism, chiefly from the historical standpoint. The book deals finally with the more practical aspects of worship of God, and with the nature of divine revelation.

A few points may be mentioned which have struck the present reviewer. The philosophical chapter seems to suggest that the metaphysical questions concerning theism are to a large extent dependent on theories of physical science, but surely the metaphysical approach consists in an analysis of experience, which is independent of particular scientific theories. Again, is not the account given of the formation of the Gospels rather too dogmatic? Surely it must be agreed that there is a respectable body of expert opinion which places St Matthew's Gospel first? Then the discussion of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception seems unsatisfactory: the view we take will necessarily depend on our view of the Church; if the Church has continued divine guidance in its teaching we need not consider the evidence for a given doctrine merely on its own merits. At the same time it should be made clear that

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the Catholic will find the general approach of this book to its subject Christian and often entirely orthodox. Every reader may be assured of profit and enjoyment from a book which is undoubtedly learned and stimulating.

DOM MARK PONTIFEX.

Wulfstan's Prose—Sir Israel Gollancz Memorial Lecture, British Academy, 1948, by Angus McIntosh. Pp. 36 (London: Geoffrey Cumberlege) 8s.

THE Wulfstan whose prose rhythms are examined in this lecture was Bishop of London from 996 to 1002, when he was translated to Worcester and York. He held both these sees till 1016, when he relinquished that of Worcester, retaining the see of York till his death in 1023. Most of his life thus fell in troubled times in England, much of it in the reign of Ethelred, the so-called Unready, when the constant Danish invasions were having a demoralizing effect upon the population. His most famous work, the *Sermo Lupi ad Anglos*, which is in English, gives a vivid picture of the misfortunes of the age and the evils they brought in their train. It is of interest therefore, and may not generally be realized by those unfamiliar with Old English literature, that even at such a time we should find a highly self-conscious and developed literary technique.

Old English verse, in addition to the strict laws governing its alliteration, had of course its own special rhythms, but it is particularly in these later troubled times that there appear the highly technical prose-rhythms of Aelfric and Wulfstan. Professor McIntosh argues attractively that to this day ordinary spoken English has a natural predilection for a basic two-stress rhythm and that Wulfstan deliberately chose to compose in a succession of rhythmically rich variations on this basic two-stress theme. The interesting thing is that he should on occasion have taken the equally, though differently, rhythmic prose of Aelfric and re-modelled it according to his own ideas, though the process was admittedly brought about chiefly through his desire to expand the text.

Such an analysis as Professor McIntosh has made of Wulfstan's prose-rhythms is necessarily very technical, and it is obviously addressed to the small band of professed students of Old English literature; but apart from its value in helping to fix the canon of Wulfstan's works—a point which is not yet settled—it will interest the historian and the general reader as evidence for a very real culture in a period which otherwise does not seem to hold out much promise.

DOM GERARD SITWELL.

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Pfarre und Laie by Karl Lechner. Pp. 86 (Verlag Herder, Vienna,) S. 12.80.

HERE is a little book on the parish and its members which sets out, with many references to *Mediator Dei*, the duties of the laity in parochial work.

The parish is shown to be a miniature Mystical Body in which each person has his vital work to perform in unison with all other members, as a living cell in the human body works in conjunction with the whole. Men have their work in singing, serving and sacristy work; women in cleaning and mending and the care of the Church and vestments. There should be, as it were, concentric circles around the altar of members under the direction of laymen, who meet weekly to study the Mass, the liturgical year, the Old and New Testaments, and who find their fulfilment at sung Mass and corporate communion on Sunday. The unity of the parish shows itself in general participation in baptisms, first communions, and weddings, and is helped by a parish leaflet in which family news is published. Those with specialized knowledge should offer their services for the good of the community. Charity should not consist merely in giving money to charitable organizations, but in practical help given not only to the devout poor and sick, but to all, including the agnostic.

In short, this is the picture of a large family, with the members interested in each other's spiritual and temporal welfare, with the parish priest as the father of them all by their re-birth at baptism, and wherein each person as a member of the lay priesthood has a responsibility for his brethren.

In the average English parish such a spirit is much lacking, and in these days, when there is a shortage of priests, it would seem that it would not only help the parish priest in his work and enable him to concentrate on his priestly functions, but also foster vocations.

EMMI SHEPPARD.

The Spirit of God by C. C. Martindale, s.J. Pp. vii + 125 (Sheed and Ward) 7s. 6d.

SERMONS by Fr Martindale can be relied upon to be no insipid rehash of pulpit platitudes but a presentation of spiritual doctrine in a way which both brings out its meaning and shows its particular reference to present-day problems. This collection 'insists on the spiritual element in man; then, on the angelic world; and then on the Holy Spirit Himself, who alone can bring the otherwise dying world to life'.

DOM HILARY STEUERT.

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Affrontements Mystiques by Henri de Lubac, S.J. Pp. 215 (Editions du Témoinage Chrétien) n.p.

EVEN the occasional writings of a great theologian convey something of his general outlook, and these four essays should encourage readers to attempt P. de Lubac's better known and weightier works. The abundant references to contemporary writers will make a special appeal to the man of letters who is in close touch with the thought of his time. The first essay is a confrontation of 'the Christian idea of man' with the Marxist, the second deals with the modern attack upon religion conducted under the guise of what is unfortunately called 'anti-Semitism', and the third is an analysis of Nietzsche's tragedy; the last ('The Light of Christ') is the author's personal testimony. Running through the whole is the question of the relations between the temporal and the eternal, the tension between the pursuit of the *Unum necessarium* and the desire for 'incarnation' and 'animation universelle'. It seems fair to say that P. de Lubac is more concerned here with the dangers of a false emphasis on the former than with presenting it in its true theological setting.

Dictionnaire de Spiritualité—Fascicule XII (Communion fréquente—Connaissance de soi) Coll. 1265-1520. (Beauchesne) n.p.

REVIEWING the preceding *fascicule* a year ago, we expressed the hope that the series, started before the war, would now move rapidly to its completion; at the present rate it is going to take another twenty years. The only complete articles in the *fascicule* of any considerable size and theological importance are those on *Concupiscence* (by Fr Baumgartner, S.J.) and on *Confirmation en grace* (by Fr Gummersbach, S.J., and the general editor, Fr Marcel Viller, S.J.). It is not to be expected that they should offer any fresh solution of the thorny theological problems involved; but we may rely upon finding throughout this *Dictionnaire* an accurate and enlightening account of the present state of theological thought on the subjects treated.

DOM ILLTYD TRETHOWAN.

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The Spaniards in their History by Ramon Menéndez Pidal. Translated with a Prefatory Essay by Walter Starkie. Pp. 251 (Hollis and Carter) 16s.

WHETHER the foreigner has a deep knowledge or no knowledge at all of Spanish literature, he is almost certain to have very decided opinions on Spain and the Spaniards. At least this is true of the English-speaking world. And how evident it is to-day that we cannot be dispassionate about this country and this people. Yet this is not altogether surprising since the Spaniards themselves seem incapable of being dispassionate with regard to their own problems. Indeed, a dispassionate Spaniard would appear to be a contradiction in terms. The numerous essays they have written on the subject of the Spanish character have greatly added to the confusion in the minds of foreigners. For some generations now, we have been presented with the two Spains, one good and the other bad, and we have been forced to the conclusion that this must in fact be the case. We see Spain as a hopelessly divided country with the two sides constantly warring with each other. Naturally enough we wonder if there will ever be a solution to the problem, but clearly much can be done when once the Spaniard and the foreigner makes up their minds that the idea of the two Spains is misleading and only tends to perpetuate the strife. And it is precisely on this point that Menéndez Pidal is so insistent. As the translator says, we find here a 'passionate appeal for the eternal single Spain that exists deep down in the soul of every Spaniard: it is not one of the half Spains that will survive as a single party with the epitaph of the other party; it will be the complete Spain for whom so many have longed'.

The author is the acknowledged patriarch of Spanish humanism, and this essay which appeared in 1947 is the fruit of more than fifty years of historical research. It is immensely readable, and this is in no small measure due to the excellent translation. The essay can be read without any introduction, but the prefatory essay by Professor Starkie greatly adds to our appreciation of it by giving in considerable detail a description of the life work of scholarship which Menéndez Pidal has dedicated to the historical problems of his country.

DOM FRANCIS LITTLE.

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Durham Jurisdictional Peculiars by Frank Barlow. Pp. xviii + 164 (Oxford University Press, Geoffrey Cumberlege) 12s. 6d.

ECCLESIASTICAL franchises, like *ban-leuca* and other areas of peculiar jurisdiction, are always well worth study. The individual character of such jurisdiction, no single example serving to form the basis of generalization, has always a fascination of its own. Mr Barlow's study of the beginnings, growth and character of the peculiar jurisdictions belonging to the cathedral priory of Durham—extending as they do over areas rendered vivid to us by memories of Anglo-Saxon saints and the grey austerity of the Northern landscape—are of much more interest to us than any work of general character is usually likely to be. This study of the inter-play of forces operating locally has of course its implications in general history, and it is quite clear that the general conclusions reached by the author will have implications which cannot be disregarded by the ecclesiastical historian. The book is accurately written and conceived in an orderly manner; its only defect is perhaps—dare one say it?—its over-objective character, which makes it seem remote from the human experience which fashioned these institutions of the past.

England before Elizabeth by Helen Cam. Pp. xii + 184 (Hutchinson's Universal Library) 7s. 6d.

PROFESSOR CAM in this most readable book has taken as her thesis the essential continuity of English society and government through the centuries. It is an unusually interesting and stimulating work, and contains far more hard thinking and wide reading than its unpretentious appearance would at first suggest. On concluding it the reader is left with the question in his mind: 'Can we regard our modern way of life and thought as one directly evolved from institutions and ideals of past ages, or are we to consider that the English have a genius for retaining ancient forms and terminologies while revolutionizing entirely the character of their institutions?' Probably the answer to the question lies in a combination: there is an essential continuity in English ways of life and habits of thought, but on the other hand with regard to many elements—in particular representative institutions and religious dogma—there has clearly been a revolution disguised satisfactorily to the superficial observer by a careful retention of ancient terminology and systems of organization. Whatever view is taken no one can put down this book without having his intelligence sharpened—though whether we shall regard the English genius

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as essentially one which has the defects of its qualities or the qualities of its defects is a question which can be answered only at levels deeper than that of tracing evolutionary changes of opinion and habits of life, valuable though that is. 'Pseudo-antiquarians' (p. 15n) should of course be 'pseudo-antiquaries.'

DOM AELRED WATKIN.

Le Dieu de Sartre by H. Paissac. Pp. 158 (*Structures de notre temps*: Arthaud) 260 frs.

ANOTHER book in the series on various aspects of existence in the light of modern existentialism which is being produced by the Dominican House of Studies in Lyons. Fr Paissac discusses in it the reasons for Sartre's explicit and systematic rejection of God, and shows that this follows largely from his conception of human liberty. But God, in fact, is not the contradiction but the guarantee of human freedom, as appears in a discussion as to his true nature under the proper name *Hels*. And it is suggested that a really existentialist philosophy, from its very first experience of existence, will be theocentric.

DOM JOHN ROBERTS.

[ERRATUM. On p. 139 of the previous issue Karl Barth was described as a 'German Protestant'; we have been asked to state that he has never given up his Swiss nationality.—ED.]

COMMENTARY

ON GERMAN REVIEWS

Fr Edward Quinn writes :

The most interesting sign this year of the revival of Catholic theology in Germany is the appearance of the quarterly *Münchener Theologische Zeitschrift* (München 25, Lindenschmirstrasse 47 ; 14 D.M. p.a). It is edited by the members of the theological faculty at Munich, and its contributors are mainly professors in South Germany. Although its academic standards are high, there are always some articles of practical concern to the parish clergy and the educated laity, and most of them are written in a refreshing style without the ponderousness too often found in German theological and philosophical writing. Its aims are stated in the first number to be: 1, to provide information about the actual state of theological studies; 2, to contribute to the solution of current theological problems, and thus 3, to give a firm intellectual foundation to religious practice.

'The Kingdom of God and the Sacrament of Penance' is the title of an important article by Michael Schmaus in the first issue. Like other theological reformers, he brings the reader to a new appreciation of the traditional teaching and throws light on aspects that have been missed in the controversies of the past four centuries. We have rightly emphasized the secrecy of the Confessional, the priestly authority which still does not hinder the direct approach of the soul to God; but we have thus overlooked the Church's concern for the erring member. The priest is also the minister of the Church, reconciling the sinner with an offended community and removing the scandal it has suffered. None may know what passes between these two persons in the delicate colloquy which gives expression to the deepest problems of the spirit; but beyond the essential minimum there is need to render the sacramental sign more recognizable, to assure the rest of the faithful that their penitent brother may be readmitted to the common table. Dr Schmaus points out that just as the daily low Mass, fulfilling all essentials, is an irreducible minimum—the pontifical high Mass being the full form of the eucharistic celebration—so the present manner of administering the sacrament of Penance is a stunted form of the more solemn primitive rite.

This number also includes articles on the Vulgate version of the Canticle of Anna, on St John's account of the anointing at

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Bethania, and on the need of a Moral Theology which will be more than a commentary on the commandments or a description of virtues and vices—which will ‘examine thoroughly, clarify and present the data, the content, and the means of realization of Christian morality’.

The second number (March) is notable for an article by the ever-active and always challenging Hans Urs von Balthasar, on ‘The Theology of History’. The Incarnation does not mean simply that God’s Son accepts temporal conditions, nor even merely a new division of time: it means that time is dominated by this Fact, and all history must be interpreted in the light of it. We should not separate Christ’s life in time from his eternal life, as if these were utterly distinct (a little reflexion on the unity of his personality should prevent an over-facile distinction), but recognize ‘that it is precisely in time and in history that he has placed his eternal being to be most clearly and positively mirrored’. The distinction between profane and sacred history is for our convenience, it rests on no fundamental difference—not only in the sense that all history is under Divine Providence, but that the birth of Christ and all his acts were a submission to history and the ground of his rule over it, as his free acceptance of the Divine Will gained for him dominance over all creation. This is only the first instalment and some ten thousand words long; it is too rich and abounding in suggestive thought to make possible any adequate attempt at a summary. Something like it has been said before, but scarcely with the same power or with the same insistence.

In the same issue Georg Wunderle pleads for a greater interest in the spiritual life of ordinary people on the part of psychologists of religion. Altogether, this review is a most creditable production and we must be grateful for the efforts of the editorial board and the contributors under conditions that are still far from favourable.

From Freiburg im Breisgau (Karl Alber, 4 Johannerstrasse), comes a sumptuous new review of universal history, *Saeculum*. The contributors are mainly German, but there is one contribution in the first number from U.S.A.—George Vernadsky writes on ‘The Eurasian Nomads and their Art in the history of civilization’. The annual subscription (four issues) is 24 D.M.

BOOKS RECEIVED

ARCHABBEY PRESS (Latrobe, Penn):

Benedictine Contributions to Church Architecture (K. J. Conart) \$2.25.

AUBIER (Paris):

Histoire et Esprit—Intelligence de l'Écriture d'après Origène
(H. de Lubac, S.J.) n.p.

BEAUCHESNE (Paris):

Saint Paul: Les Épîtres Pastorales (tr. and ed. A. Boudou) n.p.

BENZIGER (Einsiedeln):

Heiliges Priestentum (J. Staudinger) D.M. 17.80.

BLACKWELL:

Handbook to Dante Studies (U. Cosmo; tr. D. Moore) 15s.

The Nature of the Universe (F. Hoyle) 5s.

BURNS OATES AND WASHBOURNE:

The Good Duchess of France (A. M. C. Forster) 8s. 6d.

The Sacristan's Manual (The Revd D. G. Murphy) 10s. 6d.

The Message of Thérèse of Lisieux (M. M. Philipon, O.P.; tr. E. J. Ross) 5s.

A History of Philosophy—Vol. II, Augustine to Scotus (F. Copleston, S.J.), 25s.

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA PRESS:

The Attitude of John Pecham Towards Monastic Houses Under His Jurisdiction (J. J. Smith, O.F.M.CONV.)

Valerio of Bierzo (Sr C. M. Aherne) n.p.

CLONMORE AND REYNOLDS:

More about Dom Marmion (tr. from the French by the Earl of Wicklow) 7s. 6d.

DACRE PRESS:

The Baptism of Art (W. Weidlé) 3s. 6d.

DESCLEE DE BROUWER (Paris):

Le Sacrifice du Corps Mystique (E. Masure) n.p.

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DENNIS DOBSON LTD:

Redemption of the Common Life (J. Wilson) 7d. 6d.

EDITIONS SPES (Paris):

Qu'est-ce qu'un Catholique ? (R. P. E. Delaye, s.J.) 300 frs.

EOS VERLAG (St Ottilien):

Das Christentum in Neuen Indien (T. O. Ohm) n.p.

FABER AND FABER:

Is God Evident ? (G. Heard) 12s. 6d.

HANSTEIN VERLAG (Bonn) :

Die Überlieferung (N. Monsel) D.M.8.50

HARRISON AND SONS:

The Psalter Collects (Dom A. Wilmart; ed. Dom L. Brou) Henry Bradshaw Society. n.p.

HARVILL PRESS:

Free Among the Dead (A. Marnau, tr. from German) 9s. 6d.

Journal in the Night (T. Haecker; tr. and ed. A. Dru) 12s. 6d.

HERDER (Vienna):

Novum Testamentum—Graece et Latine—Pars Secunda (ed. J. Vogels) D.M.7.

HODDER AND STOUGHTON:

Law, Liberty and Love (C. Cary-Elwes, O.S.B.; pref. Prof. A. J. Toynbee) 10s. 6d.

JOHN HOPKINS PRESS (London: Geoffrey Cumberlege):

The Reign of King John (S. Painter) 45s.

LONGMANS GREEN AND CO.:

Phoenix and Turtle (T. Gilby, O.P.) 16s.

Reginald Pole (W. Shenck) 15s.

Aquinas and Kant (G. Ardley) 18s.

LOUVAIN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY:

Indices Pseudo-Dionysiani (A. van der Daele) n.p.

BOOKS RECEIVED

MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY PRESS:

English Bishops' Chancelleries 1100-1250 (C. R. Cheney) 12s. 6d.

MULLER (F.):

Introduction to Kierkegaard (R. Jolivet; tr. W. H. Barber) 15s.

NEWMAN PRESS (Westminster, Maryland):

St Athanasius: The Life of St Antony (tr. and ed. R. T. Meyer)
\$2.50.

St Augustine: The Greatness of the Soul; The Teacher (tr. J. M. Colleran, C.S.S.R.) \$3.00

ODHAMS PRESS:

The Vatican (A. Carnahan) 12s. 6d.

PATERNOSTER PUBLICATIONS LTD.:

Catholic Schools and Colleges 2s. 6d.

PENNSYLVANIA UNIVERSITY PRESS (London: Geoffrey Cumberlege):

Gregory of Tours: Selections from the Minor Works (W. C. McDermott)
20s.

S.P.C.K.:

Henri Bremond (H. Hogarth) 13s. 6d.

St Ambrose on the Sacraments and on the Mysteries (tr. T. Thompson;
ed. and introd. J. H. Srawley) 10s. 6d.

STANBROOK ABBEY (Worcester):

The Religious Orders and Congregations of Great Britain and Ireland
(P. F. Anson) 12s. 6d.

UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME PRESS:

God and the World of Man (T. M. Hesburgh, C.S.C.) n.p.

The Christian Virtues (C. E. Sheedy, C.S.C.) n.p.

UPPSALA PUBLICATIONS (Wretmans Boktryckeri and Einar Munksgaard, Copenhagen):

Coniectanea Neotestamentica (III—XIII; 1938—1949).

Symbolae Biblicae Upsalienses (I—V; 1943—1945 and VIII—X;
1946—1948).

DOWNSIDE NEWS

ON April 16th we were honoured by a visit from His Eminence Cardinal Gilroy of Sydney. His Eminence wished his visit to be of a purely informal nature, a friendly gesture to a house which has been so intimately connected with the early history of Australian Catholicism. He said Mass the next morning at the High Altar and resumed his journey in the afternoon.

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We are glad to report that Abbot Kendal, after being confined to his bed for some time, is now about again as usual.

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Dom Francis Little has been appointed Choirmaster in succession to Dom Alphege Shebbeare, who is retiring in his seventy-fifth year. Dom Alphege's long connexion with Downside music will not be entirely ended, for he will continue to help us at the organ.

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Benet House, Cambridge, which has been closed for some years as a result of the war, is to reopen in October, when Dom Mark Pontifex will resume his charge of it. As previously, a number of the younger monks will be reading there for their degrees.

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The School Literary Society, under the direction of Dom Hilary Steuert, is to be congratulated on achieving last term, at short notice and in the face of exceptional difficulties, a performance of T. S. Eliot's *Murder in the Cathedral* at which the subtleties of the verse were rendered with conspicuous clarity and the acting in some cases reached a very high level.

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M. J. L. Hickling and G. M. Young have passed into the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst.

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The breakdown of the School train in a snowstorm on the first day of the Summer Term seems an event worthy of record. But it was not caused by the snow (nor by the passengers): two engines proved insufficient to pull the eleven coaches up the Maesbury gradient, and a third had to be summoned from Bath.

DOWNSIDE NEWS

On April 11th a Downside party, thirty-three in number, including senior boys from the School, Old Gregorians and their families, made a Holy Year pilgrimage to Rome under the leadership of Dom Vincent Cavanagh. A rough channel crossing was followed by a breakdown on the French railway system, but the party was sufficiently intact to make its way to St Peter's on reaching Rome early on the 13th. Each day in Rome was begun with a pilgrimage Mass, on four occasions at Major Basilicas, followed by the prescribed prayers for the Jubilee Indulgence. The only expedition made from Rome was, it need hardly be said, to Subiaco by way of Frascati. What calls chiefly perhaps for congratulation is the party's achievement in not only obtaining a ticket for a tribune in St Peter's for a Papal Audience but penetrating the enormous crowd to this coveted position.

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Recently *The Times* said of Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick's appointment as United Kingdom High Commissioner in Germany: 'The selection of Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick to join Mr McCloy and M. François Poncet was obvious. His experience in German affairs is unique among British officials.

In the years immediately before the last war Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick was head of the Chancery under two Ambassadors to Germany, Sir Eric Phipps and Sir Neville Henderson. (At that time the French Ambassador was M. François Poncet.) He interpreted for Mr Neville Chamberlain at the Godesberg and Munich conferences with Hitler. He was officially deputed to identify and interview Rudolph Hess when the Führer's deputy flew to Scotland in 1941. During the war he was seconded to the Ministry of Information as director of the foreign division, and later to the B.B.C. as Controller of European services. He organized the British section of the Allied Control Council for Germany, but remained at the Foreign Office when its headquarters were transferred to Berlin. In 1948 he succeeded Sir William Strang as Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the German section of the Foreign Office'.

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C. J. Hamson, Reader in Comparative Law in the University of Cambridge, has contributed recently to *The Times* a series of articles under the heading 'Prosecutor and Accused'.

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W. A. Morrison was ordained priest by the Bishop of Gravelbourg in Ottawa on April 14th for the Canadian Province of the Order

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of Preachers. His probable destination is Japan, and he has been learning the language for some time.

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D. A. French-Mullen was ordained priest at the Lateran Basilica on Holy Saturday. He has been studying at the Collegio Beda.

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P. R. Baker has been elected President of the Catholic Society in the University of St Andrew's.

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Six months ago a forestry expert was asked to report on our trees, and advised that the elm avenue should be felled, since only two of the trees were sound. This has now been done, leaving the beeches near the main School gate and the copper beeches on one side of the drive. The elms were found to be in a very bad condition, and it is surprising that they survived the recent gale which cost us three of the big beeches in the Green Lane. It is proposed to plant a lime avenue next autumn in place of the elms. One of them had grown round and entirely concealed an iron hurdle, the last relic of the palings which once stretched along the drive to keep in the cattle.

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The old novices' tennis court, where turkeys were reared in recent years, has now been made into a garden lawn. Beech hedges have been set on three sides and three species of magnolia planted.

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As a result of the establishment of Sellafield as a station for atomic research there has been a considerable increase in the population of Dom William Tate's parish of Egremont in Cumberland. A Curate, who lives in one of the Camps, has been assigned to him by the Bishop and this may well prove to be the nucleus of a fresh parish.

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A contract has been signed for the rebuilding of St Mary's, Highfield Street, Liverpool, and work will soon be begun on the site. An article entitled 'The Burning of St Mary's' was published in this REVIEW in April, 1942. As the mother-parish of Liverpool, St Mary's is held in special affection by the Catholics of Lancashire, and the completion of the new church will be eagerly anticipated.